

A LOOK OVER THE MICROHISTORY: THE FILIPESCU BOYARS FROM DRAJNA, PRAHOVA COUNTY*

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Rezumat. Pentru o microistorie: Boierii Filipescu din Drajna, județul Prahova

Lucrarea de față are ca subiect istoricul familiei Filipescu, din localitatea Drajna, județul Prahova. Motivul alegerii noastre a fost acela al redescoperirii unei familii boierești într-un spațiu care s-a considerat a fi exclusiv apanajul moșnenilor.

Marile familii boierești care au trăit în zonă, Filipescu, Bălăceanu, Macovei etc., au exercitat o puternică influență asupra locuitorilor, faptele lor rămânând în memoria colectivă a supușilor.

Am folosit în cercetarea noastră instrumente ale istoriei orale, precum interviul și fotografia, iar în ansamblul holistic al științei istorice lucrarea se poate încadra în domeniul istoriei locale. Am încercat să surprindem aspecte asupra impactului social pe care l-au avut boierii asupra comunității, atât pozitive, cât și negative.

*În alcătuirea lucrării, am folosit surse primare, așa cum este manuscrisul urmașului familiei Filipescu, Dumitru Kretzulescu-Warhiadi, inginer agronom, deținătorul unei colecții impresionante de documente, care ulterior au fost donate Arhivelor Statului. De asemenea, am consultat și o serie de surse editate, cum sunt colecțiile de documente ale lui Nicolae Iorga și ale lui Dumitru I Brezeanu Teișani, **Documente de pe Valea Teleajenului**. Lucrările generale și cele speciale au contribuit la elaborarea acestei scrieri și au întregit sinteza noastră.*

Abstract. A Look over the Microhistory: the Filipescu Boyars from Drajna, Prahova County

This paperwork shows a piece of history regarding a boyar family, Filipescu, from Drajna, Prahova County. The reason of our choice was that we need to rediscover the past of our aristocrats in a region that was considered to be the attribute of the free peasants.

The aristocratic families that lived in this area, Filipescu, Balaceanu, Macovei etc. had a great influence on the inhabitants, their deeds being remembered by their vassals.

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We have used in our research, instruments of oral history, such as the interview and the photography, and regarding the field of interest, this paper-work can be integrated in the area of local history. We tried to show how influential the boyars were in the community, taking into consideration both positive and negative aspects.

*For this study, we have used primary sources, the manuscript of a descendant of the Filipescu family, Dumitru Kretzulescu-Warhiadi, agricultural engineer, the holder of an impressive collection of documents. We have also seen secondary sources, for example the volumes of Nicolae Iorga and Dumitru I. Brezeanu Teisani, **Documents from the Teleajen Valley**.*

Résumé. Pour une micro-histoire: les boyards Filipescu de Drajna, le département de Prahova

Ce travail est l'histoire de la famille Filipescu de Drajna, Prahova County. La raison de notre choix était que de redécouvrir une famille de boyards dans une zone qui a été considéré comme l'apanage des tenanciers.

Les grandes familles nobles qui vivaient dans la région, Filipescu, Bălăceanu, Macovei, etc., ont exercé une forte influence sur les gens, leurs œuvres restent dans la mémoire collective des sujets.

Nous avons utilisé dans notre recherche, instruments d'histoire orale tels que l'entrevue et la photographie et la science holistique à travers l'histoire, les travaux peuvent tomber dans l'histoire locale. J'ai essayé de surprendre les questions d'impact social que j'avais sur les propriétaires fonciers de la communauté, à la fois positif et négatif.

*Dans la recherche, nous avons utilisé des sources primaires comme manuscrit écrit par l'héritier de la famille Filipescu, Dumitru Kretzulescu-Warhiadi, agronome, titulaire d'impressionnantes collections de documents, qui ont ensuite été donnés aux Archives d'Etat. J'ai également consulté un certain nombre de sources éditées, comme les collections de documents de Nicolae Iorga et Dumitru Brezeanu Teisani, **Documents sur la Vallée du Teleajen**. Travaux générale et spéciale ont contribué au développement de l'écriture et ont fait l'ensemble de notre synthèse.*

Keywords: boyars, Filipescu family, aristocratic families, Teleajen Valley, Romanian Principalities, Drajna

Introduction

The word *boyar* had many interpretations over the time. Constantin Giurescu expanded the notion for the entire class of landowners. The exegesis of the great historian appeared because he studied medieval judicial documents, in which the swearers, the free peasants, no matter how much land they owned, were named boyars. Those peasants could have had the statute of a boyar, but

their right was passed only due to this privilege¹.

Giurescu's remark dealt with criticism, because he considered that there was not a great difference between the great aristocrats and the small ones in the Romanian territory. P. P. Panaitescu considered that the property of boyars from the sixteenth century was very large and the servants worked it, meanwhile the small property was worked only by its owner or owners².

I. C. Filitti, another Romanian historian, brought other theory towards this aspect, but he sustained Giurescu's theory. He considered that Wallachia did not have a strong blood aristocracy, comparing to the one existing in the Western states. In those areas, the nobleman was someone who demonstrated he had at least two blood ancestors, were swordsman, entitled and married only within the same social class.

Many other Romanian historians have theories about our aristocracy. Stefan S. Gorovei gave a definition in this way: "the boyars were a social class which held the most important role in the Romanian society in the Middle Age... a social class that can be defined through the free ownership of a land, in the virtue and based upon a document given by the lord (place called "the estate's dam")³.

We have also consulted the books of professor Ioan Aurel Pop and we agree with his opinion about the beginning of our aristocracy, in which he sees a group detached from the rural community with allogeneic elements taken from Pecheneg people, Slavic and Cuman people. In this way, the frontrunners were about to form a local feudality at the end of Romanian people and language's birth. This feudality evolved in the interior of the Romanian pre-state formations and it continued to exist even after the integration of Transylvania in the Hungarian Kingdom. However, these gentry had been replaced with feudal that contributed to the unification of the state and helped the ruler: the boyars in Wallachia and Moldavia and the nobility in Transylvania⁴.

¹ C. Giurescu, *Studii de istorie socială. Despre vechimea rumâniei în Țara Românească și legătura lui Mihai Viteazul. Despre boieri. Despre rumâni* [Studies of Social History. The Beginning of Wallachian Enslavement of the Peasants and the Land Binging of Michael the Great. Considerations about boyars and about enslaved peasants], București, Editura Universul S. A., 1943, pp. 227-349.

² P. P. Panaitescu, *Interpretări românești. Studii de istorie economică și socială* [Romanian Interpretations. Studies of Economical and Social History], București, Editura Enciclopedică, pp. 30-65.

³ Ștefan S. Gorovei, *Clanuri, familii, autorități, puteri (Moldova, secolele XV-XVIII)* [Clans, Families, Authorities, Powers (Moldovia, XV-XVIII Centuries)], in „Arhiva Genealogică”, I (VI), 1994, vol. 1-2, p. 87.

⁴ Ioan Aurel Pop, *Naștunea română medievală* [Medieval Romanian Nation], București, Editura Enciclopedica, 1998, p. 195-196.

Pop also considers that the most powerful connection that had created larger unities in the Middle Age, was the report of the vassalage. The difference between kings and their nobles did not act as a type but as a degree⁵.

Regarding foreign historiography, the article of David D. Hamlin, "*We sind wir? Orientalism, Gendere and War in the German Encounter with Romania*"⁶ debates these aspects of the Romanian social classes, through the eyes of some foreign travellers. They wrote their memories and gave a general view over the way Romania had been evolving in the nineteenth century, from the backwardness orientalism, to the technological advance that characterizes the Western worlds. One of the observers, Karl Braun, considered that there is a connection between Romanian aristocracy and the fear for Turkish raids, as a consequence was the way the Romanian boyar ladies lived – an example of oriental intolerance, as a whole class. Moreover, Braun impression was that modern Romania was created by the elites who took contact with the ideas of the West- European way of life.

Hamlin's study explains the way Romanian elites were confronted with the market economy in full expansion in the Western Europe. Starting with the Adrianople Treaty (1829), Romania developed an international market, especially for agricultural products, becoming the fourth great exporter of those products in the nineteenth century. This aspect brought wealth to the elites of landowners and much more connection with the Western world⁷.

Almost all the children of boyars went to study in Western countries which reinforced the relations between the Western countries. The Romanian landowners were getting rapidly enriched due to the domains they had and to the peasants class more and more exploited and impoverished. The rental system provided that one part was given to the peasants in exchange for a free work to the landlord's domain which fostered the quick enrichment of the new elite. The system limited the possibilities of the peasants to obtain incomes from other sources. Hamlin talks about a neo-feudal system, through the persistence of the feudal domination relations in the forms of modern capitalism.

The foreign observers considered the Romanian poverty was caused by the Ottoman influence. Even if the Turks did not rule the Romanian Principalities, as in the South-East European countries, the pauperization of population caused by taxes was obvious. The condition of Romanian aristocracy did not change, the

⁵ Idem, *Geneza medievală a națiunii moderne [The Medieval Genesis of Modern Nation]*, București, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1998, p. 62.

⁶ David D. Hamlin, *We sind wir? Orientalism, Gendere and War in the German Encounter with Romania*, in „German History”, 2010, Vol. 28, nr. 4, pp. 424-452.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 428-430.

boyars still kept their privileged status, which prevented Romania from becoming a country of peasants like Serbia and Bulgaria.

Hans Kraus⁸ explained, in the same article, the way Romanians successfully adapted to the greedy necessities of the Sultan's servants. For example, the great boyars needed to speak Greek language in day-to-day life, while Romanian language was spoken only by the peasants and servants. In that era, the boyars were under the influence of Byzantium and they evolved from simple landowners to an aristocracy of the robe occupying positions in administration and enriching even more due to exemption. Those boyars, the exempted ones, became a caste that considered that the personal interest is more powerful than the national one. The Ottoman domination and the boyars' mentality destroyed the boyar's ambition of efficient work and let them inert to the nature's treasures. This state of fact was a reality when King Carol came to Romania.

Another observer, Karl E. Franzos, considered the connection between Romanian people and Turks very deep, but destructive for Romanians' folk culture. This aspect made Romanians vulnerable in front of Western influence, totally different from the background they had until then. Even if our boyars or their children travelled to the Western countries, it was not enough to solve the problems of shapes without substance. In this way, the boyars were civilized from the outside, but in the inside, they were very ignorant, while the servants did not modify their structure for centuries. That tragic condition was the result of the profound laziness, in Franzos opinion, which made the peasants to work just "as much as he did not to starve". Our peasants worked the land; brought the everyday bread but he left all the worries to his wife. Moreover, Franzos had a particular interest for the Romanian women and considered them victims and funders of the society. Many of them, the majority, were uneducated and underestimated since their childhood. In Romania, the woman was the slave of her husband because marriage crushed any joy of live. In what concerns the dominant class, the status of woman had alterations: the life of the boyar's lady resembled the one from the harem at the beginning of the nineteenth century but the feminine elites became emancipated, fashionable like the French women at the end of the same century⁹.

In this article, Hamlin suggests the fact that, in a very large sense, giving other examples of German authors, Romania was modernized thanks to the German role that King Carol had in transforming the country from a state under foreign authority to a respectful country, with a similar structure as the

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 431.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 432-433.

Western ones¹⁰.

We have also worked with the tools of the microhistory, meaning that we work with a group of semi-anonymous people, the free peasants' community from a region in Romania. But those people are interconnected with a family of ennobled members, the Filipescu, the subject of our study. All microhistory works try to find something general from that micro-aspect, because it is important to create cases that help to generalize a reality. An important study that helped us to reflect over the microhistory tools is that of Dennis A. Frey, Jr., *Wealth, Consumerism and Culture among the Artisans of Göppingen, Dynamism and Tradition in an Eighteenth-Century Hometown*.¹¹ Thanks to the documents of the inventories made by the Handwerker (the artisans), the author could establish the stages of development for this little society. In what concerns our work, the great era for the Filipescu family was considered to be the mid of the XVIIIth century, until the late of the XIXth century. It was also a great help to see how inventories can be considered the focus of a work and we follow the method for the fixture made by Dumitru Kretzulescu – Warthiadi in his manuscript. Dennis A. Frey took into consideration the analysis of the welfare among artisans and he searched the economical evolution of the Göppingen region. Due to this article, we also explained the evolution of the Filipescu family's lands from the founder to nowadays.

In time, the status of the boyars did not represent the privilege of the ancient families, the beginning of professional boyars started in the middle of the nineteenth century. The rules put into practice, persons without brilliant origins, and in the Phanariot era, the ranks were bought, becoming, like in the West, honorary. In this context, the role of the Filipescu family had an important status in the community and their acts were often considered rapacious and unfair by the free peasants. For this aspect, we looked over another article *The Tirolean Aristocracy in 1567*, written by M. A. Chisholm where we found another perspective over the aristocratic families from a region¹². The event presented by the author was the refining of 23 families in XVIth century. It was believed that Tirol didn't have a true aristocracy and he wanted to show this was a false hypothesis. He explained how the Habsburg grew the power of the existing aristocrats, most of them great soldiers. The reason was the power of this local

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 433.

¹¹ Dennis A. Frey Jr., *Wealth, Consumerism, and Culture among the Artisans of Göppingen: Dynamism and Tradition in an Eighteenth-Century Hometown*, in "Central European History", 2013, Vol. 46, no. 4, pp 741-778; <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9220558&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0008938914000028>, accessed on May 2015.

¹² M. A. Chisholm, *The Tirolean Aristocracy in 1567*, in "Austrian History Yearbook", 2009, Vol. 40, pp. 3-27.

chiefs in every aspect of the Tyrolean province: politics, religion, financial and military because they were part of the local government. Every Habsburg emperor needed their influence and for that he gave them great influence. In our article, we have shown the roots of the Filipescu family, in the person of Radu from Candesti and Constantin Filipescu The Captain, both great soldiers, ennobled by two lords: Matei Basarab and Serban Cantacuzino.

Another aspect that I took into consideration when I made the research was the oral history. In this way, I found the impression of the old people concerning the notion of boyar. It was considered in the area that I study that there were a large number of aristocrats. In fact, those were free peasants who did not pay any taxes but that benefited from a series of free fees and had, in this way, a privileged status. In this way, the phrase "it was the boyar's son", does not have the value given by the scientific truth. The common people understood the boyars only as a free-tax notion and a high level of life better than the majority had.

Historical information about Drajna

Regarding the history of Drajna, we have the Teleajen River which bounds the western part of Drajna. From its source, in the Ciucas Mountain, to the river's mouth, in Prahova River, the Teleajen water has 113 km length. This valley was also called "a carts road", because the word *teleajen* has a Slavic origin, from *telega*, which means carts, chariots. Almost all the places from this valley had a free peasant structure. Afterwards, in the middle of free peasants' community, the great boyars have infiltrated but also the monastery's superiors. They took a large number of the free peasants' lands and the reasons were numerous: properties of the sellers who were in difficulty because of the illnesses and debts, critical situations, which determined the abandonment of lands, like the riots, the plague etc. or the abuses of the boyars¹³.

Drajna, a village from Prahova County, has antiques origins, on its territory it was discovered a Roman camp that is still researched by archaeologists. The majority of medieval inhabitants of Drajna came from Transylvania. As a consequence, an Upper Drajna was created, a place where foreigners lived, and a Down Drajna, where natives lived¹⁴.

In this way, the entire Saac County, the administrative unit in the eighteenth century, had a mixed component between natives and Romanian

¹³ Nicolae Costea Teleajen, *Drajna și Ogretin, sate de moșneni. Monografie [Drajna and Ogretin, free peasants villages. Monographical Study]*, Ploiești, Editura Printeuro, 2005, p. 81.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 81-106

refugees from Transylvania because of the abuses of the Hungarian noblemen and the Austrian conquerors.

In what concerns the social component of Drajna, it was formed from Upper Drajna, Down Drajna, Ungurelu Hamlet, Ogretin and Poiana Mierlei in 1831. In what concerns the population of the same year, we found that in Upper Drajna there were 75 families and in Down Drajna, 237¹⁵.

Genealogy, history, observations

The beginning of Filipescu family in Drajna had to do with Radu from Candesti and Patarlagele, chief of the ruler's stables and the herald of Matei Basarab in Transylvania in 1647, killed by Mihnea III in 1659. Radu built in Candesti stronghold houses and a beautiful church, but he was attracted by Drajna's landscapes so he built here a fortress with four towers. The fortress was besieged by the Turkish troops of Pasvan-Oglu and the ruins were demolished by general Lahovary, the first husband of Elena Kretzulescu, the owner of Drajna at the end of the nineteenth century. Radu considerably expanded the Drajna domain buying three more villages (Upper Drajna, Cerasiu and Slon) his ownership being confirmed by Wallachia rulers' Matei Basarab and Constantin Serban¹⁶.

Radu died in 1659 and because he did not have masculine children, he left the domain to his daughter, Rada, who married Constantin Filipescu Margineanul, great captain well-known chronicle.

The origins of the Filipescu family were linked to the great boyar Draghici, the governor from Margineni (1540) and his son Udriste whose boy, Filip, gave the name of the land which is situated on the banks of Prahova River, between Floresti and Margineni. Pana Filipescu, another great boyar of Wallachia, who lived somewhere by 1650, during the reign of Matei the Voivode, built the mansion from Filipestii de Targ. Constantin Filipescu the Captain, the son of Pana wrote "The Histories of Wallachia's Rulers" dated between the ruler of Radu Negru and Serban Cantacuzino¹⁷.

Constantin Filipescu became landlord of Drajna and Serban Cantacuzino gave him a document which revealed that he was the only owner. Constantin Filipescu was also a great diplomat, his uncle, the ruler Serban Cantacuzino gave

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

¹⁶ Dumitru Kretzulescu-Warhiadi, *Istoricul castelului din Drajna, a regiunii înconjurătoare și a familiei care-l stăpânește de peste 300 de ani*, 1957 – 1959 + foto, Arhiva INP, Dosar DMI (Direcția Monumentelor Istorice) [The History of Drajna Castle, of the surrounding area and the family that owns it for over 300 years, 1957 – 1959 + foto, INP Archive, HMD Files (Historical Monuments Direction)], No. 4504, p. 15.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

him a mission in 1680 to go to the Prince Mihai I Apaffy of Transylvania. Until his death in 1696, Constantin Filipescu bought many lands near Drajna, enlarging his domain. The same things did Rada, his wife and for that, she had disputes with the boyars from the neighbourhood. To calm the spirits, the ruler, Constantin Brancoveanu, created a comitee to see who is right.

After the death of Captain Filipescu, his three sons were still underaged and their mother, Rada, continued the Captain's work, absorbing the lands and enlarging the domain, and the limit was Buzau County. The boyar's lady fought on every aspect too and, for that, she had trouble with the free peasants' community because she entered their lands¹⁸.

For almost four centuries, Drajna village was ruled by old, authentic families: the two descendent-in-law: Dumitru from Ipotesti and Neagoe from Patarlagele, the first one was Great Steward and the other one Great Governor of Mihai Viteazul, the ruler from the sixteenth century. In this way, we see the link with Filipescu family from Margineni who gave, in the seventeenth century a great chronicle-Constantin Margineanul Filipescu, The Captain and also the Governor of Craiova Pana Filipescu.

In this way, we see that, in what concerns the genealogy, Filipescu family from Drajna has a common antecessor, the Great Steward Radu, landlord in the seventeenth century. His daughter, Rada, married Contantin Filipescu, also a nobleman. Even if they were not members of Basarabs, the ruling family, Filipescu had had a great domain formed by several villages: Drajna, Teisani, Cerasu, Magurele and others, each of the members trying to expand the domain even more. In 1702, a surveyor document of twelve boyars limited the Fllipescu domain in a way that satisfied everyone, because the landlord did not want any disputes¹⁹.

Another document, dated a little earlier than the precedent, presents how Filipescu family had "issues" with the free peasants from Drajna. The ruler, Constantin Brancoveanu, was asked to make surveyors documents between Rada Filipescu and the free peasants and the ruler Grigore Ghica was asked the same thing because the situation turned to be difficult. So, the disposal was that a commission formed by twelve surveyors' boyars to measure the lands from Valenii de Munte, Drajna and Stanesti. The ruler mentioned in his disposal: "go and search and choose all the arts from the lands the Great Administrator from Stanesti and Drajna had, and what percent of the land bought him in Ogretin. But we want all the landowners and surveyors boyars to be present in front of us."²⁰

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁹ O.D.I. Brezeanu, *Teişanii - vatră străveche de moşneni* [Teisanii - ancient village of the free peasants], Bucureşti, f. e., 1991, p. 69.

²⁰ N. Costea Teleajen, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

Filipescu continued to make purchases. Nicolae Filipescu is a model in this way because he bought a mill and a place from a pub in Drajna de Jos from “Radu Pinteau and Ilie and all of his brothers”. On 10th of July 1813, Zmaranda Filipescu bought from “father Mihai and his brother Tudor from Ogretin the fourth part of Tataru’s Mountain”.²¹

Another case of selling the land, this time compelled, was the case of Stan Duduci from Teisani whose property was sold by the community because he tried to get away from the army (there was a riot in the country). When he came back, the man was forced to accept the deal, especially because the buyer, Andrei the Merchant, gave him 35 dollars, besides the first 52 dollars the community gave him, to finish the document²². But, the deal wasn’t satisfactory for Constantin Filipescu. The merchant’s lands were too close to his domain. In the end, he convinced the merchant to sell in change, a mill, bought from the free peasants of Teisani, which Filipescu renovated and that still exists.

We observe that the purchase of lands represented a powerful wish for the Filipescu family and nothing could stop from fulfilling it. But, at the same time, the family donated lands to the monasteries giving documents in this way. For example, in 1720, Grigore Filipescu donated the Monastery of Valenii de Munte, a large part from Homoraciu-Ungureni and the document from 1729 proves this.

In what concerns the condition of the people from Drajna and the neighbourhood, the majority of those living in Upper Drajna and Ogretin were free peasants and those from Bottom Drajna, Catunul and Rancezi were servants. The land reform for the last ones was made in the first half of the XIXth century with 1312 acres of Maria Filipescu’s lands²³.



The mill Filipescu family restored in the eighteenth century

More information about this family gives us a descendant of them, Dumitru-Kretzulescu Warthiadi, a doctor in Agronomy. He made a paper work about the family’s lands and the castle of Drajna, *The History of Drajna Castle, the*

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

²² O.D.I. Brezeanu-Teisani, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

²³ N. Costea Teleajen, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

Outdoor Area and the Family that Rules It for over 300 Years. The manuscript presents many elements from the life of this family who gives us the impression that the author worked with his family's original documents. He was also a well-read person because he gave examples from the works of great historians, such as N. Iorga, B. Iorgulescu, Gh. Sincai etc. The reason for writing this work was to transform the castle that the family owned and the communists nationalized, from an agro technical farm into something more hygienic: a hospital. Thanks to the manuscript, in 1958, the castle's use was changed.

The legacy: the mill, the castle and the church

The memories of Warthiadi are very useful because, nowadays, the constructions have modified their structure and we need to imagine them in the glorious age. We have already talked about the mill and its owners. In what concerns the castle, it was originally built by the Great Chancellor Alexandru N. Filipescu, a man with a great culture, who studied in Sorbone. The architecture was eclectic, in the Romanian buildings spirit. The castle and the neighborhood were also described by Vaillant in his book *La Roumanie*. The traveler visited the area, did not find boyar Alexandru at home but he was encountered by his secretary, the Frenchman Jean Colson. The meeting was a delight for Vaillant, finding in our country a compatriot and he described the castle very accurate, the yard and the landscapes were unique for him.

The description of the castle continues until 1957 when the manuscript was written and the author mentioned his personal attachment to the construction. More than that, he explained the importance of the castle with a little story. One day, two merchants were crossing our country by train, one Romanian, and the other, French. They were near Drajna, when the French, very proud by his country, worshipped it in any possible way and confessed that Romania did not have anything worthily to admire. After its monologue, the Romanian guy showed the French the magnificent castle and also the landscape near it. The French felt embarrassed and apologized because he was judgemental.

The tour of the castle starts with the description of the main entrance which is situated in the North and where it was an armoury chamber. Vaillant was describing it by saying that there were spears, antiques halberds etc. From this room, the visitor entered a poolroom and then other rooms prepared for the guests. There is also an exit that led to the terraces of the valley. A lobby, linked to the servants' rooms, the kitchen, and the pantry with the rich cellar.



Armory Chamber

In the drawing-room, the valuable paintings enriched the room which had massive armchairs and a sumptuous piano and that entertained the boyars in the evening. This room has a balcony where it can be seen an extraordinary landscape with the Teleajen Valley.²⁴

The *fumoir* (smoking room) was decorated in Oriental style, with walls full of Turkish yataghans and all kind of arabesques, Kashmir shawls, velvet, armchairs and mirrors with the Sultan's signature. All around there were sofas with big pillows, and on the windows the curtains were from a Constantinople mosque.



The drawing-room



The Fumoir

The castle, with its magnificence, became hard to keep up, especially in the winter and it was only a summerhouse or a guesthouse and a museum for well-known people like N. Iorga, Em. Bucuta etc.²⁵

In the photos, I revealed some aspects of the castle in its contemporary form. In the '90s, the castle and the other properties were given back to the descendants of the family, precisely to Ms. Elena Aldea Filipescu who let the sanatorium to function.

²⁴ Dumitru Kretzulescu-Warhiadi, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

In winter, the family lived in the “small house”. Easier to maintain, the house was cool in the summer and warm in the winter, built in the old Romanian architecture with rock foundation and brick walls, from tree-stumps and an enormous roof.



The castle from the exterior



*The main entrance, the former
Armoury Chamber*



The balcony from the tower



*The winter mansion
or The “small house”*

The structure of the building was practical with a 10 meters lobby, surrounded by newer libraries different from the ones from the castle, tables from massive oak-tree, armchairs and all around there were entrances in other rooms, to the parents’ bedroom, to the children’ rooms, guests etc. The Northern part of the house was ministered by the staff, with kitchens, pantries etc. The big windows had a huge effect when it



"Saint Alexander" Church

The church had a tomb and the frescoes were painted by Vintilescu. The iconostasis was carved by Alexandru. Father Ilie, the priest of this church for over 40 years, told us that the old men told him stories about the unusual activities that Alexandru had as a boyar. He was handy and he liked technical inventions. More than that, we found out from father Ilie, a good keeper of oral history, that Alexandru brought with him "a small saw, a little chisel or other objects for his passion" whenever he returned from his travels.

In the manuscript, we found a story brought to light by Constantin Gane in *Passed lives of miss and missis*. Panaiot Ghica, the wealthy son of Grigore Ghica, the ruler, wanted badly to marry Sultana, the daughter of the Great Administrator Rosetti. His mother did not want Sultana, so the couple ran away to Drajna, to Uncle Alexandru and they got married in his church. After the event, the parents found out about it and they went to the metropolitan bishop to cancel the wedding.



From the left side: Elena, Dumitru Kretzulescu-Warhiadi and Maria Filipescu



From the left side: Pana, Alexander and Nicolae Filipescu

The frescoes of the founders offer us an image about the boyars' faces, males or females.

In what concerns the personality of Alexander, we found out it was powerful and in the same time sensitive. His face had a big scar because he fought a bear that he killed after a tight fight as the old men to whom we talked, remembered. His sensitiveness appeared in his carvings, especially the iconostasis he created for the church. Also, he loved horses and for a stallion, he would give a mountain, Mihaila's Mountain which was situated near the border to Transylvania. Despising all dignities and administrative affairs, he preferred the silence and the view of Drajna where he had intellectual occupations or he was just ruling the domain.

Alexandru liked innovations, so he bought a machine that produced electricity and the peasants said "it brought sparks like thunder".

When he came back from France, where he went to study, he brought Colson with him, who became close friend, administrator and secretary.



*The Iconostasis made by
Alexander Filipescu*

In what concerns his personal life, Alexandru was married to Profira Racutti. She was at her second marriage and from her first marriage with Racutti, she had a daughter, Elena. This daughter married Constantin Zossima, who had Greek origins with whom she had eight children.

From Profira's marriage with Alexandru, she had a daughter, Maria, a restless figure, resembling a lot his father's character. She was unfearful, a great rider she could tame even the most restive horses. When she returned to Drajna, she used to fire three

shotguns to announce her arrival. It was this personality that made Alexandru to marry her young with the wiser and older Constantin Kretzulescu. More than that, his father did not leave her in his will the castle and the domain on Drajna, but to "the child she will have". Six months after the marriage, Maria gave birth to a daughter, Elena, Warthiadi's mother, in France where she left with her

husband.²⁶ An open character, a fashionable person, Maria entered the French high-life, where she became a favourite of empress Eugenia and her husband, the emperor Napoleon III. The emperor badly wanted to baptize her daughter in Catholic Church and to name her Blanche, which he did. But, when she returned home, because her father died, Maria baptized her daughter again, this time in the Orthodox Church, naming her Elena. The Great Chancellor Alexandru died in December 1856 aged almost 70.

There is a legend about Maria, who does not appear in Warthiadi's work, but in the memory of Drajna's people. Many years it was thought that Maria had an affair with the French emperor, and the result of their love was Elena, whom the emperor wanted to baptize. Warthiadi mentioned about the fact that Maria was close to Napoleon III, but he said Maria gave birth only six months after the marriage, in France.. We don't really know all the details, but Kretzulescu, who was old and without any descendants did not want a scandal, so he recognized Elena as his only daughter.

The paper-work of Warthiadi is, of course, subjective and made from a personal point of view but extremely valuable because he describes private details, showing us pictures with the interiors of the constructions. The manuscript had a specific purpose, to change the destination of the castle in a way that wouldn't affect the buildings. Warthiadi accomplished his purpose and the castle became, from an agro- technique farm, a sanatorium.

Conclusions

The boyar families, in general, are difficult to define because the word has changed its meaning over the centuries. Even if the Romanians did not have an old nobility like the one that existed in Western Europe, this does not diminish the importance of our ruling class. It's a reality that the Greeks influenced and changed dramatically Romanian perspective over the nobility, because the structure was shaken from its roots. Of course, Romanians have a natural sense of adaptation, which is a great quality, and they created their own realities, in a way they resisted until the late nineteenth century.

It's a certain fact that we had different categories of boyars in our Principalities and, the one we had presented knew the glory of the high dignities but did not influence the destiny of the Romanian policy. The Filipescu family gave powerful descendants, men of their times, as in the case of Alexandru "Fox" Filipescu, the participant in the Revolution of Tudor Vladimirescu, Nicolae Filipescu, the Tory leader and many others. But many of the successors preferred

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

the quiet life of the province, where they enjoyed the beauties of life, like Alexandru Filipescu, the Great Chancellor.

The document we revealed, the manuscript of Warthiadi has not been exposed until now, even if there were researchers who referred to it. We found it important because it describes aspects of private life, focusing on photos.

In what concerns the alterity, oral history helped us a lot because the old people's memoirs give us a new perspective over this family. Of course, the fingerprint Filipescu left in the collective memoir of the people from the Teleajen Valley was important, especially because the links between the simple people and the aristocrats were rarely good and peaceful. But, it is nonetheless true that the family we had presented, had tried to improve the life of the community, and it's still valid nowadays because the last successor did not change the use of the castle, so the sanatorium is still functional.

**ОСОБЕННОСТИ СОЦИАЛЬНОЙ ИНТЕГРАЦИИ
В «СВЕТСКОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО» БУКОВИНЫ
(1848-1914)**

**CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION
INTO BUKOVINIAN «HIGH SOCIETY»
(1848-1914)**

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**Rezumat: Caracteristici ale integrării sociale în «societatea înaltă»
bucovineană (1848-1914)**

Articolul tratează problematica legăturilor și raporturilor sociale în clasele conducătoare ale societății bucovinene din perioada administrației imperiale austriece (1848-1914), analizând canalele și criteriile de integrare socială în societatea elitară. Analiza autoarei conduce la concluzia că acest tip de societate și-a extins cadrele (limitele) de integrare, datorită consolidării în Bucovina celei de a doua jumătăți a secolului XIX a clasei mijlocii (burgheze) educate, cu elemente atât autohtone, cât și alogene.

**Abstract: Characteristics of Social Integration into Bukovinian «high society»
(1848 - 1914)**

The article deals with the issue of the social ties and relations among the ruling classes of Bukovinian society during the Austrian imperial administration (1848 - 1914), analysing the channels and criteria of social integration into an elitist society. The author's analysis leads to the conclusion that this type of society has expanded its frameworks (limits) of integration, due to consolidation of the educated middle-class (bourgeois), with elements both autochthones, and allogenes, in Bukovina in the second half of the nineteenth century.

**Résumé: Traits de l'intégration sociale dans la «haute société» de Bucovine
(1848-1914)**

L'article ci-joint traite la question des liaisons et des rapports sociaux au milieu des classes dirigeantes de la société bucovinienne pendant l'administration impériale autrichienne (1848-1914), tout en analysant les canaux et les critères d'intégration sociale dans la société élitare. L'analyse de l'auteur mène à la conclusion que ce type de société élargit ses cadres (limites) d'intégration, grâce au renforcement dans la Bucovine de la

seconde moitié du XIX-ème siècle de la classe moyenne (bourgeoise) éduquée, avec des éléments autochtones, mais aussi allogènes.

Keywords: «high society», Austrian Empire, Bukovina, symbolic capital, habitus, bourgeoisie, public life, social mobility.

ВВЕДЕНИЕ

С присоединением в 1775 году к Австрийской империи Буковина попадает под влияние немецкой культуры. Вследствие социокультурной модернизации, главным образом в городах Буковины, во второй половине XIX – первой половине XX в. произошел переход от гомогенного архаического порядка к модели культурной идентичности с Центрально-Восточной Европой. Внешняя сторона этой идентичности проявлялась прежде всего в самопрезентации и различных формах общественной жизни представителей высших слоев населения Буковины, что представляло собой т.н. «светское общество», которое, исходя из особенностей края, имело полиэтнический характер. Как отмечает в своих воспоминаниях писатель Г. Дроздовский, средством сближения наций «на уровне публичного общения» на Буковине выступали «танцы, игра в тарок и бридж»¹.

Целью исследования является анализ особенностей формирования современного элитарного сообщества на территории Буковины в рамках его публичных проявлений и габитуса в период после «весны народов» до начала Первой мировой войны.

Повседневная жизнь элитарных групп населения уже давно является предметом исследования социальной истории в Австрии и странах, земли которых входили в состав Австро-Венгерской империи. Весомым является труд Г. Штекля, *Adel und Bürgertum in der Habsburgermonarchie*², а также 10-томное исследование *Bürgertum in der Habsburgermonarchie*³, которое посвящено различным сферам общественной жизни буржуазии.

¹ Georg Drozdowski, *Damals in Czernowitz und rundum. Erinnerungen eines Altösterreichers* [Then in Chernivtsi and its Surroundings. Memories of an old Austrian], Klagenfurt, 2003, S. 37.

² Hannes Stekl, *Adel und Bürgertum in der Habsburgermonarchie* [Nobility and bourgeoisie in the Habsburg Monarchy], Wien, München, 2004, 312 S.

³ *Bürgertum in der Habsburgermonarchie* [Bourgeoisie in the Habsburg Monarchy]: Bd. 1. *Bürgertum in der Habsburgermonarchie* [Bourgeoisie in the Habsburg Monarchy], Wien, Köln, 1990, 318 S.; Bd.2. «Durch Arbeit, Besitz, Wissen und Gerechtigkeit»

Отдавая должное ученым в изучении «белых пятен» в истории Буковины, следует отметить, что большинство исследований Модерной эпохи в истории Буковины посвящены изучению отдельных народов. Поэтому иногда это наталкивает на представление об общественной жизни австрийской Буковины, как истории отдельных этнических сообществ. В то же время, совместную картину сосуществования различных этнических групп, их повседневную жизнь оставлено без должного внимания.

Комплексно публичную жизнь Буковины в австрийский период взяли исследовать румынские германисты А. Корбеа-Гойше⁴ и И. Лигачу⁵, светская жизнь немецкой общины на Буковине частично затронута в работе украинского историка С. Осачука⁶.

Источниковая база исследования представлена воспоминаниями Теодота Галипа⁷, Георга Дроздовського⁸, автобиографией Эрнста Рудольфа

[Through Work, Possessions, Knowledge and Justice], Wien, 1992, 393 S.; Bd.3. *Bürgerliche Wohnkultur des Fin de siècle in Ungarn* [Bourgeois Living Culture during the Fin de siècle in Hungary], Wien, 1994, 309 S.; Bd.4. *Bürgerliche Selbstdarstellung: Städtebau, Architektur, Denkmäler* [Bourgeois Self-presentation: Urban Planning, Architecture, Monuments], Wien, 1995, 256 S.; Bd.5. *Von Bürgern und ihre Frauen* [On Representatives of Bourgeoisie and their Wives,], Wien, 1996, 255 S.; Bd.6. *Bürger zwischen Tradition und Modernität* [Bourgeoisie in-between Tradition and Modernity], Wien, 1992, 393 S.; Bd.7. *Zwischen Gestern und Morgen. Wiens frühe Bourgeoisie an der Wende vom 18. zum 19. Jahrhundert* [In-between Yesterday and Tomorrow. Early Bourgeoisie of Vienna at the turn of the 18th and 19th Centuries], Wien, 1998, 372 S.; Bd.8. *Bürgerliche Familien: Lebenswege im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* [Bourgeois Families: Life Paths in the 19th and 20th Centuries], Wien, 2000, 298 S.; Bd.9. *Kleinstandbürgertum in der Habsburgermonarchie 1862 – 1914* [Petite Bourgeoisie in the Habsburg Monarchy 1862 - 1914], Wien, 2000, 518 S.; Bd.10. *Bürgertum und Protestantismus: die Geschichte der Familie Ludwig in Wien und Oberösterreich (1860 – 1900)* [Bourgeoisie and Protestantism: History of the Ludwig family in Vienna and Upper Austria (1860 - 1900)], Wien, 2003, 283 S.

⁴ Andrei Corbea-Hoise, *Czernowitzer Geschichten. Über eine städtische Kultur in Mitteleuropa* [Chernivtsi Stories. About an Urban Culture in Central and Eastern Europe], Wien, Köln, Weimar, 2003, 252 S.

⁵ Ion Lihaciu, *Czernowitz 1848-1918: Das kulturelle Leben einer Provinzmetropole* [Chernivtsi in 1848 - 1918: The cultural life of a provincial metropolis], München, 2012, 258 S.

⁶ Сергій Осачук, *Німці Буковини. Історія товариського руху (друга половина XIX – початок XX ст.)* [Germans of Bukovina. History of the Fellowship Movement (the second half of the 19th – beginning of the 20th centuries)], Чернівці, Золоті литаври, 2002, 288 с.

⁷ Теодот Галіп, *З моїх споминів* [From my Recollections], in «Буковинський журнал» [«Bukovina Magazine»], Чернівці, 1994, Ч. 1-4, С. 152-179.

⁸ Georg Drozdowski, *op. cit.*, 200 S.

Нойбауэра⁹, путевыми записками Елизаветы де Витте¹⁰ и материалами, собранными Осипом Маковеем для изучения жизни и творчества писателя Юрия Федькоковича¹¹, а также мемуарами Ольги Кобылянської и воспоминаниями о ней современников¹², художественными произведениями писательницы, в которых отображена социокультурная картина Буковины в последней четверти XIX в. – до начала Первой мировой войны¹³. Хронику светских мероприятий, социальный состав «света» Буковины находим на страницах газет: *Буковина*, *Bukowina Landes- und Amts- Zeitung*, *Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Czernowitzer Zeitung*.

ОБЩЕСТВЕННЫЕ ОБЪЕДИНЕНИЯ КАК ПОЛЕ СОЦИАЛЬНОГО ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЯ «СВЕТСКОГО ОБЩЕСТВА» БУКОВИНЫ

В связи с особенностями социальной структуры населения края основными носителями «изысканного» образа жизни на Буковине во времена австрийского правления было «*zweite Gesellschaft*» (*дословно «второе общество» - авт.*), а именно, чиновники, офицеры и представители свободных профессий, которых можно классифицировать как «буржуазию». Поэтому и характер «светского общества» Буковины определялся преимущественно в рамках т.н. «буржуазной культуры», которая основывалась на рационалистической основе классического

⁹ *Biographische Momente aus dem Leben Ernst Rudolf Neubauers (von ihm selbst geschrieben)* [Biographical Moments from the Life of Ernst Rudolf Neubauer (written by himself)], in «Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung» [«Chernivtsi General Newspaper»], 1908, 7. Mai, S. 3 – 4.

¹⁰ Елизавета де Витте, Путевыя впечатлѣнія (съ історическими очерками) Лѣто 1903. Буковина и Галичина [Impressions of Travels (with historical essays), summer 1903. Bukovina and Galicia], Киевъ, 1904, 249 с.

¹¹ Осип Маковей, *Життєпис Осипа Юрія Гординського-Федьковича* [Biography of Osyp-Yurii Hordynskyi-Fedkovych], Чернівці, Золоті литаври, 2005, 432 с.

¹² *Щоденники Ольги Кобилянської* [Diaries of Olha Kobylianska], Чернівецький літературно-меморіальний музей Ольги Кобилянської, інв. № 2455; Ольга Кобилянська, *Слова зворушеного серця: Щоденники; Автобіографії; Листи* [Words of a Touched Heart: Diaries; Autobiographies; Letters], Київ, 1982, 359 с.; *Ольга Кобилянська: Альманах у пам'ятку її сорокалітньої письменницької діяльності (1887-1927)* [Olha Kobylianska: Almanac in Memory of her forty-year literary Activity (1887-1927)], Чернівці, 1928, 314 с.; *Ольга Кобилянська в критиці та спогадах. Збірник статей* [Olha Kobylianska through Criticism and Recollections. Collection of articles], Київ, 1963, 559 с.

¹³ Ольга Кобилянська, *Людина: Повісті, оповідання* [Human: narratives, stories], Київ, Веселка, 2000, 350 с.; Ольга Кобилянська, *Апостол черні* [Apostle of the Rabble], Львів, 1994, 234 с.

образования и охватывала такие элементы, как общее понимание самих себя, жизненных установок, частично подобный стиль жизни¹⁴.

Начиная с 30-40 гг. XIX в. частыми местами встречи ведущих групп населения Буковины стали редуты, балы, стрелковое общество, «казиновое общество», кафе-сообщества, общества для чтения. В рамках таких форм публичной коммуникации новая общественная элита воплощала свое представление о «благородном образе жизни» («gehobene Lebensart»), что было с их стороны символическим выражением высокого статуса в социуме. Характерными чертами этого современного общества были образованность и понимание в творческой деятельности, «хороший вкус», владение символической системой – от знания манер во время общения за столом, формы приветствия, моды – к стилю переписки¹⁵.

Благодаря законам 60-х гг. XIX в., в том числе закону об объединениях и собраниях 1867 г., которые декларировали широкие демократические свободы, представители высших слоев населения Буковины постепенно начали объединяться в рамках широкой сети различных обществ. По статистическим подсчетам в 1882 г., на Буковине насчитывалось 170 обществ, среди них благотворительных – 34, казино-сообществ – 17, читальных обществ – 14, музыкальных – 4¹⁶.

В состав таких обществ преимущественно входили представители состоятельных слоев населения. Членами многонационального «Общества содействия музыкальному искусству на Буковине» («Verein zur Förderung der Kunst in der Bukowina»), основанного в 1862 г., были высокие государственные служащие, политики, землевладельцы, профессора гимназии (Евгений Гакман, бароны А. Петрино, М. Мустаца, А. Кохановский, граф Р. Амадей, М. Баумгартен), а среди 136-ти учредителей «Общего гимнастического общества в Черновцах» («Allgemeiner Turnverein in Czernowitz» -1867) – директор кесарско-королевской гимназии д-р Штефан Вольф, президент торгово-

¹⁴ Ernst Bruckmüller, Hannes Stekl, *Zur Geschichte des Bürgertums in Österreich* [On the History of Bourgeoisie in Austria], in «Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert. Bd.1: Einheit und Vielfalt Europas» [«Bourgeoisie in the 19th century. Vol.1: Unity and Diversity of Europe»], 1995, S. 168.

¹⁵ Ulrike Döcker, «Bürgerlichkeit und Kultur - Bürgerlichkeit als Kultur». Eine Einführung [«Bourgeoisie and Culture - Bourgeoisie as a Culture». An Introduction], in «Bürgertum in der Habsburgermonarchie» [«Bourgeoisie in the Habsburg Monarchy»], Wien, Köln, S. 97.

¹⁶ *Vergleichende graphische Statistik in ihrer Anwendung auf das Herzogtum Bukowina und das österreichische Staatsgebiet* [Comparative Graphical Statistics in its Application to the Duchy of Bukovina and Austrian Territory], Wien, 1886, S. 22.

промышленной палаты Вильгельм фон Альт, купец Арон Амстер, кесарско-королевский майор Доминик Бекер, архимандрит Теофил Бенделла, городской врач д-р Высоцкий, часовщик Фердинанд Гаенски, советник краевого кесарско-королевского суда д-р Лео Иссеческул и др.¹⁷

Для светского времяпровождения и отдыха создавались также «Казино-общества» (Casino-Verein). Первое казино на Буковине было основано в 1842 г., но через несколько лет оно закрылось. Инициатором основания казино в 1860-х гг. в краевом городе герцогства Буковина был фельдмаршал-лейтенант барон Куделька. Как писала в 1862 г. *Bukowina Landes- und Amts- Zeitung* целью создания казино в Черновцах было «объединение интеллигентных людей в кругу друзей, невзирая на принадлежность к социальному положению, чтобы достойным образом проводить время». Особой атмосферы таким собраниям предоставляла изысканная музыка, песни и танцы. Подобные объединения возникли в Черновцах (1860 и 1877), Сучаве (1861), Радауцах (1862), Кымполунге (1868), Серете (1871), Кицмане (1873), Вижнице (1875), Сторожинце (1879), Садгоре и Заставне (1881)¹⁸.

Казиноное общество как форма коммуникации позволяла завязывать выгодные социальные связи. Так, по свидетельству декана Буковинской греко-католической церкви Келестина Костецкого, в 1887 г. староста села Раранча Стокира «жил с румынскими боярами в большой приязни, потому что ежедневно с ними в казино в карты играл»¹⁹.

«Казино», в отличие от частного салона, было в основном местом для общения мужского пола. По этому поводу писатель и литературовед Иосиф Маковей наводит в своей работе забавный случай о А. Гординской, матери известного буковинского писателя Юрия Федьковича (1834 – 1888):

*некоторое время (А. Гординская – авт.) находилась в Черновцах, но ей здесь было скучно, нечего было делать, и она очень удивлялась, что муж сидит целыми вечерами в казино. Раз нарядилась в белую шляпу и пошла за ним в казино, потому что думала, что там бывают женщины, но убедилась, что не было. Побыла немного и пошла домой. – перевод авт.*²⁰.

¹⁷ Сергій Осачук, *Німці Буковини...*, с. 72 – 73.

¹⁸ *Hauptbericht und Statistik über das Herzogtum Bukowina für die Periode vom Jahre 1862-1871* [Home Reports and statistics on the duchy Bukovina for the period from 1862-1871 years], Lemberg, 1872, S. 410; Сергій Осачук, *Німці Буковини...*, с. 75.

¹⁹ *Хроніка парохії гр.-кат. в Чернівцях від її основання аж до часу біжучого 26/2 1912* [Chronicles of the Greek Catholic Eparchy of Chernivtsi from its Foundation and to this Day 26/2 1912] in «Буковинський журнал» [«Bukovina Magazine»], 1997, Ч. 1, с.112.

²⁰ Осип Маковей, *op. cit.*, с. 78.

Развитие различных обществ на Буковине было толчком к созданию отдельных этнических организаций²¹. Центром румынского населения стало «Общество румынской литературы и культуры на Буковине» («Societatea pentru cultura și literatura poporului român în Bucovina», 1862), польского – «Общество братской помощи» («Towarzystwo Bratniej Pomocy», 1867), украинского – литературное общество «Руская Беседа» («Руська Бесіда», 1869). Первым немецким национальным обществом на Буковине считается «Немецкая читальня в Черновцах» («Deutsche Lesehalle in Czernowitz», 1871)²². Основной целью таких обществ было распространение образования в обществе, а позднее пробуждение национального сознания.

Важным для нашего исследования является тот факт, что этнические общества принимали активное участие в публичной жизни края. Так, «Руская Беседа», с целью развития взаимоотношений между членами общества, организовывала различные чтения, игры с танцами, декламационные и юмористические вечера, театральные представления. В течение 1871-1872 гг. общество арендовало большой зал, где проводило музыкальные и литературные вечера. По инициативе музыкального и литературного деятеля С. Воробкевича такие мероприятия с 1873 г. стали регулярными и тематическими²³. Характер этого общества в 70-х гг. XIX в. лучше всего характеризует мнение почетного члена общества Е. Пигуляка, который считал, что «Русская Беседа» в это время была «простым казино» (казиновим обществом – *авт.*), а его учредители руководствовались «аристократическими принципами»²⁴, то есть они подражали дворянским объединениям.

На увеселительных вечерах национальные общества не ограничивались приглашениям только собственных членов. Так, 2 февраля 1885 г., на балу общества украинских студентов «Союз», кроме украинцев, было

²¹ Олександр Добржанський, *Національний рух українців Буковини другої половини XIX – початку XX ст.* [National movement of Ukrainians of Bukovina in the second half of XIX - beginning of the XX century], Чернівці, Золоті литаври, 1999, с. 114.

²² Сергій Осачук, *Німці Буковини...*, с. 81.

²³ Євгеній Дмитрів, *Ілюстрована історія просвітнього товариства Руска Бесіда в Чернівцях* [Illustrated History of the Education Fellowship Ruska Besida in Chernivtsi], Чернівці, 1909, с.68; Сергій Добржанський, *Культурно-масові заходи українського товариства «Руська Бесіда» на Буковині* [Cultural events of the Ukrainian Fellowship Ruska Besida in Bukovina] in «Питання історії України» [Issues of the History of Ukraine], 2009, Т. 12, с. 133.

²⁴ Єротеї Пігуляк. *Автобіографічний нарис* [Autobiographical outline], in «Буковина» [Bukovina], 1905, Ч. 59-60, 22 травня, с.2.

много поляков, румынов и немцев. Среди именитых гостей – бургомистр Черновицкого городского совета Клиmesh, советник высшего краевого суда Питей, нотариус Векслер, российский консул Динжан²⁵. Это способствовало объединению элиты Буковины всех национальностей за их культурными интересами, но в связи с нарастанием национального противостояния между двумя автохтонами края – украинцами и румынами, такие мероприятия не всегда проходили без некоего напряжения.

Самый большой успех на Буковине имели развлекательные вечера, которые организовывались польскими национальными обществами в «Польском Доме». На «польском балу» собиралась изысканная публика, а именно «дворянство из окрестных имений и элита города», представленные различными этносами²⁶.

Как отмечает С. Осачук, активное участие в неформальных рамках обществ и других объединениях способствовало интеграции членов обществ в сеть т. н. «хорошего общества» («gute Gesellschaft»)²⁷.

КАНАЛЫ ВЕРТИКАЛЬНОЙ МОБИЛЬНОСТИ В «СВЕТСКОМ ОБЩЕСТВЕ» БУКОВИНЫ

Благодаря модернизационным процессам в Габсбургской монархии, на Буковине произошла социальная трансформация, которая обусловила возможность вертикальной циркуляции в рамках различных общественных институтов.

Как отмечает С. Пахолкив, социальным лифтом в Австрийской империи служило образование. «Матура была в Габсбургской Галиции критерием образованности и принадлежности к слою интеллигенции»²⁸. Аналогичное утверждение можно применить и к тогдашней Буковине. Экзамен зрелости (Maturitätsprüfung) для учащихся после окончания учебы был введен в Черновицкой гимназии вследствие нового организационного закона для гимназии, который вступил в силу после революции 1848-

²⁵ „Буковина” [Bukowina], 1885, Ч. 3., с. 5.

²⁶ Georg Drozdowski, *op. cit.*, S. 103.

²⁷ Sergij Osatschuk, *Bukowiner Bote – die erste deutsche Vereinzeitung der Bukowina* [Bukovinian Messenger - the first joint German Newspaper of Bukovina] in «Deutschsprachige Öffentlichkeit und Presse in Mittelost- und Südosteuropa (1848-1948)» [«German-speaking public and the press in East Central and South East Europe (1848-1948)»], Iași, 2008, S. 367-368.

²⁸ Святослав Пахолків, *Українська інтелігенція у Габсбурзькій Галичині: освічена верства й емансипація нації* [Ukrainian Intelligentsia in Habsburg Galicia: educated stratum and emancipation of the nation], Львів, 2014, с. 241.

1849 гг.²⁹.

Образованию и экзаменам по аттестату зрелости (матура) придавали большое значение в обществе. Из писем известной буковинской писательницы Ольги Кобылянской узнаем, что ее младший брат – Владимир, в 1895 г. тщательно готовился «к матуре» в их тогдашнем доме на ул. Рошковской, хотя, как иронически замечала писательница, «этот черный час еще далеко»³⁰.

Особое значение сдачи матуры в обществе подтверждается многочисленными показателями сообщений, которые постоянно появлялись на страницах местных газет. Газета «Буковина» в 1885 г. сообщала, что первой девушкой на Буковине, которая получила свидетельство гимназической матуры, была Зузана Рубинштайн, вторая – Роза Вельт, третья – София Окуневская³¹, которая в будущем станет первой женщиной-врачом в Австро-Венгрии. Показателен тот факт, что на экзаменах в Львовской академической гимназии, где С. Окуневська сдавала экзамен, присутствовали многие известные личности, среди которых писатели Иван Нечуй-Левицкий и Иван Франко. А первой девушкой, которая сдала матуру в Черновицкой гимназии, была Климента Ганкевич, дочь Клима Ганкевича, бывшего секретаря Черновицкого университета³².

Со времени введения матуры в Черновицкой гимназии экзамен зрелости сдали 3 108 учеников. Среди них было много тех, кто в будущем будут занимать высокие должностные посты в сферах управления, юстиции, преподавания и церкви, станут художниками и писателями, которые будут играть влиятельную роль в культурной жизни. Среди них Эрих Прокопович называет австрийского министра барона фон Петрино и барона фон Шенка, поэтов Михая Эминеску и Юрия Федьковича, писателя Карла Эмиля Францоу, хирурга д-ра Иоганнеса фон Микулич-Радецкого, театроведа Йозефа Грегора³³.

Аттестат зрелости предоставлял много возможностей своему владельцу, чем пользовались даже сыновья зажиточных крестьян, особенно сельских священников, что лучше всего демонстрирует карьера

²⁹ Erich Prokopowitsch, *Die Entwicklung des Schulwesens in der Bukowina* [The Development of Education in the Bukovina] in «Buchenland. Hundertfünfzig Jahre Deutschtum in der Bukowina» [«Beech Land. One hundred and fifty years of German Heritage in Bukovina»], München, 1961, S. 283.

³⁰ Ольга Кобылянская, *Твори: У 5-ти томах* [Works: In 5 volumes], Т. 5, Київ, 1963, с. 284.

³¹ „Буковина” [Bukovina], Ч. 12, 1885, 15 червня, с. 6.

³² „Буковина” [Bukovina], Ч. 77, 1900, 30 червня, с. 3.

³³ Erich Prokopowitsch, *op. cit.*, S. 285.

черновицкого педагога и политика, депутата парламента Ерофея Пигуляка, который родился в с. Новые-Мамаевцы в многодетной семье сельского дьяка³⁴.

Преодоление социальных барьеров «светского общества» Буковины несколько упростилось с основанием университета «Франциско-Йозефина» в 1875 г. Это событие существенно наполнило смыслом общественную и культурную жизнь края благодаря притоку интеллектуального и социального элемента.

Университет стал мощным каналом социальной мобильности. Студенты, кроме получения знаний, имели возможность объединяться в академические общества, посещать разного рода публичные мероприятия. С 1897 г. университет начал принимать на обучение девушек (кроме теологического факультета), однако они всегда составляли незначительную часть студентов: в 1899/1900 учебном году - 4 из 384 студентов, в 1906/1907 учебном году - 64 с 799³⁵.

В отличие от большинства других немецких университетов, где ученые и высшие чиновники образовывали касту и отмежевывались «от всех контактов с т. н. буржуазией», создавая, таким образом, барьеры, ученые в Черновицком университете находились в тесных отношениях не только со студенческими корпорациями и представителями средних сословий, которые здесь учились, а также с церковными сановниками и культурными обществами³⁶.

Бывший студент Черновицкого университета Ганс Людвар вспоминал, что студенты получали «вход» в дома преподавателей, которые желали видеть своих дочерей в обществе образованных молодых людей. Часто такие обстоятельства приводили к замужеству. Кроме того, студенты расширяли свои социальные связи благодаря танцевальным курсам и комерсам, которые проводили студенческие корпорации, и на домашних товарищеских вечерах в домах преподавателей, куда приглашали прилежных учеников с целью формирования новой

³⁴ Василь Пилипчук, *Єропей Пігуляк – політичний портрет* [Yerotei Pihuliak - political portrait] in «Österreichisch-ukrainische Rundschau» [«Austrian-Ukrainian Review»], 2000, № 10, с. 35.

³⁵ Василь Ботушанський, *Місто в період австрійського правління* [City under the Austrian rule], in «Чернівці: Історія і сучасність» [«Chernivtsi: History and Modernity»], Чернівці, Зелена Буковина, 2009, с. 142.

³⁶ Emanuel Turczynski, *Geschichte der Bukowina in der Neuzeit: zur Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte einer mitteleuropäisch geprägten Landschaft* [History of Bukovina in the Modern Era: On social and cultural history of Central European landscape], Wiesbaden, 1993, S. 159.

интеллектуальной элиты³⁷. К примеру, лучших студентов к себе приглашал и преподаватель украинского языка и литературы И. Маковей, проживая на ул. Новый Свет³⁸.

Братья писательницы О. Кобылянской (1863-1942), Александр и Владимир, изучая право в Черновицком университете, познакомили писательницу «с определенными кругами „в свете“, потому что сама она жила как жрица своего очага в святилище и довольно редко выходила», как писал украинский писатель и литературовед Д. Лукьянович в своих воспоминаниях³⁹.

Как утверждал Е. Брукмюллер, «гарантом» социального подъема в XIX в. в Австрии была карьера священника⁴⁰. Улучшение материального и образовательного уровня, влияние европейского культурного воспитания постепенно обусловили социальный престиж богословского состояния и на Буковине⁴¹. Есть все основания считать, что церковь в австрийской Буковине выполняла, помимо всего прочего, функцию канала вертикальной мобильности. Как указывает в своей работе черновицкий историк М. Чучко, новый социальный тип буковинского православного священника, сформированный под влиянием йозефинского идеала, идентифицировал себя с интеллигенцией⁴², что сказывалось на его образе жизни.

По многим свидетельствам, активным участником «благородного» времяпровождения был православный епископ Буковины Евгений Гакман. Вполне возможно, что еще, будучи студентом (1819-1822) Венского университета, где существовал специальный «императорский конквит» для подготовки теологов разных конфессий⁴³, он посещал различные

³⁷ Rudolf Wagner, *Alma Mater Francisco Josephina: die deutschsprachige Nationalitäten-Universität in Czernowitz* [Alma mater Francisco Josephina: the German-speaking National University in Chernivtsi], München, 1979, S. 334.

³⁸ Денис Лукіянович, *Мої спогади про Ольгу Кобилянську* [My Memories of Olha Kobylianska], in «Письменники Буковини другої половини XIX – першої половини XX століття: Хрестоматія» [Writers of Bukovina of the second half of the 19th – first half of the 20th centuries: A Reader], Ч. 1, Чернівці, 2001, с. 454.

³⁹ *Ольга Кобилянська в критиці та спогадах...*, с. 353.

⁴⁰ Ernst Bruckmüller, Hannes Stekl, *op. cit.*, S. 169.

⁴¹ Михайло Чучко, «*И взят Бога на помощь*»: соціально-релігійний чинник в житті православного населення північних волостей Молдавського воєводства та австрійської Буковини (епоха пізнього середньовіччя та нового часу) [And take God for Assistance: socio-religious factor in the life of the Orthodox population of the northern districts of Moldovan Voivodship and Austrian Bukovina (late Middle Ages and modern times)], Чернівці, Книги – XXI, 2008, с. 116.

⁴² *Ibid.*, с.116.

⁴³ Олександр Масан, *Владика Євген (Гакман) – визначний діяч православної церкви*

светские мероприятия, на которых ознакомился с этикетом и вкусами, которые господствовали в столице монархии.

Высшие духовные лица, к которым принадлежал и евангелистский священник, проводили компанейские встречи у краевого раввина, где играли в тарок (*карточная игра* - авт.), который на Буковине был особо популярным⁴⁴.

Представители духовенства часто фигурируют в газетных колонках среди публики праздничных вечеров. Интересным для нас выдается сообщение в газете „Буковина” 1886 г. о том, что Черновицкая духовная семинария разрешила участвовать богословам на вечере общества «Союз» только в «гражданской» одежде, поскольку накануне на вечере румынского общества «Junimea» («Юность») богословы танцевали в рясах⁴⁵.

Даже сельские священники в своей повседневности имитировали изысканный образ жизни. Картину жизни буковинского священника иллюстрирует в своих воспоминаниях писатель и политический деятель Буковины Теодот Галип, отец которого был православным священником с. Волока, что на правом берегу р. Черемош:

[...] хозяйство у родителей было небольшое – отец выписывал периодичу из Черновцов и со Львова, а также немецкий иллюстрированный журнал. Когда наступали долгие вечера, отец читал маме и моей старшей сестре немецкие романы. А я тогда не знал другого языка, лишь украинский, поэтому выбегал, бывало, из столовой туда, где говорилось на понятном мне языке, - в просторную кухню, в которой собралась челядь⁴⁶. – перевод авт.

Т. Галип упоминает также о старой служанке Ции (Анастасия) и об извозчике Иване Гуцуляке. Как видим, несмотря на «небольшое хозяйство», жизнь семьи сельского священника не была аскетичной, а была больше похожа на жизнь семьи из образованного среднего класса, которая владела материальной возможностью для содержания домашних слуг.

Светская жизнь некоторых священников имела и противоположную, негативную сторону. Российская писательница и педагог Елизавета де

на Буковині в ХІХ столітті. Нарис життя і діяльності [Bishop Yevhen (Hakman) - A prominent Figure of Bukovina Orthodox Church in the 20th Century. Outline of Life and Activity], Чернівці, 1999, с. 10-11.

⁴⁴ Emanuel Turczynski, *Czernowitz am Pruth, Hauptstadt der Bukowina* [Chernivtsi on the Prut, capital of Bukovina] in «Hauptstädte in Südosteuropa: Geschichte, Funktion, nationale Symbolkraft» [«Major Cities of the South Eastern Europe: history, function and national symbolism»], Wien, 1994, S. 74.

⁴⁵ „Буковина” [Bukovina], 1886, Ч. 5, 1 березня, с. 4.

⁴⁶ Теодот Галіп, *op. cit.*, с. 154.

Витте, путешествуя Буковиной летом 1903 г., зафиксировала в своих записках, на ее взгляд, негативные черты быта православного духовенства: *«Карты, вино, сон – вот времяпрепровождение многих из них. Матушки обычно не хозяйки, а светские дамы, думающие только о нарядах и выездах»*⁴⁷.

Аналогичную церкви социальную функцию выполняли такие институты, как государственная и военная службы, как средство для поднятия по социальной лестнице для талантливых и способных лиц в среде среднего класса⁴⁸. Идея йозефинизма передала служащим особую профессиональную этику и наделила их важными интегративными функциями в государстве. Поэтому благодаря этой профессиональной этике и присущим им ведением «изысканного» образа жизни возник значительный социальный престиж руководящих слоев служащих⁴⁹. Если высокие служебные должности в герцогстве Буковина занимали назначенные из Вены чиновники, то к формированию среднего звена служащих привлекался также автохтонный элемент.

Профессия чиновника как идеал буржуазной жизни воплощена в произведении О. Кобылянской *Человек* (1891). Вот о какой жизни мечтала для своего сына литературная героиня повести, жена господина Ляуфера, кесарско-королевского лесного советника:

*Она видела сама не раз в своих мечтах сына лесным советником, видела, как он ездил в элегантной коляске, гордыми конями, возле него богатая жена, его низко приветствуют малые и большие, старые и молодые; видела его также важным врачом-советником в обществе высоких лиц, которые с ним дружно разговаривают. Временами менял муж свое будущее призвание и выбирал положение надворного советника. Против этого нельзя было уже ничего упрекнуть*⁵⁰. – перевод авт.

На Буковине встречались и случаи, когда желанием войти в «избранное» общество манипулировали в политических целях. В 1899 г. барон Мустаца угрожал послу В. Воляну:

А Мустаца вызывает между рускими (украинскими – авт.) депутатами раздор, терроризуя Воляна, лакомого на присущее выскочкам

⁴⁷ Елизавета де Витте, *op. cit.*, с. 26-27.

⁴⁸ Peter Melichar, *Metamorphosen eines treuen Dieners. Zum bürgerlichen Offizier Der k. (u) k. Armee im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert* [Metamorphosis of a Faithful Servant. On the Civil Officer of the Joint Imperial and Royal Army in the 18th and 19th Century in] in «Bürger zwischen Tradition und Modernität» [Bourgeoisie in-between Tradition and Modernity], S. 107.

⁴⁹ Ernst Bruckmüller, Hannes Stekl, *op. cit.*, S. 167-168.

⁵⁰ Ольга Кобылянская, *Людина...*, с. 15-16.

общества тем, что пригрозил ему запретом вступления в панское общество [...]»⁵¹. – перевод авт.

Отдельного рассмотрения требует военная карьера, которая пользовалась престижем, несмотря на постоянные войны Австрийской (Австро-Венгерской) империи, а также тот факт, что офицеры за свою службу имели возможность получить дворянский титул⁵². В 1851 г. вышло постановление, которое позволяло претендовать на кадетство, независимо от сословной и родовой принадлежности. В это время были такие виды кадетов, как императорские – сыновья шляхты и офицеров; полковые – сыновья государственных служащих; и кадеты, которые проходили военную службу за собственные деньги.

Отец писателя Ю. Федьковича, Адальберт Гординский, который в конце 50 – 60-х гг. XIX в. был чиновником Краевой табулы, отдал своего сына в армию, оправдывая свой поступок тем, что сделал это «для его добра». С этой целью А. Гординский попросил о. Г. Кантемира, родственника Ю. Федьковича по материнской линии, «склонить» сына к военной службе. Но все же барьером были экзамены и оплата за обучение. А. Гординский заплатил за службу своего сына 120 золотых ринских⁵³ (гульденов; флоринов).

13 апреля 1853 г. Ю. Федькович стал «полковым кадетом и пошел в полк», который располагался в Трансильвании, и был назначен к второй кампании (роты) гренадеров. 16 марта 1854 г. он стал капралом, 18 мая 1855 г. – фельдфебелем, 11 апреля 1859 г. – офицером-подпоручиком (лейтенантом) второго класса, 25 мая того же года – подпоручиком (лейтенантом) первого класса⁵⁴. Взирая на такой рост военной карьеры Ю. Федьковича, можно утверждать, что он зарекомендовал себя как способный офицер. Можем предположить, что, прибывши в Черновцы в 1859 г., он получил вход в «светское общество» Буковины скорее в качестве офицера, а уже позднее в качестве талантливого поэта. Из воспоминаний о писателе его современников узнаем, что в образованных кругах Черновцов в начале 60-х гг. XIX в. Ю. Федькович был известен уже как офицер, который пишет немецкие стихи⁵⁵.

⁵¹ „Буковина” [Bukovina], 1899, № 95, 23 сепня, с. 1.

⁵² Ernst Bruckmüller, *Sozialgeschichte Österreichs* [Social history of Austria], Wien, München, 1985, S. 330.

⁵³ Осип Маковей, *op. cit.*, с. 81-82.

⁵⁴ Лідія Ковалець, *Юрій Федькович: Історія розвитку індивідуальності письменника* [Yurii Fedkovych: history of the writer's personality development], Київ, 2011, с. 141.

⁵⁵ Осип Маковей, *op. cit.*, с. 103.

Прохождение военной службы в армии Австрийской империи было также своеобразной традицией среди многих сыновей помещичьих семей Буковины, среди них Я. Флондор, М. Попович, И. Якубович и Н. Василько, которые служили при 16-м гусарском полку⁵⁶. В военной академии в Вене учился и Виктор барон фон Стырча (1839 – 1908), который получил звание оберлейтенанта во время войны в Италии⁵⁷. Традиции отправлять своих сыновей после обучения в гимназии на военную службу среди крупных землевладельцев Буковины и престижность военной профессии подтверждаются и в художественных произведениях. Так, военную службу в Вене проходил сын крупного землевладельца Ганга, о чем упоминается в произведении О. Кобылянської *Апостол черни*⁵⁸.

Еще одну причину популярности военной службы на Буковине выразил Г. Дроздовский:

*У нас жилось роскошно, так как край гудел от состоятельных помещиков, которые охотно искали себе зятьев там, где сверкали яркие мундиры*⁵⁹. – перевод авт.

Исходя из вышеизложенного, можем утверждать, что в Модерное время на Буковине не только традиционные общественные институты, такие как армия, церковь и бюрократия, создавали условия для социальной циркуляции, но в этом плане усиливается и роль образования, что свидетельствует о трансформации общественной структуры Буковины и об ее соответствии центрально-европейской общественной модели. Поэтому и элита Буковины формировалась в соответствующих социальных рамках и практике.

МАТЕРИАЛЬНЫЕ И СИМВОЛИЧЕСКИЕ РАМКИ «СВЕТСКОГО ОБЩЕСТВА» БУКОВИНЫ

Право «с рождения» на принадлежность к т. н. «erste Gesellschaft» принадлежало представителям дворянских семей Буковины. Это были потомки боярских семей, получивших титул еще в начале австрийского правления на Буковине (1778). А именно, титулы графов и баронов были предоставлены 12 богатым боярским семьям и тем дворянам, годовой

⁵⁶Микола Василько, *Посольська діяльність в державній раді і в крайовому сеймі в роках 1901 – 1903* [Ambassadorial Activity in the State Council and Regional Sejm specified in years 1901 – 1903], Чернівці, 1904, с. 372.

⁵⁷*Unsere Vertreter im Reichsrat* [Our Representatives in the Reichsrat], in «Im Buchwald» [«In the Beech Forest»], 1891, № 14, S. 214.

⁵⁸Ольга Кобылянська, *Апостол черні*, с. 28.

⁵⁹Georg Drozdowski, *op. cit.*, S. 82.

доход которых составлял не менее 3 тыс. Все остальные бояре получали рыцарское сословие⁶⁰. Кроме того, австрийские правители часто «нобилитировали» за заслуги в военной, административной, экономической и культурной сферах, что влияло на рост численности знати из буржуазии⁶¹.

Крупная и мелкая буржуазия без титулов постулировала свою равноценность со старой элитой благодаря «демонстративному потреблению» во всех сферах «компанейской жизни» (*das gesellige Leben*) и создавала также средство дистанционирования внутри собственного окружения⁶². Поэтому, чтобы попасть в такое сообщество нужно было соответствовать ее культурному габитусу, в основе которого лежал, прежде всего, успех, который определялся материальным, социальным и культурным капиталом.

Ведение светского образа жизни требовало значительного финансирования, начиная с одежды и заканчивая затратами на благотворительную деятельность.

Чтобы стать членом культурных или профессиональных обществ, нужно было пройти имущественный ценз. Так, ежегодный взнос для членов «Музыкального общества» составлял 50 гульденов. «Обычные» члены «Руской Беседы» обязывались ежегодно платить 2 гульдена, или один взнос в размере 25 гульденов⁶³. Поэтому не каждый желающий мог стать членом таких обществ. Например, в 1886 г. материальные трудности испытывала О. Кобылянская, когда хотела записаться в Кымпулунге в женское общество, которое состояло из 12 членов, но для этого нужно было заплатить взнос в размере 25 флоринов. Таких денег у нее не было, что заставило ее просить помощи у австрийской эрцгерцогини Валерии⁶⁴.

На редутах, музыкальных и театральных вечерах, где собирались ведущие группы общества, барьером была цена входного билета. К примеру, во время концерта известного композитора Ференца Листа в 1847 г. в большом зале гостиницы «Молдавия» («*Hotel de Moldavie*») место в первых рядах стоило 15 фл., в средних – 10 фл., а в остальных рядах – 5

⁶⁰ Ion Nistor, *Istoria Bukovinei* [History of Bukovina], București, 1991, p. 54.

⁶¹ Ernst Bruckmüller, Hannes Stekl, *op. cit.*, S. 178.

⁶² *Ibid.*, S. 179.

⁶³ *Статут літературного товариства «Руська Бесіда» в Чернівцях* [Charter of the Literary Fellowship Ruska Besida in Chernivtsi], Чернівці, [year of publication unknown], с. 3.

⁶⁴ Ольга Кобылянська, *Людина*, с. 117.

фл.⁶⁵. На торжественных танцах, которые устраивало казино-общество в 1863 г., вход для гостей был платным как для семей членов общества, так и для сторонних гостей: для семьи – до 4 фл., вход для одной персоны – 1 фл. Входной билет на редут в гостинице «Молдавия» этого же года был немного умеренным – 90 крейцеров⁶⁶.

Кроме того, присутствие на балах обязывало иметь соответствующий бальный туалет (Ballstaat). Так, в 1870 г. одежда для бала стоила от 4 до 20 фл.⁶⁷. В 1898 г. бальные и вечерние туалеты для дам продавала Йоганна Шафнер на ул. Панской, № 8 (Herrengasse, № 8)⁶⁸, но среди наиболее обеспеченных слоев общества было принято бальную одежду шить или заказывать в Вене. В начале XX в., как вспоминал Г. Дроздовский, представители сливок общества шили свой гардероб у портного Йозефа Залодека на Мучной площади (*Mehlplatz, с 1880 г. Rudolfplatz, теперь – пл. Филармонии – авт.*), но самым дорогим ведущим мастером был Соломон Мизелес (Hauptstrasse, 8), в салоне которого заказывали одежду прежде всего директора банков и крупных предприятий⁶⁹.

На благотворительном балу-маскараде, организованном 27 февраля 1854 г. Францем Урбаном в зале Микули, всего благотворительных взносов было собрано на сумму 65 фл. 20 к. Эта сумма компенсировала затраты на изготовление 83 входных билетов, аренду зала, освещение, музыку и другое, и только 10 фл. было передано в фонд инвалидов и бедных Буковины⁷⁰.

Ограничительными рамками относительно других слоев населения и как символ статуса в среде т. н. «zweite Gesellschaft» выступали не только имущество и материальные средства, а прежде всего «нематериальный»

⁶⁵ Andreas Mikulicz, *Die Musik in der Bukowina vor der Gründung des Vereins zur Förderung der Tonkunst 1775-1862* [Music in Bukovyna before the Founding of the Association for Promotion of Musical Arts 1775-1862], Czernowitz 1903, S. 22.

⁶⁶ *Bukowina Landes- und Amts- Zeitung* [Bukovina Official State Newspaper], 1863, 21. Jänner, S. 3.

⁶⁷ „Czernowitzer Zeitung” [Chernivtsi Newspaper], 1870, № 4, 9. Jänner, S. 4.

⁶⁸ „Bukowiner Rundschau” [Bukovinian Review], № 2620, 1898, 4. Jänner, S. 4.

⁶⁹ Georg Drozdowski, *op. cit.*, S. 110-111; *Handels- und Gewerbeadressbuch der Landeshauptstadt Czernowitz* [Trade and Industry Address Book of the Province Capital Chernivtsi], Czernowitz, 1911, S. 28-29.

⁷⁰ *Сведения и объявления о проведении маскарадов в г. Черновцы в благотворительных целях* [Information and Announcements on Masquerades held for charitable Purposes in Chernivtsi], Державний архів Чернівецької області, Ф.3. Крайове управління Буковини., Оп.1, Спр. 532, арк. 16.

капитал и образованность⁷¹.

Культурным капиталом на Буковине как доступ к «светскому обществу» для ненемецких наций выступало знание немецкого языка. Так, в салоне госпожи Марошани в конце 50-60 гг. XIX в. разговоры велись исключительно на немецком языке⁷², который в тогдашнем обществе считался «языком культуры». Но, несмотря на значительную популяризацию немецкого языка и культуры среди элиты Буковины, румынская знать, отправляя своих сыновей в Вену на обучение, чтобы они хорошо овладели немецким языком, как отмечает А. Л. Штауфе-Симигинович называла, его всего лишь «вторым родным языком»⁷³. Очевидно, буковинские румыны, ассимилируясь в культурном пространстве, не забывали о своей этнической идентичности и родном языке. Кроме того, в изысканном обществе общались также на румынском и польском языках, преимущество и общественный престиж которых также гарантировали принадлежность к «высшей культуре», возможность карьерного роста.

Указанные процессы были одной из причин т. н. «германизации», «ополячевания» и «румынизации» представителей украинского населения Буковины. Таких персон обобщали понятием «перебежчики». Во время визита в 1901 г. украинских писательниц О. Кобылянской и Л. Украинки дома священника Е. Федоровича в с. Стрилецкий Кут, он рассказывал им «родословные всех украинских перебежчиков на Буковине», которые в зависимости от личной выгоды превращались из украинцев в «волохов, немчиков и якобы „истиннорусских“»⁷⁴.

В среде среднего сословия, имитируя модель поведения аристократических групп, в повседневном общении прибегали к использованию французских и немецких слов и реплик. Так, госпожа Горецкая, героиня новеллы Е. Ярошинской, когда ей не хватало украинских слов, заменяла их немецкими, «как у нас почти все девицы делают, что с родителями и с матерями разговаривают на немецком и

⁷¹ Peter Urbanitsch, *Die Deutschen in Österreich. Statistisch-deskriptiver Überblick* [Germans in Austria. Statistical and Descriptive Overview], in «Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918» [The Habsburg Monarchy 1848–1918], Bd. III. Die Völker des Reiches [Peoples of the empire], T. 2, Wien, 1980, S. 150.

⁷² Осип Маковей, *op. cit.*, с. 107.

⁷³ Ludwig Adolf Simiginowicz-Staufe, *Die Völkergruppen der Bukowina. Ethnographisch-culturhistorische Skizzen*, Czernowitz [Ethnic Groups of Bukovina. Ethnographic, Cultural and Historical Sketches], 1884, S. 34.

⁷⁴ Денис Лукіянович, *op. cit.*, с. 455.

поэтому не имеют родного языка в употреблении»⁷⁵.

Принятие в светский круг общения происходило на основе селективного отбора способностей, качеств и «талантов» человека. Вежливые формы поведения и демонстрация «талантов» были составляющей частью аристократической самопрезентации, а также образцом для подражания средним классам⁷⁶. Культурный капитал для мужчин состоял из профессионального успеха, наличия мужских «талантов» (охота, спорт, знания в сфере естественных наук, искусства, культуры и др.) и мужских свойств (устойчивость, любовь к правде, умеренность, благоразумие и др.)⁷⁷. Для Австро-Венгерской империи общим был идеал мужчины с материальным достатком, который вместе с семьей посещал церковь и благотворительные балы, был желанным в обществе, а также часто принимал у себя гостей⁷⁸. Так, положительными коннотациями в дневнике О. Кобылянської наполнено следующее описание Чеховского, знакомого писательницы в городке Кымпулунг:

<i>Max meinte, dass Cz[echovsky]</i>	<i>Макс считает, что Ч[еховский]</i>
<i>seine Frau immer sehr nobel kleiden</i>	<i>будет всегда благородно одевать свою</i>
<i>wurde, und alle Bälle besuchen, sehr</i>	<i>жену, будет посещать все балы, очень</i>
<i>viel mit der Welt verkehren</i>	<i>часто общаться со светом. – перевод</i>
<i>wurde[...]</i> ⁷⁹ .	авт.

Из цитированного текста следует, что семья Кобылянских благосклонно относилась к мужчине, который ведет публичную жизнь.

Представителем новой элиты Буковины, которому в своей жизни удалось ярко воплотить в жизнь благородный способ поведения, был Эрнст Рудольф Нойбауэр (1822-1890) – профессор Черновицкой гимназии, поэт и импровизатор. Э. Р. Нойбауэр был выходцем из среднего сословия, его отец работал кассовым контролером текстильного кооператива в городе Игла (Моравия)⁸⁰. Свой социальный и культурный капитал Э. Р. Нойбауэр получил еще в Вене, во время прохождения там юридического обучения и работая воспитателем в доме старинной

⁷⁵ Євгенія Ярошинська, *Понад Дністром* [Over Dniester], in «Твори» [«Works»], Київ, 1968, с. 104.

⁷⁶ Ulrike Döcker, *op. cit.*, S. 97.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, S. 97.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, S. 98-99.

⁷⁹ *Щоденники Ольги Кобилянської* [Diaries of Olha Kobylianska], Чернівецький літературно-меморіальний музей Ольги Кобилянської, інв. № 2455, арк. 160.

⁸⁰ Alfred Klug, *Ernst Rudolf Neubauer. Der Mann und sein Werk* [The Man and his Work], T. 1, Czernowitz, 1931, S. 14.

дворянской семьи Маннер (1844-1846)⁸¹. Впоследствии ему удалось устроиться на должность секретаря при редакции газеты „Wiener Zeitung”. Но важнее, чем материальное обеспечение, было для него обстоятельство, что благодаря работе в редакции имперской газеты, он вошел в некоторый высокосветский круг. Так, он часто посещал салон владелицы газеты „Wiener Zeitung” госпожи фон Сальм. Ее салон был известным местом встречи художников Вены. В частности, Э. Р. Нойбауэр здесь лично познакомился с популярным сатириком М. Г. Сафиром⁸².

И. Лигачу считает, что Э. Р. Нойбауэр владел всеми компонентами символического капитала (экономический, социальный и культурный капиталы). Это подтверждается следующими фактами: Э. Р. Нойбауэр был издателем местного печатного органа, преподавателем единственной гимназии в Черновцах и членом многих обществ, а также автором многих прозаических и лирических произведений, изданных в Вене⁸³.

Э. Р. Нойбауэр в определенной степени попытался воплотить венский образ жизни в Черновцах. Известно, что он вел открытый дом («offene Haus») в Черновцах, где собирались все, кто имел тягу к искусству⁸⁴. Также он поддерживал отношения с местным дворянством. Особенно он подружился с землевладельцем Иоганном фон Мустацой. Именно последнему Э. Р. Нойбауэр обязан опубликованием *Lieder aus der Bukowina* в Вене (1855) и финансированием празднования столетнего юбилея немецкого писателя Фридриха Шиллера в своем доме (1859), куда были приглашены около 150 гостей⁸⁵.

К кругу его знакомых принадлежали также творческие личности Черновцов: Иоганн Кауфман, Карл Эмиль Француз, братья Теодор и Янку Лупу, Юрий Федькович⁸⁶. Последний часто бывал в доме Э. Р. Нойбауэра, который побудил его к переводу украинских народных песен, вышедших на немецком языке в приложении газеты „Bukowina-Sonntagsblatt” (издатель Э. Р. Нойбауэр – *авт.*). Вот как описывает Ю. Федькович знакомство со своим наставником:

Возвратившись уже офицером летом 1859 года из Италии в Черновцы, познакомился с любимым немецким поэтом, профессором Найбавером, которого так высоко ценю, как самого певца Всеволода Тура;

⁸¹ *Biographische Momente aus dem Leben Ernst Rudolf Neubauers...*, S. 4.

⁸² Alfred Klug, *op. cit.*, S. 26.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, S. 19.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, S. 38.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, S. 40.

⁸⁶ Ion Lihaciu, *op. cit.*, S. 18.

прочитав мои немецкие думы, которые еще в Молдове писал, этот ревностный немецкий поэт так меня очень полюбил, что я не только вход в его высоко почтенный дом получил, но он мне даже раз говорил, что я в лирике с любым немецким поэтом меряться могу ... - перевод авт.⁸⁷

Кроме того, Ю. Федькович находясь в доме Э. Р. Нойбауера, обсуждал вопрос основания украиноязычного журнала, о чем он пишет в письме от 1863 г. к Д. Тянячкевичу:

«Как-то в Черновцах был я у редактора «Буковины» (Bukowina Landes- und Amtszeitung – авт.) – о многом там говорилось, и наконец пришли к тому, не могла бы на нашей Буковине одна руська [украинская. – авт.] газета [...] выходить. Профессор Найбавер говорил, что он бы мог сейчас концессию получить, если бы я редактором этой газеты стал»⁸⁸.

Таким образом, благодаря своему поэтическому таланту офицер Ю. Федькович получил доступ не только к дому Э. Р. Нойбауера, но и к другим «честным домам», как пишет сам писатель⁸⁹. Состоятельные черновицкие семьи также были рады видеть в своих домах талантливого юного поэта Карла Эмиля Францоza. Они видели в нем, как предполагает А. Корбеа-Гойше, потенциальную «брачную партию» («Heiratspartie») для своих дочерей. В частности, в письме к другу К. Е. Француз пишет о своих дружеских отношениях с богатыми еврейскими семьями Цукер и Розенцвайг⁹⁰.

Главную роль для человека в XIX в. играла способность к коммуникации⁹¹, основы которой были сформулированы в многочисленных книгах о манерах, которые стали одним из инструментов индивидуального проникновения в «высший свет»⁹². Так, в книге с названием *Welt und Ton: Ein nützliches Bildungsbuch zum Eintritte in die feine Gesellschaft* (Свет и тон: полезное учебное пособие для входа в светское общество), которая была издана в 1833 г. (Прага). Автор пишет, что достигнуть положения в «изысканном обществе» позволяют не только происхождение, богатство или высокий ранг – «сейчас нас приводят в „изысканное общество“ разумное воспитание, хороший способ мышления, обычай, духовность и дружеские отношения [...], способ поведения»⁹³. Таким

⁸⁷ Осип Маковей, *op. cit.*, с. 96.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, с. 195.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, с. 105.

⁹⁰ Andrei Corbea-Noise, *op. cit.*, S. 47, 79.

⁹¹ Ulrike Döcker, *op. cit.*, S. 100.

⁹² Ernst Bruckmüller, Hannes Stekl, *op. cit.*, S. 180.

⁹³ Alexandre Martin, *Welt und Ton: Ein nützliches Bildungsbuch zum Eintritte in die feine Gesellschaft* [World and Sound: A useful educational book for introduction to the fine

образом, автор фиксирует изменение общественных представлений и возрастание роли безупречной самопрезентации и репутации в «светском обществе».

Для лучшей репутации и успеха в «изысканном» обществе нужно было работать над своими талантами: посещать высшую школу и университет, самостоятельно расширять свои знания по культуре и искусству, игре на фортепиано, танцев, фехтованию, путешествовать, иметь эксклюзивное хобби, совершенствовать манеры. Талантам, которые бы отвечали габитусу «буржуазности», можно было научиться и в Черновицком университете. Г. Дроздовский писал, что в начале XX в. уроки танца и хорошие манеры для черновицкой молодежи преподавал Антон Филес, который читал курс *«Танец и эстетика рук и ног»* в университете, также известный как танцмейстер на балах⁹⁴. К нему на курсы записывались члены академических обществ. *«Иногда эти курсы посещали целеустремленные и дальновидные дамы, принадлежавшие не к простому люду, а имели благородных родителей и происходили из «добропорядочных семей» («aus gutem Hause»)*⁹⁵.

На страницах буковинских газет конца XIX – нач. XX вв. часто встречаются объявления частных уроков танцев и преподавания иностранного языка: на зимних курсах 1883-1884 гг. танцам учил А. Биндерер⁹⁶, а в 1901 г. свои услуги обучения французскому языку и игре на фортепиано предлагала родителям учениц А. Билинская⁹⁷.

Владение культурным капиталом служило также средством для подъема в «изысканное» общество путем брака с представителем соответствующего социального слоя. В произведении Е. Ярошинской *Золотое сердце* родители главной героини пытались убедить ее выйти замуж за большого землевладельца – «пана», мотивируя это тем, что она, таким образом, займет высокий социальный статус:

*С ним сможешь вступить в лучшие общества; не понадобится строить комплименты дамам чиновников, как до сих пор, будешь на них сверху смотреть, как они теперь на тебя*⁹⁸.

society], Prag, 1833, S. 13

⁹⁴ Georg Drozdowski, *op. cit.*, S. 89; „Bukowiner Nachrichten“, 1898, № 2791, 16. Jänner, S. 2.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, S. 90.

⁹⁶ „Czernowitzer Zeitung“ [Chernivtsi Newspaper], 1883, № 255, 8. November, S. 7.

⁹⁷ „Буковина“ [Bukovina], 1901, Ч. 93, 8 сепня, с. 3.

⁹⁸ Євгенія Ярошинська, *Золоте серце* [Golden Heart], in «Твори» [Works], Київ, 1968, с. 63.

Особенно это было актуально для женщин из среднего сословия, культурный капитал которых состоял из их умений ведения домашнего хозяйства, женских талантов (образованность в искусстве и культуре, музыкальные интересы, послушание, вежливость) и женских качеств (добродушие, верность, порядочность и др.)⁹⁹. Э. Турчинский отмечает, что образование для молодых девушек в Новое время было даже важнее чем приданое¹⁰⁰. В автобиографии *О себе самой* О. Кобылянская подает детальный список составляющих культурного капитала «для женщин среднего слоя»:

*Знание хозяйства, знание красного шитья, вышивки, чистописание ... знание священного писания, чтения вообще, знание французского языка (хотя бы только поверхностное), игра на гитаре, на фортепиано, танцы – вот и все, что давалось девушке - как духовное приданое*¹⁰¹. – перевод авт.

Обладая таким инструментарием, у женщины из буржуазной среды появлялся шанс на «выгодную партию». Героиня произведения О. Кобылянской *Меланхолический вальс*, не обладая материальным благополучием, заботилась о накоплении культурного капитала с целью удачно выйти замуж:

*Училась музыки и языков, и всевозможных ручных работ, и все остальное, что только можно было, вбирала я в себя, чтобы стало когда-нибудь капиталом и обернулось на пользу. Имущества у меня не было, а жизнь, привередлива, как молодая девушка, требовала своего*¹⁰². – перевод авт.

Таким образом, безупречные репрезентации и знания соответствующей символической системы были средством для интеграции в изысканное общество.

ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЕ

Во второй половине XIX в. на Буковине возникла новая общественная элита, которую характеризовали не только принадлежность к новым формам коммуникации, но и новая культурная практика. Составной такой практики стало ведение «изысканного» образа жизни в пределах т. н. «светского общества».

Социальным полем формирования светского общества Буковины

⁹⁹ Ulrike Döcker, *op. cit.*, S. 97.

¹⁰⁰ Emanuel Turczynski, *op. cit.*, S. 130.

¹⁰¹ Ольга Кобылянська: *Альманах у пам'ятку її сорокалітньої письменницької діяльності (1887-1927)*, с. 46.

¹⁰² Ольга Кобылянська, *Людина...*, с. 116.

были просветительно-культурные и этнические объединения, частные салоны, престижные профессии. Пределы интеграции устанавливались как целенаправленным использованием материальных благ, так и поведенческими ритуалами и нормами.

Возникновение новых форм коммуникации, в том числе сети «казиновых обществ» в городах, иногда и в селах Буковины, создало поле для общения элитных слоев местного населения и их самовоспроизведения, которое базировалось на принятии в свою группу лиц, соответствующих их культурному габитусу. Кроме того, социальный состав таких обществ не был однородным, их членами были как дворяне, чиновники, так и представители духовенства и образованного среднего сословия. Таким образом, это способствовало преодолению сословной дифференциации (между представителями знати и среднего сословия). Касательно национального деления в структуре «светского общества» Буковины, то немцы, евреи, румыны и поляки доминантно занимали в нем привилегированное положение, в отличие от украинцев. Такое положение представителей украинского населения в публичной жизни Буковины способствовало их германизации и румынизации.

FORMATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE BORDERS OF GREATER ROMANIA (1918-1940)*

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Rezumat: Constituirea și evoluția frontierelor României Mari (1918-1940)

Frontierele României Mari sunt rezultatul direct al Primului Război Mondial. Datorită efortului de război făcut de partea Antantei, România și-a alipit vechile provincii istorice românești Bucovina și Transilvania (incluzând Banat, Crișana, Maramureș și Satu Mare) și județele Durostor și Caliacra din sudul Dobrogei. Ca urmare a izbucnirii Revoluției Socialiste din octombrie 1917 și a demantelării Imperiului Rus, România a reușit să alipească provincia istorică românească Basarabia, anexată de Imperiul Rus în 1812.

Evoluția propriu-zisă a frontierelor Regatului Român în perioada 1918-1940 a fost influențată de contextul politic, diplomatic și militar internațional. După recunoașterea noilor frontiere ale României în cadrul Conferinței de Pace de la Paris (1919-1920), Regatul Român a cultivat relații politice, diplomatice și militare bune cu Polonia, Cehoslovacia și Iugoslavia, în cazul unui atac neprovocat venit din partea Uniunii Sovietice (alianța cu Polonia) sau a Ungariei (Mica Înțelegeră, alianță creată în 1923 împreună cu Iugoslavia și Cehoslovacia).

Frontiera cu Bulgaria era apărată diplomatic și, la nevoie, militar de către statul român prin intermediul Înțelegerii Balcanice, formate în 1934 cu participarea României, Iugoslaviei, Greciei și Turciei.

În perioada interbelică, frontierele României Mari erau amenințate de trei revizionisme: revizionismul sovietic (de departe cel mai periculos), revizionismul maghiar și revizionismul bulgar. Beneficiind de un context internațional extrem de favorabil, generat de politica de conciliatorism a Angliei și Franței față de Germania, Italia și URSS, coroborat cu pactul de neagresiune germano-sovietic din 23 august 1939, Uniunea Sovietică, Ungaria și Bulgaria au modificat frontierele României Mari în 1940. Atunci România a cedat în favoarea URSS-ului Basarabia și nordul Bucovinei, nord-vestul Transilvaniei în favoarea Ungariei, județele Durostor și Caliacra în favoarea Bulgariei.

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Abstract: *The borders of the Greater Romania are the direct result of the First World War. Due to the war effort made on the side of the Entente, Romania has reunited the old Romanian historical provinces Bucovina and Transylvania (including Banat, Crișana, Maramureș and Satu Mare), and the counties of Durostor (Dorostolon) and Kaliakra of Southern Dobrogea. Following the outbreak of the Socialist Revolution of October 1917, and the unraveling of the Russian Empire, Romania managed to incorporate the Romanian historical province of Bessarabia, annexed by the Russian Empire in 1812.*

The properly evolution of the Romanian Kingdom's borders in the years between 1918 and 1940 was influenced by the political, diplomatic and military international context. After recognizing the new borders of Romania at the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920), the Kingdom of Romania cultivated good political, diplomatic and military relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, in case of an unprovoked attack by the Soviet Union (the alliance with Poland) or by Hungary (The Little Entente, the alliance formed in 1923 together with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia).

The border with Bulgaria was defended diplomatic and, if necessary, military by the Romanian State, through the Balkan Entente, formed in 1934 with the participation of Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey.

In the interwar period, the borders of the Greater Romania were threatened by three revisionist attitudes: the Soviet revisionism (by far the most dangerous), the Hungarian revisionism and the Bulgarian revisionism. In 1940, with a highly favorable international context, generated by the policy of appeasement followed by Britain and France towards Germany, Italy and the USSR, in conjunction with the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria have changed the borders of the Greater Romania. In addition, Romania has ceded Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina to the USSR, the Northwestern Transylvania to Hungary, and the counties of Durostor (Dorostolon) and Kaliakra to Bulgaria.

Résumé: La constitution et l'évolution des frontières de la Roumanie Grande (1918-1940)

Les frontières de la Roumanie Grande sont le résultat direct de la Première Guerre Mondiale. Grâce à l'effort de guerre que l'Entente fit, la Roumanie réunit les anciennes provinces historiques roumaines la Bucovine et la Transylvanie (y inclus Banat, Crișana, Maramureș et Satu Mare), ainsi que les départements Durostor (Dorostolon) et Caliacra du sud de Dobroudja. Par conséquent de l'éclatement de la Révolution Socialiste d'octobre 1917 et de la désorganisation de l'Empire Russe, la Roumanie réussit à relier la province historique roumaine la Bessarabie que l'Empire Russe annexa en 1812.

Le contexte politique, diplomatique et militaire international influença l'évolution proprement-dite des frontières du Royaume Roumain dans la période 1918-1940. Après avoir reconnu les nouvelles frontières de la Roumanie dans le cadre de la Conférence de paix de Paris (1919-1920), le Royaume Roumain cultiva de bonnes relations politiques, diplomatiques et militaires avec la Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie et l'Yougoslavie, le cas d'une attaque pas provoquée de la partie de l'Union Soviétique (l'alliance avec la Pologne)

ou de l'Hongrie (la Petite Entente, alliance créée en 1923 ensemble à l'Yougoslavie et la Tchécoslovaquie).

L'Etat roumain a défendu la frontière avec la Bulgarie diplomatiquement et, si nécessaire militairement, à l'intermédiaire de l'Entente Balkanique, formée en 1934 avec la participation de la Roumanie, l'Yougoslavie, la Grèce et la Turquie.

Pendant la période de l'entre-deux-guerres, trois attitudes révisionnistes menacèrent les frontières de la Roumanie Grande: le révisionnisme soviétique (de loin de plus dangereux), le révisionnisme hongrois et le révisionnisme bulgare. Tout en bénéficiant d'un contexte international extrêmement favorable, généré par la politique conciliatoire de l'Angleterre et de la France envers l'Allemagne, l'Italie et l'URSS, corroboré avec le pacte de non agression allemand-soviétique de 23 août 1939, l'Union Soviétique, l'Hongrie et la Bulgarie modifièrent en 1940 les frontières de la Roumanie Grande. De plus, la Roumanie céda en faveur de l'URSS la Bessarabie et le nord de la Bucovine, le nord-ouest de la Transylvanie en faveur de l'Hongrie, les départements Durostor et Kaliakra en faveur de la Bulgarie.

Keywords: Greater Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Soviet Union

Introduction

Kingdom of Romania or Greater Romania (Rom. „Romania Mare”) was placed in 1920 to sixth place in Europe in terms of area (295,641 km square) and population (19,084,000 people)¹. In terms of borders, the new Romanian state faces a dual problem: embedded Romanian historical provinces that had been part of other states; become neighbor with new states.

Thus, Bessarabia had been part of The Russian Empire; Bukovina and Transylvania (in which the regions Banat, Crişana, Maramureş and Satu Mare were included) had been parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The mentality and way of living of the population, economic and social legislation and the organization of these provinces were completely different from those of the former kingdom of Romania (Rom. „România Mică”², i.e. Little Romania). In addition, customs and frontier guards' services organization here was totally different compared to that of the Little Romania. Also, in 1919 Greater Romania

¹ „Grănicerul. Publicație lunară pentru educarea soldatului grănicer” [Border Guard. Monthly periodical for education of the border guard soldier], Bucharest, 4th Frontier Guard Brigade, II, 1st of March, 1933.

² This expression is usually used in the Romanian historiography to designate the Romanian state between 1859-1918.

had international borders with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary and the Soviet Union; these countries did not exist before 1918.

In this context, the Romanian authorities had to solve two problems: fixing borders with neighbors and accommodating legislation concerning its borders to the international context and realities. This article, based on unpublished sources and the most representative Romanian bibliography, has the following structure:

1. The importance of borders in history
2. Genesis and evolution of state borders of Greater Romania
3. Under revisionist pressure. The end of Greater Romania

The importance of borders in history

The concept of border was not practically known from the genesis of the ancient states. Typically, in Antiquity, between two states or two tribes, or between a state and a union of tribes, an uninhabited area was kept, in order to avoid possible conflicts. According to Roman point of view, border was reduced to famous fortified *limes*, with troops encamped in *castra* and *castella*, in order to create a military protective device (most known examples in the ancient Dacia: *limes Alutanus* (Alutus = Olt river in nowadays Romania), *limes Transalutanus*). At the end of the 9th century a.Chr., **border concept** is taking shape thanks to the division of territories – after some treaties were concluded. In this respect, the best known example is the Treaty of Verdun (843), which defines the future medieval Germany, France and Lotharingia (i.e. Alsace and Lorraine, the object of century-old quarrel between Germany and France).

Since the 9th century meaning of the ancient Roman term *limes*, with meanings mainly related to military protection has changed, leading to contemporary signification.

Thus, the meaning of the word *boundary* is defined as real or imaginary line demarcating the territories of two states or the territory of a state and the high seas. Border delimits also, vertically, airspace and subsoil of a state. In most cases, borders between states are established by treaties, while maritime borders are delimited, usually, by the national legislation of the littoral states.³

Borders have played an important role in international relations, their establishment being in history the subject of endless conflicts. According to the

³ Aurel Neagu, Dumitru Popescu, Anton Găgiu, *Monografia frontierei de stat a României* [Monograph of the state border of Romania], Bucharest, CNI Coresi Publishing House, 2003, p. 22.

general opinion of specialists, 85% of international conflicts start from border or territorial disputes.

Closely related to the concept of border is the notion "territory". Roughly speaking, we can say that the territory of the state is stable because it is inhabited by a permanent social community (people or nation), and specifically limited by borders that delimit it from other countries, the seas and cosmic space. State borders are basically – except wars, inviolable. There is between state and its borders a close interdependence, an indestructible unity: the territory is enclosed between borders and boundaries delimited territory.

Demarcation of the border territories was considered since ancient times a sacred duty of the state. This duty was and it is put into practice by protecting citizens and enhancing the territory, as a place of building and future development of peoples/nations. Currently, the border is considered as a pledge of national security, its violations constituting an act of extreme gravity, sanctioned by both, national and international laws.

Presently, the notion of border is indisputably linked to the notion of state⁴. Evolution of a State border is very closely linked to the historical development of the State⁵. Nowadays, there is no territory in the world without a clear and precise delimitation of its frontiers⁶.

Romanian borders were thus logically very closely related to the metamorphosis of the Romanian state, to its various conflicts and wars. Accordingly, Romania's territorial boundaries have changed many times⁷.

Besides this definition somewhat "static" of the border (i.e. limit of territorial expansion of a state) there is a "dynamic" definition, introduced after 1990 in Romania especially by the sociologist Ilie Bădescu, who borrowed it from the Anglo-Saxon sociology.

According to analyzes made by Ilie Bădescu, followed by Dan Dungaciu, border is a phenomenon of expansion of a people, civilization, ideology. We offer to the reader two quoting, significant in this respect.

"Border phenomenon is the opportunity of a people to check the power of conservation its identity. Today, people no longer relate to each other, but each separately and all together, at one and the same phenomenon: the European

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Marcela Nedeia, *Ținuturile istorice românești. Evoluție, structură, tensiuni* [Romanian historical realms. Evolution, structure, tensions], in "Geopolitica". Revistă de Geografie, GeoPolitică și Geostrategie [Geopolitics. Journal of Geography, geopolitics and geostrategy], Bucharest, III, no. 11/2005, p. 93.

⁶ Aurel Neagu, Dumitru Popescu, Anton Gagi, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁷ Petre Deică, *Frontierele statale ale României* [State borders of Romania], in "Geopolitica", IV, no. 20/2006, p. 13.

frontier. Europe is a universal phenomenon frontier. This means that every nation on the planet confronted itself in the modern era, with European frontier phenomenon. In this sense, every people is working on solving the same problems raised by the European expansion. Although universal in nature, the European frontier manifests itself every time, as a set of economic, social, political, gnosiological, cultural and psychological processes absolutely specific, unmistakable, from a nation to another"⁸.

In Greater Romania (Romania Mare) has amplified the phenomenon of adaptation of the country to the European frontier. This process started in the 19th century when, after 1821, attempts of recovery of around three centuries of economic, social, cultural, military, technological etc underdevelopment were made. These good or bad attempts (see famous Titu Maiorescu's famous "theory of forms without substance", Rom. *forme fără fond*) were made by all Romanian elites, who have taken and adapted more or less happy, Western institutions to the Romanian space.

Romanian elites from interwar period have taken Western notions of international law related to the delimitation of boundaries and adapted them to the Romanian state.

Genesis and evolution of state borders of Greater Romania

Establishing of borders between neighboring countries is legally made by treaties (agreements) which describing the route of the border line. On a map annexed to these treaties, the borderline is graphically represented. To enter into force, these agreements must be ratified by the legal institution of each state. After their ratification, these agreements (treaties) become part of the law and can be applied only by this. Obviously, there are internal laws of each State which governing borders' regime. International law and specialty literature emphasis the fact that the legal rules governing relations between neighboring states designate a legal regime of neighborhood.

Greater Romania was created after the First World War. Ionel I.C. Brătianu, the premier of Romania, delayed two years his country's enter into the war, either the Central Powers, or the (Triple) Entente. It decided in 1916 that Romania will enter into the war on the (Triple) Entente side. Then it was already obvious that the Central Powers cannot use endless their military advantages (better officers and troops) and will be surely defeated in this conflict of attrition

⁸ Ilie Bădescu, Dan Dungaci, *Sociologia și geopolitica frontierei* [Sociology and geopolitics of frontiers], vol. 1, Bucharest: Floare Albastră [i.e. Blue Flower] Publishing House, 1995, p. 2.

by the Entente (Britain, France, Russia, Italy), with far greater economic and demographic resources. Romania's entry into the war was decided by secret treaty of alliance of 4/17 August 1916, signed by Romania, Russia, France, England and Italy.

This treaty specifies that:

"I. Russia, France, England and Italy guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Romania in the whole extent of its current borders.

II. Romania is obliged to declare war and attack Austria-Hungary as determined by the military convention; Romania is also obligated to cease since the declaration of war any commercial ties and economic exchange with all enemies of the allies.

III. Russia, France, England and Italy recognize Romania's right to annex the territories of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy provided in Article IV.

IV. Limits of territories from the past article (i.e. art. III) are determined as follows:

The borderline will start from the Prut from a point of nowadays borders between Russia and Romania near Novosulitza (Rom. Noua Suliță = New Spear) and will go up the river to the border of Galicia, where Prut meets with Ceremuș. That will follow the border between Galicia and Hungary until point Stog, altitude 1655. Farther will follow the line of separation between waters of the Tisza and Vizo in order to reach the Tisza, to the village Trebuza, above where it (i.e. Tisza) joins with Vizo..."⁹.

The Happy End of WWI for Romania, in the camp of winners, led to radical changes of borders in its favor.

The Peace Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria signed at Saint Germain en Laye on 10 September 1919 recognized the union of the Romanian historical province Bukovina with its Motherland. We mention that Bukovina was kidnapped from Moldavia by the Austrian Empire in 1774-1775.

Article 59 of this treaty stipulated the following: "Austria gives up, in favor of Romania, all rights and titles to the part of the former Duchy of Bukovina so will be established later by the main Allied and Associated powers"¹⁰.

⁹ Sever Neagoe, *Teritoriul și frontierele în istoria românilor* [The territory and borders in the history of Romanians], Bucharest, Interior Ministry Publishing House, 1995, p. 187.

¹⁰ The treaty was published in a separate edition in Bucharest, the State Printing House, 1920, pp. 16-17. *Apud* Sever Neagoe, *Teritoriul și frontierele în istoria românilor*, pp. 193-194.

Borders of the Romanian Kingdom with the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom (i.e. Yugoslavia since 1929), Czechoslovakia and Poland have been established and recognized (diplomatically and legally) by the Treaty which the Allied and Associated Powers have signed with these countries at Sèvres on 10 August 1920. We mention that this treaty is known in the historical literature as “the treaty of borders”¹¹.

The border between Romania and the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian state was established by the article 2 of this treaty, which stipulated the following: “With the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian State, the following line: from here (i.e. Beba Veche, our note) to southeast up to a point chosen on the Nera, about 1 km east of the road between Kusiscs (Cusici) and Neroaranyos (Zalticsa) (...) hence to southeast towards downstream up to the confluence of the Nera with the Danube, the channel of Nera; hence towards south-east up to the confluence of Timok with the Danube: the main fairway of the Danube. This confluence is the common point of the three boundaries of Bulgaria, Romania and Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian State”¹².

Romania’s relations with the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian State were good in the interwar period; both countries have built the Little Entente (1921 – together with Czechoslovakia) and the Balkan Entente (1934), which also included Greece and Turkey.

Romania’s border with Czechoslovakia and Poland, secured by the above-mentioned Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920) was established on the following alignments:

“With the Czechoslovakian state, from the meeting point of the boundaries of Romania with the boundaries of the Czechoslovakian state and Hungary, towards northeast up to the river Tisza and then on this river up to the confluence of the river Noritza with the river Tisza; here eastward up to the Mount Stog; (...) common point of the three boundaries of Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

¹¹ Dan Lazăr, *România și Iugoslavia în primul deceniu interbelic. Relații politico-diplomatice (1919-1929)* [Romania and Yugoslavia in the first interwar decade. Political and Diplomatic Relations (1919-1929)], Iași, University Al. I. Cuza Publishing House, 2009, pp. 23-29.

¹² *** *Culegere de tratate, acorduri, convenții și acte normative interne privind marea teritorială și trupele interne ale Republicii Socialiste România* [Collection of treaties, agreements, conventions and internal law documents concerning the territorial sea and internal troops of the Socialist Republic of Romania], Bucharest, Headquarters of Border Guards, 1979, pp. 70-71.

With Poland, from the mount Stog up to the source of the Ceremuș river, then to the northeast on this river up to its confluence with the Prut river, then to the northeast on the Dniester river 10 kilometers upstream from the locality Zalescic and further towards east on the Dniester river to Hotin”¹³.

In the frame of the Romanian-Czechoslovakian border delimitation process, the Protocol of Prague was signed on the 4th of May 1921. This protocol stipulated that “Czechoslovakia gives to Romania eight communes and an area of 175 square km with a population of 10,800 persons, which 7093 are Romanians and Romania gives to Czechoslovakia three communes with an area of 60 square kilometers with a population of 3112 inhabitants, which 6 are Romanians”¹⁴. We again emphasize that the relations between Romania and Czechoslovakia were very good in the interwar period.

Romanian-Polish border, agreed in principle at the end of WWI¹⁵ and legally and diplomatic recognized during the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920)¹⁶, kept the attention of authorities in both countries at the highest level.

According to a study made by the Romanian demographer Sabin Manuilă, “the Polish border is of 346.6 kilometers, of which 271.7 km natural border. Even here, a mathematical delimitation (ethnically speaking) could not be carried out”¹⁷.

On the 3rd of March 1921, Romania and Poland signed a defensive alliance Convention, accompanied by a military convention – in fact, a mutual guarantee of their Eastern borders against of an unprovoked attack made by the Soviet Union (“neighbor to the east”, in the text).

Establishing of the Romanian-Hungarian border was not only a laborious but a controversial activity. This was achieved by the peace treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers with Hungary signed on June 4, 1920 at Trianon. In Part II, art. 27, paragraph 3, the Romanian-Hungarian border route was very attentively demarcated¹⁸.

¹³ Sever Neagoe, *Teritoriul și frontierele în istoria românilor*, p. 194.

¹⁴ Aurel Neagu, Victor Aelenei, *Istoria Frontierei României* [History of Romania's Border], Bucharest, Pro Transylvania Publishing House, 2003, p. 182.

¹⁵ Arhivele Naționale Istorie Centrale [Central Historical National Archives], further ANIC), fond Casa Regală [Royal House Fund], file 81/1919, f. 1-10.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Royal House Fund, file 42/1919, f. 1-20; *Ibid.*, Royal House Fund, file 49/1919, f. 1-2. Letter signed “Dutasta”; *Ibid.*, Royal House Fund, file 2/1920, f. 1-5.

¹⁷ Sabin Manuilă, *Studiu etnografic asupra populației României* [Ethnographic study on the population of Romania], Bucharest, Central Institute of Statistics Publishing House, 1940, p. 13.

¹⁸ Aurel Neagu, Victor Aelenei, *Istoria Frontierei României*, p. 133. Treaty of Trianon was published in Romania in “Monitorul Oficial” [Official Monitor], no. 36 of

Hungarian governments from the interwar period led by Miklos Horthy (former admiral of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) never accepted this border. Getting willingness of Germany and Italy, Hungary obtained northwest of the Romanian historical province Transylvania by the Vienna Diktat of 30 August 1940. Hungary failed to keep this region, officially returned to Romania at the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, which established the borders of Europe after the Second World War.

Romanian-Bulgarian border was established by the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, in 20 September 1920. This treaty reconfirmed Romanian-Bulgarian border, as it was set by the Peace Treaty of Bucharest (10 August 1913), at the end of the Second Balkan War. Article 27, paragraph 5 of the Treaty of 1920 provided that borders of Bulgaria with Romania are established as follows: "From the Black Sea to the Danube: similar border that existed on August 1, 1914; from there to the confluence of Timok with the Danube; the main fairway of the Danube upstream"¹⁹.

Neither Bulgaria was not satisfied with these borders, which is why he went into the camp of the revisionist powers. Speculating difficult international position of Romania, Bulgaria has taken from Romania (after official talks in Craiova, 7th of September 1940) the southern part of Dobroudja (i.e. Durostor (Dorostolon) and Kaliakra counties).

Under revisionist pressure. The end of Greater Romania

In the interwar period, Romanian diplomacy manifested in favor of collective security system – in the spirit of historical traditions of Romanian foreign policy²⁰, acting for a climate of security in the region and promoting good relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Relations with Hungary, Bulgaria and the USSR were cold.

Romanian kingdom pursued constantly, without hesitation, regardless of political composition of its governments, borders' defense against revisionist actions manifested by Hungary, Bulgaria and the USSR. The revisionist pressure became greater, especially from the 30s and had the peak in the summer of 1940.

September 21, 1920.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 151. This treaty was published in "Monitorul Oficial", no. 135 of September 20, 1920.

²⁰ Gheorghe Buzatu, *România și Marile Puteri 1939/1947* [Romania and the Great Powers 1939/1947], Bucharest, Encyclopedic Publishing House, 2003, p. 2.

German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939 gave virtually free hand for the USSR in southeastern Europe, the situation of Bessarabia and north of Bukovina becoming very difficult. We present to the reader the essence of the four articles of the secret protocol, adjacent to the non-aggression pact.

The first article provided that, if a politico-territorial transformation (Germ. *Umgestaataaltung*) occurred in the Baltic region, the northern boundary of Lithuania will represent the limit of the German sphere of influence. Finland, Estonia and Latvia had to belong to the sphere of interests of the Soviet Union and Lithuania (with Wilno) to that of Germany²¹.

The second article stated that in case of a "territorial-political transformations", the line of dividing Poland between spheres of interests of two countries will pass on watercourses Narew, Vistula and San²².

The third article interests Romania particularly: "As regards South-Eastern Europe, the Soviet side emphasis its interest for Bessarabia. The German side declares total political disinterest for these regions"²³.

The fourth article contained the agreement of both sides to keep strictly secret this protocol²⁴.

On the base of the 3rd article of this German-Soviet pact, borders of the Romanian Kingdom were arbitrarily changed in the summer of 1940 by the territorial concessions to Soviet Union (28 July 1940), Hungary (30 August 1940) and Bulgaria (6 September 1940)²⁵.

It should be noted that Soviet-Romanian relations in the interwar period, unfriendly or cold, followed by Romania's participation (allied with Germany) in the war against the Soviet Union (1941-1944) generated territorial changes

²¹ Domas Krivickas, *The Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact of 1939: Legal and Political Consequences*, in „Lituanus. Lithuanian Quarterly Journal Of Arts and Sciences”, volume 34, No. 2, Summer 1989, Vilnius, <http://www.lituanus.org/>. Accessed in 24.05.2015.

²² Ion Șișcanu, Vitalie Văratice, *Pactul Molotov - Ribbentrop. Culegere de documente* [Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact. Collection of documents], Kishinev, Universitas Publishing House, 1991, doc. no. 2, p. 7.

²³ Vitalie Văratice, *Preliminarii la raptul Basarabiei și a Nordului Bucovinei, 1938 – 1940* [Preliminaries at kidnapping of Bessarabia and North of Bukovina, 1938 – 1940], Bucharest, Libra Press Publishing House, 2000, p. 231; Vătăman, Dan, *România în relațiile internaționale (1939-1947)* [Romania in international relations (1939-1947)], vol. 1, Bucharest, Pro Universitaria Publishing House, 2009, p. 59.

²⁴ Florin Zamfir, Jean Banciu, 1939. *Ultimul an de pace, întâiul an de război* [1939. Last year of peace, the first year of war], Bucharest, Oscar Print Publishing House, 2000, pp. 265-266.

²⁵ Grigore Stamate, *Frontiera de stat a României* [State border of Romania], Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 1997, p. 143.

unfavorable for Romania. These changes persisted until nowadays. However, we must mention that the blame does not belong in any case only for Romania. Constantly, the Soviet Union maintained and developed various secret military projects to invade the territories of Bukovina and Bessarabia²⁶, supporting irredentist actions of some groups in these provinces. These actions were in the permanent attention of the Secret Services of the Romanian state²⁷. In this respect, anti-Soviet policy of interwar Romanian governments was legally justified. Borders of Bukovina were forcibly and illegally modified in 1940 after the unjust ultimatum of 26th of June addressed by the Soviet Union to Romanian Kingdom.

After this ultimatum, in the northern part of Bukovina and in the Hertza region, Romanian legislation was replaced in 1940-1941 with Soviet legislation²⁸. In the period 1941-1944 we have in these regions, again, a Romanian legislation. Meanwhile, Romanian kingdom was divided in the time of the King Carol II in realms/lands (Rom. „ținuturi”)²⁹. Later, during Ion Antonescu's regime (1940-1944), the so-called Governance of Bukovina (Rom. „Guvernământul Bucovinei”) was created. All these changes were reflected in the organization of the management of borders³⁰.

In 1945-1947 the south of Bukovina was under Soviet occupation. Later, after the end of World War II, Romania's borders were established at the Peace Conference from Paris (1947). In the case of northern part of Bukovina and Bessarabia, under pressure of the Soviet Union, was respected the border

²⁶ Octavian Țăcu, *Problema Basarabiei și a relațiilor sovieto-române în perioada interbelică (1919-1939)* [Problem of Bessarabia and Soviet-Romanian relations in the interwar period (1919-1939)], Kishinev, Prut International Publishing House, 2004, p. 206.

²⁷ Ludmila Rotari, *Mișcarea subversivă din Basarabia în anii 1918-1924* [The subversive movement in Bessarabia in the years 1918-1924], Bucharest, Encyclopedic Publishing House, 2004, p. 79ff.

²⁸ ANIC, fond Direcția Generală a Poliției [General Directorate of Police Fund, further DGP], file 457/1939, f. 1-229. A number of issues concerning Germany's preparations for the invasion of Poland (1st of September 1939) are mentioned. Also, pieces of information concerning increasing border crossings from Galicia (then in Poland, our note) to Romania and preparations made by the ethnic Germans of Romania to repatriate themselves in the Third Reich are in this file mentioned; *Ibid.* DGP Fund, file 45/1940, f. 167, 234.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Fond Inspectoratele Regionale de Poliție [Regional Inspectorates of Police, further IRP], file 280, f. 164.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Fond Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei [General Inspectorate of Gendarmerie fund, further IGJ], file 63/1940, f. 11.

established by Romanian-Soviet Agreement of 28th of June 1940³¹.

Entered in the Soviet sphere of influence and without a real support from the Great Western democracies (practically since 1937!)³², Romania was forced to accept the loss of territories which were a legal part of his national state³³.

Conclusions

In the Greater Romania (1919-1940) was manifested itself a major process of institutional, social-economic, political and cultural adaptation to the European realities.

Evolution of the borders of the Romanian Kingdom in the period 1918-1947 was closely linked to how evolved the political, diplomatic and military international situation. After the recognition of Romania's borders at the Peace Conference from Paris (1919-1920), Romania developed good political, diplomatic and military relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, in order to defend their common borders.

The border with Bulgaria was defended diplomatic and, if necessary, military, by the Balkan Entente, formed in 1934 with the participation of Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey.

In the interwar period, the borders of the Greater Romania were threatened by three revisionist attitudes: the Soviet revisionism (by far the most dangerous), the Hungarian revisionism and the Bulgarian revisionism.

Romanian borders, as they were recognized at the above mentioned Peace Conference, experienced serious changes in 1940, with Romania's territorial cessions in favor of the USSR (Bessarabia and northern part of Bukovina), Hungary (a north-western part of Transylvania) and Bulgaria (Durostor/Dorostolon and Kaliakra counties).

³¹ Petrache C. Cojocă, *Istoria unui tratat controversat. Tratat de parteneriat privilegiat și cooperare între România și Republica Moldova* [History of a controversial treaty. Privileged Partnership and Cooperation Treaty between Romania and Republic of Moldova], foreword by Oleg Serebrian, Kishinev, Zamolxe Publishing House, 2000, pp. 155-163.

³² ANIC, DGP Fund, file 225/1937, f. 37-52 – essay headed *Problema granițelor României* [Problem of Romania's borders]. The authors of this material emphasized that in 1937 Romania was already in diplomatic isolation amid platonic support of the West and the strong and dangerous revisionism practiced by Germany, Italy (and their allies, Hungary and Bulgaria) and, of course, by the Soviet Union.

³³ Liviu Vălenaș, *În culisele negocierilor cu Uniunea Sovietică 1934-1947. Convorbiri cu Alexandru Danielopol* [Inside negotiations with the Soviet Union 1934-1947. Conversations with Alexander Danielopol], Bucharest, Vremea [i.e. Weather] Publishing House, 2001, p. 25.

On 22nd of June 1941 Romania entered the war against USSR, on the German side, especially in order to recover Bessarabia and the north of Bukovina. The fate of this war was not favorable to Germany and Romania. As in the World War I, Germany's economic and demographic resources were far inferior to those of his opponents.

After the end of World War II, the north of Bukovina was integrated into the Soviet Union and the south of this province was kept by Romania. Bessarabia became the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Thus, north-east and east borders of Greater Romania were deeply reconfigured and changed by using practically the "law of force". These new territorial realities were consecrated by the Peace Conference from Paris (1947), when Romania has recovered northwestern Transylvania, but has not recovered the southern part of Dobroudja (Durostor/Dorostolon and Kaliakra counties).

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EXTERNAL TRADE POLICY AFTER THE TREATY OF LISBON: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective

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Rezumat: Politica Uniunii Europene în domeniul comerțului exterior după Tratatul de la Lisabona: O perspectivă neo-gramsciană

În acest articol se analizează politica Uniunii Europene în domeniul comerțului exterior în perioada post-Lisabona prin prisma teoriei neo-gramsciene. Aceasta din urmă susține că în pofida afirmațiilor potrivit cărora modificările procedurale și instituționale aplicate ca urmare a ratificării Tratatului servesc intereselor generale ale cetățenilor Uniunii Europene, în realitate acestea au fost orchestrate de clasa capitalistă transnațională europeană și servesc cu prioritate intereselor acestui grup. Autorul analizează principalele schimbări ale structurii instituționale și procedurilor introduse prin Tratatul de la Lisabona (intrat în vigoare la 1 decembrie 2009), scoțând succint în evidență implicațiile lor pentru UE. În continuare, raționamentele acestor schimbări sunt explicate prin concentrarea analizei pe dezvoltările socio-economice înregistrate la nivelul UE în ultimele decenii. După prezentarea modului în care a fost creat actualul bloc hegemonic, studiul încearcă să explice de ce modificările introduse sunt atât de importante pentru forțele sociale dominate în UE.

Abstract: This paper applies neo-Gramscian theory to analyze the European Union's external trade policy after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. It argues that despite the claim that procedural and institutional changes which took place as a result of the ratification of the Treaty serve the general interest of the EU citizens, they were in fact orchestrated by the European transnational capitalist class and serve primarily interests of this group. Paper starts by outlining key institutional and procedural changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, briefly outlining their implications for the EU. Further on, rationale for these changes is explained by focusing on socio-economic developments that took place in the EU during the past couple of decades. After outlining how the current hegemonic bloc was established, paper proceeds with explaining why the implemented changes were so important for the dominant in the EU social forces.

Résumé: La politique commerciale extérieure de l'Union européenne après le Traité de Lisbonne : une perspective néo-gramscienne

Cet essai a pour objectif d'analyser la politique commerciale extérieure de l'Union

européenne au regard de la théorie néo-Gramscienne et suite à la ratification du Traité de Lisbonne en 2009. Cette théorie défend l'idée qu'en dépit de la prétention selon laquelle les changements institutionnels et procéduraux survenus après la ratification du Traité servent l'intérêt général des citoyens de l'UE, ces changements ont été, en réalité, orchestrés par la classe capitaliste transnationale européenne et servent ainsi en priorité les intérêts de ce groupe. L'essai commence tout d'abord par mettre en évidence les principales modifications institutionnelles et procédurales introduites par le Traité de Lisbonne, tout en y exposant brièvement ses principales répercussions pour l'UE. Par la suite, la logique derrière la mise en place de ces changements est expliquée par les développements socio-économiques qui se sont opérés dans l'UE au cours des dernières décennies. Après avoir démontré de quelle manière le bloc hégémonique actuel fut établi, cet essai tente d'expliquer pourquoi les changements mis en oeuvre ont été si importants pour la classe dominante parmi les forces sociales de l'UE.

Keywords: Historical Materialism, Neo-Gramsci, Treaty of Lisbon, EU, trade policy.

Introduction

In this paper, institutional and procedural changes that have taken place in the EU as a result of the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 are analyzed and evaluated in respect to their effect on the European Union's external trade policy. In particular, rationale for the implemented changes is identified in a broader socio-economic context that was shaping the EU during the past couple of decades. It is important to understand why the EU has not made any significant changes to the existing trade paradigm despite the fact the recent financial crisis had a significant impact on the external trade balance of a number of its member states. Since most of the research on the European integration is conducted using mainstream theories that focus largely on the institutional form of process rather than on the socio-economic one, this research can fill in the missing gap in the recent literature on European integration. It is important to understand not only what powers were transferred from national to supranational level, but also why those powers were transferred. Therefore, this paper aims to answer the following question: *how can we explain the institutional and procedural changes to the European Union's external trade policy after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon?*

1.1 Historical Background

Since the very creation of the European Union trade policy was considered to be one of the most important tools in pursuing its foreign policy interests.

External trade has been under the EU competence since the Treaty of Rome entered into force in 1959, signifying the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC). At that time, the Common Commercial Policy was based on the three key principles: common external tariff, common trade agreements with non EEC states and the uniform application of trade instruments by the signatory states.¹ While the Treaty of Rome required signatory states to follow common principles in their trade policy, member states (MS) were free to sign their own bilateral investment treaties with other parties to provide protection against unfair expropriation or fund repatriation, which provided them with an instrument to influence inward and outward FDI flows.² In short, while some powers were delegated to the European Community, the most important issues required ratification by the EU institutions as well as national parliaments of the member states. Those were the so-called 'mixed' agreements.³ To put it simply, all important decisions had to be ratified by national parliaments before they could be officially adopted. For instance, if a given EU member state wanted to sign a trade agreement with a non-EU country, it had to ask the European Commission to negotiate the agreement which later had to be approved by the Council.⁴ In case a country that initiated negotiations was not satisfied with the outcome of negotiations, it had an opportunity to either veto the agreement through national parliament, or do so in the Council by asking for unanimity vote. As a result, the Commission had to continue negotiations until all the parties were satisfied in order to ratify a trade agreement. As a result, between 1958 and 2009 close to 1200 Bilateral Investment Agreements were concluded by the EU member states and non-EU countries.⁵

However, the ratified in 2009 Treaty of Lisbon introduced a couple of important changes to the way the European Union operates, extending its exclusive competence to a number of new areas and changing the mechanism of decision-making. For instance, national parliaments no longer need to ratify

¹ S. Meunier, K. Nicolaïdis, *Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the EU*, in "Journal of Common Market Studies", Vol. 37, No. 3, p. 479.

² R. Leal-Arcas, *The European Union's Trade and Investment Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon*, in "Journal of World Investment & Trade", Vol. 11, no. 4, August 2010, p. 487.

³ S. Meunier, K. Nicolaïdis, *op. cit.*, p. 480.

⁴ Stephen Woolcock, *The potential impact of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union External Trade Policy* in *Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies*, June 8, 2008, p. 2. Available online at <http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/427-20088epa.pdf>. Last accessed: May 19, 2013.

⁵ European Commission (2014), *Trade: South Korea*. Available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea>. Last accessed: June 6, 2014.

trade agreements, and investment related issues are now guided by the Common Commercial Policy.⁶ As a result, the direct influence of the EU member states on trade agreements was decreased by the new treaty. At the same time, while the argument is that the mentioned above changes were introduced to create a level playing field for all member states as well as increase the EU competitiveness on a global market, some scholars argue that only a small number of powerful interest groups benefited from this increase in the EU competence.⁷

In this paper, neo-Gramscian theory will be applied to analyze the rationale behind the changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon to explain whose interests stand behind those ideas. It is clear that this process needs to be studied in the light of past practice, taking into account the broader economic and political factors shaping the European Union. Neo-Gramscian concepts of hegemony, class struggle and historical blocs are very useful for this kind of analysis, as they specifically deal with the process of interest articulation and its placement on the public agenda. However, before moving to analysis, it is important to explain the institutional changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and their effect on decision-making in the European Union.

1.2 Institutional Changes after the Treaty of Lisbon

Perhaps the most notable and important change introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon is that in 2009 the European Union received a legal personality that enabled it to sign international agreements and treaties in its own name. Now it has exclusive competence over trade policy, including external trade and investment policy decision-making, and agreements no longer need to be ratified by the national parliaments.⁸ This means that there are no more mixed trade agreements, just the EU-wide ones.⁹

⁶ R. Leal-Arcas, *op.cit.*, p. 502.

⁷ G. Zarotiadis, A. Gkagka, *European Union: a diverging Union?*, in "Journal of Post Keynesian Economics", Summer 2013, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 537-568; S. M. McGuire and J. P. Lindeque, *The diminishing returns to trade policy in the European Union*, in "Journal of Common market Studies", 2010, Vol. 48, no. 5, pp. 1329-1349; Manfred Elsig, *European Union trade policy after enlargement: larger crowds, shifting priorities and informal decision-making*, in "Journal of European Public Policy", 2010, Vol. 17, no. 6, pp. 781-798, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2010.486975.

⁸ Leal-Arcas, *op. cit.*, p. 464.

⁹ Stephen Woolcock, *The potential impact of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union External Trade Policy*, in "Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies", June 8, 2008. Available online at <http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/427-20088epa.pdf>. Last accessed: May 19, 2013.

The other noticeable change is that now all trade-related decisions have to be co-ratified by both the European Parliament and the Council. Prior to 2009 the European Parliament was often consulted before important decisions were passed, but this was not a legal requirement. Its consent was not required to ratify trade or investment agreements before Lisbon, but now it is.¹⁰ Thus, after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament became a co-legislator, together with the Council.

Furthermore, under the new rules, the combined presidency of the European Council and the Council by a single member state was abolished, with the European Council now having a permanent President appointed for two and a half years.¹¹ As a result, instead of national leaders, it is now an appointed European Council President who plays a key role in the operation of this institution. For instance, during the 2004 Irish Presidency it was the prime minister of this country who chaired the meetings of the European Council. However, during the 2013 Irish Presidency all meetings of the European Council were chaired in Brussels by President Herman van Rompuy.¹² Hence, the role of rotating presidency was reduced to committee and working-group level.

Moreover, a position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was introduced, replacing the role traditionally played by the Foreign Minister of the state that holds presidency in the Council. This position was also supported by formation of the European External Action Service (EEAS).¹³ Thus, role of the Presidency has now changed to supporting the work of the newly introduced actors. And even though foreign policy decision-making is still mainly done on the intergovernmental level, it is the head of the EEAS who represents the European Union at the important international forums.¹⁴

¹⁰ European Commission (2014), *Policy-Making*. Available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/policy-making/>. Last accessed: April 22, 2014.

¹¹ A. Batory, U. Puetter, *Consistency and diversity? The EU's rotating trio Council Presidency after the Lisbon Treaty*, in "Journal of European Public Policy", Vol. 20, Issue no. 1, 2013.

¹² Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union (2013), *What is the EU Presidency Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2013*. Available online at: <http://www.eu2013.ie/ireland-and-the-presidency/about-the-presidency/what-is-the-eu-presidency/>. Last accessed: June 30, 2013.

¹³ European Union, *About CSDP - Overview*. European Union – European External Action Service. Available online at http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/index_en.htm. Last accessed: April 24, 2014.

¹⁴ Anthony Luzzatto Gardner, Stuart E. Eizenstat, *New Treaty, New Influence: Europe's Chance to Punch Its Weight*, in "Foreign Affairs", March/April 2010, p. 108.

In addition, qualified majority vote (QMV) requirement in the Council was modified by the Treaty of Lisbon. A new principle of 'double majority' was introduced.¹⁵ After November 1, 2014, the vote of at least 55% of the Council members representing at least 65% of the European population and 15 member states is enough to pass international agreements or decisions related to trade matters. In addition, in order to block a decision, at least four member states have to vote against it. This mechanism replaced the unanimity requirement that was traditionally used in the Council. As a result, if one of the member states is not satisfied with the way the Commission has negotiated an agreement - there is not much it can do to change it.

The other notable change is that now Common Commercial Policy (CCP) has to operate in a broader framework of EU's external action.¹⁶ Therefore, all elements of EU's external action, no matter whether it is security or trade policy, are now submitted to the same principles, which include human rights, good governance, environmental protection, etc. This means that non-economic objectives are now considered to be as important as economic ones during the trade negotiations. In addition, as was already mentioned earlier, foreign direct investment is now a part of the Common Commercial Policy.¹⁷ Since the EU has an exclusive competence over the latter, individual member states have lost their authority to sign new Bilateral Investment Treaties.

1.3 Implications for the EU

The fact that since ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon Common Commercial Policy has to operate under the general framework of EU's external action creates a possibility for political considerations to play a greater role during the negotiation of trade agreements. There is a danger that inclusion of, for example, social or environmental clauses could be used to justify indirect expropriation. It also raises a question of whether the EU's external trade policy will be used to pursue foreign policy more than it has been the case to date.¹⁸

¹⁵ *European Union* in "Summaries of EU legislation. Glossary: Qualified Majority." Available online at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/qualified_majority_en.htm. Last accessed: April 27, 2014.

¹⁶ A. Dimopoulos, *The Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing parallelism between internal and external economic policy*, in "Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy", University of Zagreb, Vol. 4, 2008, p. 102.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹⁸ Stephen Woolcock, *op. cit.*, p. 2. Available online at <http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/>

Furthermore, exclusive competence of the European Union in external trade policy has led to elimination of national parliaments from decision-making not only in this field, but in Common Commercial Policy as a whole. Now a single member state can do very little if it is not satisfied with the negotiated agreement. The European Union's new competence for foreign direct investment means that the member states can no longer conclude Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) without the EU's prior consent.¹⁹ Taking into account the fact that over the last decades FDI flows to and from the EU increased significantly and have become just as important as trade when it comes to economic growth, this change could have a significant impact on economic development of some member states.

It is also important to note that while most of the changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon were supposed to positively affect the EU's external trade, there remains significant variation in the usage of intra-EU and external trade between various EU member states. Most of the newly joined MS are usually much more dependent on intra-EU trade, and therefore do not see external trade to be very important for their growth.²⁰ However, the European Commission has recently announced that by 2015 90% of the world's growth will be generated outside Europe and that there is a need to "seize an opportunity of higher levels of growth abroad".²¹ As a result, European businesses are becoming increasingly outward-oriented and rely on new markets for growth.

There are also a lot of discussions regarding introduction of the new QMV scheme since it was one of the main obstacles in the reform of the Nice Treaty.²² The idea that the shift of powers from the national parliaments to the European Parliament would democratize decision-making in the EU is often contested. Few

files/427-20088epa.pdf. Last accessed: May 19, 2013.

¹⁹ Christopher Herrmann, *The Treaty of Lisbon Expands the EU's External Trade and Investment Powers*, in "American Society of International Law Insight", Vol. 14, Issue 29, September 21, 2010. p. 3. Available online at: <http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/14/issue/29/treaty-lisbon-expands-eu%E2%80%99s-external-trade-and-investment-powers>. Last accessed: April 25, 2014.

²⁰ Manfred Elsig, *European Union trade policy after enlargement: larger crowds, shifting priorities and informal decision-making*, in "Journal of European Public Policy", 2010, Vol. 17, no. 6, p. 782, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2010.486975.

²¹ European Commission. *Trade, Growth and World Affairs: Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU's 2020 Strategy*, Brussels, 9. 11. 2010, COM(2010)612. p. 4. Available online at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_146955.pdf. Last accessed: April 26, 2014.

²² D. Varela, J. Prado-Dominguez, *Negotiating the Lisbon Treaty: Redistribution, Efficiency and Power Indices*, in "AUCO Czech Economic Review", 2012, Vol. 6, no. 2, p. 107.

would agree that this was an equal substitute, given that some member states may have as much as 96 representatives, while others - as few as six.²³ As a result, MS can now affect the trade negotiations either by delegating their experts to various committees or through their vote in the Council. However, as was already discussed earlier, under the new scheme the disapproval of at least four member states is required to block the decision from being passed. As a result, individual member states can do little to influence the European Union's decisions even if those are not in favour of their interests. This is especially the case for the smaller states that may not have the capacity to delegate the desired number of experts to the EU. Some scholars claim this has led to the increased importance of informal processes at the EU level. For instance, an ambassador of a medium-sized member state has recently said that the important decisions are made by big states outside the Council chamber.²⁴ This points to the fact that concentration of power at the EU level implemented in order to improve effectiveness of decision-making in the EU has in fact resulted in more informal decision-making.

Furthermore, some experts claim that the Treaty of Lisbon is almost identical to the Constitutional Treaty that failed to be ratified just a few years prior to Lisbon because of the fear that it would transfer too much power to already mighty institutions.²⁵ It is believed that the text of the Lisbon Treaty was deliberately made difficult to understand for ordinary citizens, so that there would be less opposition. For instance, the Treaty of Nice was 87 pages long, the Treaty of Amsterdam – 144, while the Lisbon Treaty is 271 pages long and used a lot of technical terms that only experts can understand.²⁶ It is also important to note that as compared to the previous treaties that simply established institutional rules, the Treaty of Lisbon includes specific policy measures that have to be taken in certain situations.²⁷

²³ A. Niemann, *Conceptualising Common Commercial Policy Treaty Revision: Explaining Stagnancy and Dynamics from the Amsterdam IGC to the Treaty of Lisbon*, in "European Integration online Papers-EIoP", 2011, Vol. 15, no. 6, p. 25.

²⁴ Q. Peel, *A profitable union – enlarged Europe finds new ways to work*, in "Financial Times", May 1, 2008. p.11; Manfred Elsig, *op. cit.*, pp. 781-798, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2010.486975

²⁵ C. H. Church, D. Phinnemore, *Understanding the Treaty of Lisbon*, in "Romanian Journal of European Affairs", 2010, Vol. 10, no. 2, p. 8.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

²⁷ R. Leal-Arcas, *The European Union and new leading powers: towards partnership in strategic trade policy areas*, in "Fordham International Law Journal", 2008, vol. 32, no. 2, p. 345.

The discussed above changes have caused fear that certain political and economic groups may receive preferential treatment because of their influence over the European Parliament and other EU institutions. For instance, it is argued that the Commission gives favourable access to actors with similar preferences.²⁸ In addition, it is a matter of fact that a number of large interest groups regularly consult the EU experts during various informal events and meetings. A lot of research is done about the role of the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) in shaping the European Union's policies. For instance, Bastian van Apeldoorn argues that elite platforms like ERT play a decisive role in shaping political interests and even ideologies of the European states and the European Union in general. This group acts as a platform where general class interests of European transnational capital are being shaped and long-term strategy shaping European socio-economic governance is formed.²⁹ Their economic power often transcends to political power since all the national governments are looking for economic development and therefore are interested in maintaining good working relations with economic elites. According to Hubert Buch-Hansen, high mobility of transnational capital and dependency of national governments on jobs and wealth created by transnational companies creates dependency of the former on the latter.³⁰ Therefore, the increased concentration of power in the hands of the EU officials after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon made it easier for such elite groups to pursue their interests and compete against similar groups in other parts of the world.

2. Theoretical background

Unfortunately, orthodox theories are not able to accurately conceptualize power relations that exist on the European arena. They fail to recognize that the capital and the state are internally related and that state power cannot be abstracted from the power of capital.³¹ Very often national policy preferences are simply taken for granted and little is done to investigate their link to

²⁸ Manfred Elsig, *op. cit.*, p. 790, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2010.486975.

²⁹ B. Apeldoorn, *Transnational Class Agency and European Governance: The Case of the European Roundtable of Industrialists*, in "New Political Economy", 2010, Vol. 5, no. 2, p. 165. DOI: 10.1080/713687772.

³⁰ H. Buch-Hansen, *Freedom to compete? The cartelization of European transnational corporations*, in "Competition & change", 2012, Vol. 16, no. 1, p. 23.

³¹ B. Apeldoorn, N. de Graaff, H. Overbeek, *The Reconfiguration of the Global State-Capital Nexus*, in "Globalizations", 2012, Vol. 9, no. 4, p. 472.

interests of groups that form the basis of state authority. Although some mainstream theories do try to account for power relations and special interests, they often do so in relation to certain elements of European integration, rather than the process as a whole. For instance, according to Bastian van Apeldoorn and Sandy Hagerb, the current debate is more focused on the institutional form of the process rather than on the socio-economic one. Therefore, instead of looking at the process of interest articulation, most scholars follow neo-functional perspective and examine the extent to which power has been transferred from national to supranational level.³²

In contrast, neo-Gramscian approach, also referred to as transnational historical materialism, captures the whole picture. It allows us to trace back the origin of existing ideological hegemony. By investigating the role of various state and non-state actors we can better understand the underpinnings of changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. According to this theory, social relations are being constituted transnationally in a spatial domain that is not defined in terms of national boundaries.³³ It places a lot of importance on the role of ideas and their relation to construction of meaning, as well as its contestation and interpretation. The neo-Gramscian scholars reject reductionism and break with state-centrism that, as was discussed before, is still a key assumption in most mainstream theories.³⁴ Instead, they focus on the role and interplay of social forces and historical structures. The latter, according to Robert Cox, consist of three spheres of activity: the social relations of production; the forms of state, consisting of historically contingent state/civil society complexes; and the world orders.³⁵ Furthermore, within each of the three spheres, ideas, material

³² B. Apeldoorn, S. B. Hager, *The social purpose of new governance: Lisbon and the limits to legitimacy*, in "Journal of International Relations and Development", 2010, Vol. 13, no. 3, p. 211.

³³ B. Apeldoorn, H. Overbeek, M. Ryner, *Theories of European Integration: A Critique*, in A. W. Cafruny, M. Ryner (eds), *A Ruined Fortress? Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe*, Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield, 2003, p. 35.

³⁴ H. Overbeek, *Transnational Historical Materialism: Theories of Transnational Class Formation and World Order*, In R. P. Palan (Ed.), *Global Political Economy. Contemporary Theories* (2nd, revised and expanded, edition), London, Routledge, 2000, p. 168.

³⁵ R. W. Cox, *Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory*, in "Millennium: Journal of International Studies", 1981, Vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 135-138; A. D. Morton, *Social Forces in the Struggle over Hegemony: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy*, in "Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society", 2003, Vol. 15, no. 2, p. 156, DOI: 10.1080/0893569032000113514.

capabilities and institutions interact to establish a historical structure.³⁶

Neo-Gramscian scholars believe that social relations of production may give rise to certain social forces, which in turn could become the basis of state power. Therefore, rather than taking the state as a given the neo-Gramscian perspective considers historical construction of various forms of state as well as the social context of political struggle. The rival groups constantly compete by articulating their interests through various lobby groups, forums, committees, associations, working groups, and other available channels. This helps them shape policy discourses that effect decision-makers at various levels of governance.³⁷ Consequently, a state is not simply an institutional mechanism used to govern, but an "entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules".³⁸ An important role here is assigned to the concept of control, which, according to Henk Overbeek, expresses the ideological and "hegemonic structure of particular historical configuration of capital," and is used to organize and direct the hegemony of ruling class.³⁹

Hegemony is understood as an expression of a broadly based consent manifested in the acceptance of ideas. Most frequently it is backed up by material resources and institutions. However, this dominance is not only physical, but also ideological, cultural and institutional one since, as was explained earlier, neo-Gramscians avoid reductionism and believe that ideas and material conditions are always bound together and are mutually reinforcing.⁴⁰ The expansion of hegemony is orchestrated by organic intellectuals who consolidate the social forces they come from and develop a hegemonic project that transcends the particular interests of their social group into a historical bloc. The latter concept refers to the way in which leading social forces establish a relationship with their rivals. It implies integration of various class interests that exist in the society.⁴¹ Successful historical bloc implies a rule based on

³⁶ A. Bieler, A. D. Morton, *A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical change: neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations*, in "Capital & Class", 2004, Vol. 28, no. 1, p. 88.

³⁷ B. V. Apeldoorn, S. B. Hager, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

³⁸ A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, translated and edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, in A. Bieler, A. D. Morton, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

³⁹ H. Overbeek, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

⁴⁰ A. Bieler, A. D. Morton, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

⁴¹ A. D. Morton, *op. cit.*, p. 157, DOI: 10.1080/0893569032000113514.

consent, rather than on forceful domination.⁴² At the same time, according to Gill, hegemony is not always a pre-requisite for the establishment of a historical bloc.⁴³ In some cases dominance over opponents could be sufficient for its establishment.

In sum, transnational historical materialism is capable of conceptualizing the structuration of power relations among various European and international political and economic groups. It helps explain how the social underpinnings of the current European order shape the principles of social organization in Europe. The neo-Gramscian perspective “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing”.⁴⁴ It allows to investigate how new practices emerge, and what forces may have the potential to change or transform the prevailing order.⁴⁵ The fact that neo-Gramscians try to move beyond economism is very important since it allows us to assign equal importance to ideas, institutions, and material capabilities.⁴⁶ As such, a transnational historical materialism develops “a dialectical theory of history concerned not just with the past but with a continual process of historical change and with exploring the potential for alternative forms of development”.⁴⁷

3. Analysis

3.1 Transnational Capitalist Class in the EU

In order to analyze the procedural and institutional changes introduced as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon it is important to understand the broader socio-economic situation in Europe during the preceding years. According to Angela Wigger & Hubert Buch-Hansen, a major shift in the consolidation of power at the European level occurred during the late 1980s.⁴⁸ It was during this time that the

⁴² R. Cox, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

⁴³ S. Gill, *Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.40; A.D. Morton, *op. cit.*, p.157, DOI: 10.1080/0893569032000113514.

⁴⁴ R. Cox, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

⁴⁵ A. Bieler, A. D. Morton, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

⁴⁶ P. Burnham, *Neo-Gramscian hegemony and the international order*, in “Capital and Class”, 1991, Vol. 15, no. 3, p. 83.

⁴⁷ Robert Cox, *op. cit.*, p. 129; A. D. Morton, *op. cit.*, p.154, DOI:10.1080/0893569032000113514.

⁴⁸ H. Buch-Hansen, A. Wigger, *Explaining (missing) regulatory paradigm shifts: EU*

idea of increased competitiveness as a key to the EU's growth started to gain prominence. Free competition and move away from previously popular protectionist policies started to be presented as a key to economic growth in Europe. According to Ferdi De Ville and Jan Orbie, the neoliberal approach to the EU's trade policy started to become noticeable in the mid-1990s and could be linked to the increase in the power of transnational capitalist class in Europe.⁴⁹ During this time European businesses started to expand their trade activities on a global scale and were no longer focused on trade solely with former European colonies or immediate neighbours. Most scholars agree that this was a universal trend that has led to the establishment of a neoliberal hegemony by the transnational capitalist class in many regions of the world during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is important to note that transnational capitalist class is not only limited to those who own and control the TNCs (the corporate fraction), but also includes globalizing bureaucrats and politicians (the state fraction); globalizing professionals (the technical fraction); and merchants and media (the consumerist fraction).⁵⁰

The neoliberal approach promoted by transnational capitalist class especially benefited its financial fraction since it played a key role in the expansion of European businesses abroad. Transnationalization of production and rapid integration of supply chains required significant financial inflows from European financial institutions.⁵¹ In the early 1990s an increasing number of European businesses adopted an outward-oriented business models and became dependent on external markets for their growth due to the anticipated macroeconomic developments and demographic situation in Europe.⁵² In addition, global competitors pressured European companies to increase the scale of their businesses as well as outsource certain stages of the production process to areas with lower production costs.⁵³

competition regulation in times of economic crisis, in "New Political Economy", 2014, Vol. 19, no. 1, p. 121.

⁴⁹ F. De Ville, J. Orbie, *The European Union's trade policy response to the crisis: paradigm lost or reinforced?*, in "European Integration Online Papers", 2011, Vol. 15, Article 2, p. 8.

⁵⁰ L. Sklair, *Democracy and the Transnational Capitalist Class*, in "The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science", 2002, Vol. 581, no. 1, p. 145.

⁵¹ H. Buch-Hansen, A. Wigger, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

⁵² F. De Ville, J. Orbie, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁵³ B. Jessop, N. L. Sum, *Beyond the regulation approach: putting capitalist economies in their place*, in "Journal of Economic Geography", 2007, Vol. 7, no. 1; H. Buch-Hansen, A. Wigger, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

As a result, European productive and financial capital became highly interdependent, which led to formation of new class identities and interests. For instance, according to Eelke Heemskerk, European corporate elite has abandoned its neo-mercantilist beliefs and started to promote increased competitiveness as the most important objective for the European Union.⁵⁴ This was done not only through simple lobbying that seeks to influence political decision-making, but also at a higher level by shaping the discourse in which European decision-making is embedded.⁵⁵ Organic intellectuals of the new European elite were able to frame these issues as being of general interest of European public by spreading the norms and values of European transnational businesses not only at a national level, but also at the European one. Neoliberal policies seemed to achieve a default status during this time and were used more and more frequently used in various sectors of the European economy. In neo-Gramscian terms we can describe this process as formation of the historical bloc necessary for the establishment of the hegemony of the dominant class.

When trying to comprehend why the current European Union's external trade policy is so much reflective of interests of the European transnational businesses we need understand that institutions have always been the most important tool used to strengthen and spread ideas of the dominant social forces. Hence, the EU institutions play a particularly important role in this scheme. According to Ferdi De Ville & Jan Orbie, "the Commission cannot only be seen as an actor who pursues specific trade interests and ideas, but also as a structure of hegemonic ideas and interests on trade relations in Europe".⁵⁶

Much success in the spread of new norms, ideas and values across the EU can be attributed to the framing used by organic intellectuals representing dominant social forces when describing the emerging issues during the past years. Leading social forces were very successful in spreading a particular worldview across Europe using their influence on member state governments and the EU institutions as well as through civil society. Research conducted by numerous scholars has already demonstrated that various grassroots organizations, NGOs, advocacy networks and other civil society actors have a substantial impact on the creation of norms and their diffusion into the domestic

⁵⁴ E. M. Heemskerk, *The Rise of the European Corporate Elite: Evidence from the Network of Interlocking Directorates in 2005 and 2010*, in "Economy and Society", 2013, Vol. 42, no. 1, p. 76.

⁵⁵ B. v. Apeldoorn, *op. cit.*, p. 165. DOI: 10.1080/713687772.

⁵⁶ F. De Ville, J. Orbie, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

practices.⁵⁷ For instance, it is argued that created by the ERT European Centre for Infrastructure Studies played an important role in persuading the EU to adopt a number of policies related to infrastructure in transport and energy sectors, as well as in establishment of the Trans-European Networks that was created to boost economic growth and employment in these sectors.⁵⁸ There are many more similar examples.

As a result, through their influence on domestic and international level organic intellectuals of the dominant class are able to keep the emerging discussions about EU's trade policy within the prevailing frame that is based on assumptions imposed by them. A gradual diffusion of norms and values of the dominant class that was taking place during the past two decades helped spread, legitimize and institutionalize their beliefs as being universal. As was mentioned before, ideas play a very important role in the construction of meaning, its contestation and interpretation, therefore shaping our worldview. Thus, even despite a poor economic situation in a number of European states after the recent economic crisis there were not many discussions about the need to change the current trade policy to a more protectionist one as it was the case during the similar economic shocks in the past. Instead, further liberalization is seen to be the cure, while requests for protection of European industries are depicted in a negative way and are associated with worsening of the crisis, as it was the case during the Great Depression.⁵⁹ Neoliberal discourses of competitiveness and open market seem to be default in EU's trade policy, and if crisis occurs it is immediately linked to some trade distortions. Discussions are focused more on the correction of the current trade framework rather than on its change.

From a neo-Gramscian perspective this situation can be interpreted either as a sign that other fractions of capital are too weak to organize themselves to challenge the dominance of the established historical bloc, or that that they are satisfied with the current balance of power and work together with the hegemon to pursue shared interests. It seems like different fractions of capital at the European level are not yet ready to establish an alternative configuration of social forces that would offer a new framework for external trade. Explanation to this claim will be provided in the following section of this paper. For now, it important to remember that European institutions have consistently framed recent economic crises as crises of financial sub-domain of the global capitalist

⁵⁷ T. Risse, *Transnational Actors and World Politics*, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*. London, Sage, 2002, p. 266.

⁵⁸ L. Sklair, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

⁵⁹ F. De Ville, J. Orbie, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

system, shifting attention away from the structural flaws of the system. According to Ferdi De Ville & Jan Orbie, by shifting focus on issues like the lack of financial regulation or irresponsible behavior of investment bankers European political elites were able to frame the problem as originating as a result of miscalculations of certain individuals within the global financial subsystem.⁶⁰ Therefore, attention was successfully driven away from the negative externalities of trade liberalization.

3.2 The struggle for power within the EU

As was already mentioned before, despite the fact that a number of European economies have suffered from the 2007 financial crisis, even after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 there were no major changes to EU's external trade policy. Partly this could be explained by framing of the problem used by dominant social forces, which in turn affected the proposed solutions. Policy alternatives are always selected based on problem specification. Consequently, by manipulating the latter European political and economic elites were able to direct the opinion of decision-makers in to the 'right' direction. The established ideological, cultural and institutional dominance were key in this process.

According to Angela Wigger & Hubert Buch-Hansen, with the arrival of neoliberalism to the EU transnationally oriented productive and financial capital organized themselves against organized labour because of the threat that the latter could undermine the existing capital accumulation regime.⁶¹ The contestation of power is ongoing and recently some European associations representing organized labour have objected to plans of the European Commission to sign free trade agreements with a number of partners. According to Ferdi De Ville & Jan Orbie, large associations like European Metalworkers Federation (EMF), European Automobile Manufacturer's Association (ACEA), the European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries (EUROFER), the and European Trade Union Federation of Textiles, Clothing and Leather (ETUF-TCL) have publically objected to the negotiated FTA with South Korea due to anticipated negative consequences for their industries.⁶² However, practice has shown that at the moment none of the organized social forces on the European arena is strong enough to challenge the established historical bloc. European

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁶¹ H. Buch-Hansen, A. Wigger, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

⁶² F. De Ville, J. Orbie, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

Union has ratified the agreement and is finalizing FTA negotiations with a number of other partners. The financial and productive fractions of transnational capital in Europe have become too strong to compete against, and by their deliberate actions they try to emphasize that the only way to move forward is to accept the new rules of the game.

Research conducted by Eelke Heemskerk, who investigated relations between European businesses by looking at board interlocks, a situation when one person sits on boards of two or more companies, suggests that cohesion between European businesses has been steadily increasing during the past decade. As a result, political mobilization in Europe is now supported by a "rather elaborate social structure of corporate board interaction and intertwinement".⁶³ This finding is important for the analysis of transnational corporate power since by focusing on interlocking directorates power can be documented empirically.⁶⁴ Board interlocks serve as a platform for the exchange of norms, values and ideas between political and economic elites, and therefore help in spreading the hegemony of the dominant class. In the long run shared norms, values and ideas lead to the convergence of business practices between various connected by board interlocks companies, which in turn leads to the establishment a corporate elite network.

Another documented trend supporting the view that transnational capitalist class dominates in the EU is that board interlocks are now moving beyond national boundaries more than it was in the past. According to research conducted by William Carroll et al, while the proportion of national interlocks has declined during the past decade, the number of interlocks that crossed European borders has actually increased from 26% in 1996 to 33% in 2006.⁶⁵ Therefore, transnational forces were able to materialize their superiority over the national ones. While in the past the practice of accepting board seats in multiple European countries was mainly practiced by a small number of directors with strong pro-European orientation, today this practice has become more widespread.⁶⁶ This indicates that transnational corporate elite in Europe

⁶³ E. M. Heemskerk, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

⁶⁴ Kees Van der Pijl, Otto Holman, Or. Raviv, *The resurgence of German capital in Europe: EU integration and the restructuring of Atlantic networks of interlocking directorates after 1991*, in "Review of International Political Economy", First published on: 19 October 2010.

⁶⁵ W. K. Carroll, M. Fennema, E. M. Heemskerk, *Constituting corporate Europe: A study of elite social organization*, in "Antipode", Vol. 42, no. 4, p. 811-843; E. M. Heemskerk, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

⁶⁶ E. M. Heemskerk, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

was able to establish a strong structural base necessary to promote its interests and is steadily growing.

However, this does not mean that corporate elite is a unitary actor. The contestation of hegemony is an ongoing process. The contest for power never stops even within well-established European lobby and advocacy groups. For instance, a number of prominent globalized European companies including Unilever, Shell and ICI have, at one point of time, terminated their membership at one of the most famous and influential advocacy group in Europe - the European Roundtable of Industrialists.⁶⁷ This shows that differences occur even between seemingly similarly oriented elite groups. As such, according to Andreas Bieler, we need to distinguish between European transnational forces whose production structures are organized across borders within Europe, global forces of capital and labour whose production forces are organized across the world as well as national social forces that depend on direct state assistance.⁶⁸ It is also important to understand that there are also differences in ideological and strategic orientation between different fractions of transnational capitalist class itself.

For instance, Bastian van Apeldoorn has clearly demonstrated that there remain significant differences between neoliberal and neomercantilist fractions of European transnational capitalist class.⁶⁹ While the former fraction is mainly represented by globalized businesses and financial institutions, the latter is mainly composed of large industrial enterprises that operate on the European market and are not yet fully globalized. The neomercantilist fraction is traditionally strong in Scandinavian and Benelux states as well as in Germany and Austria, where economic development is based on suppression of domestic demand in order to maximize external account balance.⁷⁰ According to Keith Van der Pijl et al, in 2004 the capital earned by an export offensive has made Germany the largest exporter in the world in absolute terms, with trade surplus being six times that of China.⁷¹ This example clearly illustrates how important

⁶⁷ Andreas Bieler, *European Integration and Eastward Enlargement: the widening and deepening of neo-liberal restructuring in Europe*, in "Queen's Papers on Europeanisation", 2003, no. 8, p.7. Available online at <http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudiesandPhilosophy/FileStore/EuropeanisationFiles/Filetoupload,38406,en.pdf>. Last accessed 22/06/2014.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 7.

⁶⁹ B. v. Apeldoorn, *op. cit.*, p. 167. DOI: 10.1080/713687772.

⁷⁰ H. Overbeek, *Sovereign Debt Crisis in Euroland: Root Causes and Implications for European Integration*, in "The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs", 2012, Vol. 47, no. 1, p. 38-39, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2012.655006.

⁷¹ Kees Van der Pijl, Otto Holman, Or. Raviv, *The resurgence of German capital in Europe:*

external trade is for generating economic growth in export-oriented economies. Unlike the neoliberal fraction, neomercantilists are more interested in increasing their exports rather than opening markets for cheap imported goods. On the other side, the common interest they share with neoliberal fraction is having an integrated European market that would allow them to reach a scale necessary to resist pressure from non-European competitors.⁷² According to Andreas Bieler, after seeing the success of their counterparts in U.S. and Japan, the neo-mercantilist fraction of transnational capital started to regard “the fragmentation of the European market as the main cause of their lack of competitiveness”.⁷³ Therefore, both fractions were interested in centralization of decision-making in external trade that was introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon.

In sum, despite seemingly common goals, transnational capitalist class in Europe is actually a union of several distinct groups of national and transnational elites. A need to compete against similar groups from other parts of the world provides European elites with a sense of common identity. Their ideas are articulated through various national and transnational associations, think tanks, expert and lobby groups as well as national and international institutions. We can clearly see that transnational forces have become influential enough to resist protectionist ones since despite economic crisis in a number of European states there haven't been many attempts to replace the current neoliberal paradigm or implement major structural reforms in the most severely affected countries in order to reverse trade flows. Instead, problem is framed as coming from a “competitiveness gap” within the Eurozone.⁷⁴ The latter discourse had over time become key not only in the language used by European transnationals, but in socio-economic discourse in general. This indicates that their ideas are now more naturally accepted by the general public. For instance, European elites have even managed to socialize the costs of the rescued after the crisis financial sector among national taxpayers in the EU without strong objections. Despite the fact that such decisions had a negative effect on a number of EU economies and have further increased inequalities between the EU

EU integration and the restructuring of Atlantic networks of interlocking directorates after 1991, in “Review of International Political Economy”, p. 19, First published on: 19 October 2010.

⁷² B. v. Apeldoorn, *op. cit.*, p. 167. DOI: 10.1080/713687772.

⁷³ Andreas Bieler, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁷⁴ O. Holman, *Gramsci's Social Forces: Class and Class Formation and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis*, in Marlies Glasius (ed), *Gramsci for the Twenty-first Century: Dialectics and Translatability*, in “International Studies Review”, 2012, Vol. 14, no. 4, p. 676.

member states, they were still depicted as being of general interest and presented to the general public as unavoidable. As a result, pre-crisis configuration of powers is still not challenged and transnational financial capital continues to be dominant in Europe.⁷⁵ It is a clear example of a successful passive revolution that was happening in Europe since the late 1980s – early 1990s, and as a result of which viewpoints of the dominant class have become a strategic orientation for society as a whole.⁷⁶

3.3. Expansion of the Hegemony

Previous section showed that dominance of the transnational capitalist class has been successfully established in Europe. This section provides an explanation of how the changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon benefited the dominant social forces. Since it was already explained how and why the discourses, including that of ‘competitiveness’, were established by the dominant class, this section does not focus much on the process itself. Instead, it discusses how these discourses were used to promote interests of the dominant social forces.

For instance, I believe that transnational capitalist class was interested in consolidating additional powers at the EU level in order to increase its bargaining power on an international arena. Globalization and constant opening of previously closed economies had a contrasting impact on European transnationals. While the international market has become bigger in absolute terms, competition has also intensified. Transnational businesses in developing world were able to benefit from structural advantages of their economies, such as relatively cheap labour and raw materials, or lower environmental standards. In addition, high tariffs in large emerging markets such as China and India provided those countries with additional bargaining power.⁷⁷ As a result, even previously strong transnationals from the United States and Japan have lost their market share to transnationals based in developing countries.⁷⁸

We also have to keep in mind that EU is not a typical international power. Prior to the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon it could not even sign trade

⁷⁵ H. Buch-Hansen, A. Wigger, *op. cit.*, p.128.

⁷⁶ H. Overbeek, *Global Governance, Class, hegemony: A historical materialist perspective*, in “Working Papers in Political Science”, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2004/01, p. 5.

⁷⁷ R. Leal-Arcas, *The European Union's Trade and Investment Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon*, p. 467.

⁷⁸ S. M. McGuire and J. P. Lindeque, *The diminishing returns to trade policy in the European Union*, in “Journal of Common market Studies”, 2010, Vol. 48, no. 5, p.1330.

agreements in its own name. There were many discussions about its ability to defend interests of European businesses on international arena. The EU does not have the hard military power as China, US or Russia, and is therefore more dependent on its economic leverage when promoting its interests on international arena. It is its market power that provides European Union with an attribute of an actor.⁷⁹ Consequently, from the EU perspective, international trade is an important instrument to foster political relations.⁸⁰ Declining market power that resulted from rapid growth in other regions of the world was a dangerous sign for European transnational capitalist class. It was clear that something had to be done.

Relative position of a given actor vis-à-vis its opponents could be enhanced by either improving its absolute position, or by worsening that of its competitors. It seems like European transnational capitalist class is working in both directions. The Treaty of Lisbon helped the European elites consolidate substantial powers necessary to strengthen the EU's position as an actor in international trade at the EU level, which was in turn used to weaken the positions of hegemonic groups in other regions of the world by targeting their competitive advantages. For instance, since European transnationals were not able to lower environmental standards in the EU, they worked hard to promote increased standards in other parts of the world. According to European Commission, the EU actively uses its external trade policy to support environmental protection and reverse global warming as well as improve working conditions and access to healthcare in poor states.⁸¹ While on paper this looks like a good cause, in reality it is also a great way to raise costs of doing business for competitors in other parts of the world. Since European Union has already complied with those standards, the cost of such demands for European elites was quite low.

Today the EU is the largest provider of "aid for trade" in the world.⁸² In this sense, the fact that since the Treaty of Lisbon Common Commercial Policy operates under the general framework of EU's external action, thus enabling conditionality in trade, could be interpreted as an attempt by European

⁷⁹ R. Leal-Arcas, *op. cit.*, p. 467.

⁸⁰ Idem, *The European Union and new leading powers: towards partnership in strategic trade policy areas*, p. 351.

⁸¹ European Commission. *What is EU's Trade Policy Directorate General for Trade*. NG-80-09-639-EN-D. p. 6. <http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/what-is-europe-s-trade-policy--pbNG8009639>. Last accessed: June 30, 2014

⁸² *Ibid.*

transnational capitalist class to put additional burden on their competitors. It helps them legitimize conditionality and present their interests as coming from the EU citizens. According to Steven McGuire and Johan Lindeque, during trade negotiations the EU frequently demands from its partners to make commitments “they have neither the need nor the capacity to enforce”.⁸³ Such non-realistically high expectations from EU’s trading partners in the developing world can also be interpreted as an attempt to put additional pressure on them, therefore improving the bargaining position of European transnationals.

Moreover, during the past decade the EU was actively supporting the accession of a number of countries to the WTO. For instance, in exchange for their support of China, European companies were able to obtain better conditions when accessing the Chinese market.⁸⁴ At the same time, European businesses also benefited from adoption of market practices by their Chinese counterparts since once WTO membership is granted - countries have to follow all of the obligations that come with it. This view is supported by research conducted by Raphael Leal-Arcas, who claims that the “EU interest in trade has increasingly become one of persuading its trading partners to adopt rules and standards that address non-tariff and regulatory barriers.”⁸⁵ We also have to keep in mind that many principles of WTO are based on Western norms and values that the EU was actively promoting throughout the years. Therefore, European transnational capitalist class has a strong interest in persuading a comprehensive WTO agenda in order to make sure that emerging economies move in to the ‘right’ direction. Even though different WTO members have different regulations on trade defence, all of them have to be in line with the principles of the WTO Agreements.⁸⁶ Raphael Leal-Arcas also notes that “EU is a normative power in that it promotes certain common values and norms or provides a model for other regions on how to regulate integrating markets”.⁸⁷ It has been especially active in promoting regional integration among developing countries based on its model by aggressively influencing the emerging forms of governance in other parts of the world. As practice shows, such involvement is

⁸³ S. M. McGuire and J. P. Lindeque, *op. cit.*, p.1338.

⁸⁴ R. Bustillo, A. Maiza, *An analysis of the economic integration of China and the European Union: the role of European trade policy*, in “Asia Pacific Business Review”, 2012, Vol. 18, no. 3, p. 365, DOI: 10.1080/13602381.2011.626990.

⁸⁵ R. Leal-Arcas, *The European Union's Trade and Investment Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon*, p. 468.

⁸⁶ F. De Ville, J. Orbie, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁸⁷ R. Leal-Arcas, *op. cit.*, p. 472.

based on expected economic gains from future trade.⁸⁸ Therefore, European model of regional integration is promoted strategically, mostly in the regions from which European transnationals could later expropriate benefit.

It is important to note that historically transnationals were always dominant in countries with large markets since in smaller states transnational elites found it more difficult to compete against national forces. For instance, vast majority of ERT members come from the large European economies. Keeping this in mind, I would like to provide a quote from an ambassador of a medium sized EU state who said the following about power relations in the Council: "too often, we are getting squeezed out of the debate. Issues tend to be decided by the big ones outside the Council chamber."⁸⁹ This is especially alarming considering the abolishment of the principle of rotating presidency in the Council as well as transfer of co-ratification powers from national parliaments to the European Parliament that has occurred as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon since this has reduced the possibilities for national social forces to influence EUs trade policy decision-making and further strengthened the hegemony of transnational capitalist class in Europe. Besides, it helps European elites present the newly ratified trade agreements as being of general interest to the EU, since co-ratification by the EP helps them solve the democratic legitimacy problem. As a result, now the EU has a clear identity of an actor that allows European transnational capitalist class to pursue its interests on international arena more aggressively.

Changes to the qualified majority vote requirement in the Council could also been interpreted as an attempt to strengthen EU's position during trade negotiations. For instance, Sean Ehrlich notes that qualified majority vote scheme has for a long time weakened EU's bargaining power during international trade negotiations because there was always a danger that the deal could be blocked by one of the member states.⁹⁰ The EC's negotiators simply could not guarantee that the offered conditions will be supported by all members of the Council.

⁸⁸ Idem, *The European Union and new leading powers: towards partnership in strategic trade policy areas*, p. 349.

⁸⁹ Q. Peel, *A profitable Union – enlarged Europe finds new ways to work*, in "Financial Times", May 1, 2008. Available online at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dc6d3e22-16e2-11dd-bbfc-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz305VT4zoK>. Last accessed: April 27, 2014; Manfred Elsig, *op. cit.*, p. 793, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2010.486975.

⁹⁰ S. Ehrlich, *How Common is the Common External Tariff? Domestic Influences on European Union Trade Policy*, in "European Union Politics", 2009, Vol. 10, no. 1, p. 118. DOI: 10.1177/1465116508099763.

Although it is not the key aim of this paper, to illustrate the claim presented earlier, I would like to shortly focus on the only free trade agreement signed by the EU after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon – the EU-Korea FTA which was successfully ratified and entered into force in July 2011. The deal is considered to be one of the most successful ones in recent history of the EU due to the positive dynamics of trade that it resulted in. After the FTA was signed, the EU exports of fully liberalized products to South Korea increased by 32%, which is more than 3 times higher than that to the rest of the world. Furthermore, the EU's trade balance with South Korea has a positive dynamic and increased from -3.8 billion EUR in 2011 to +4.1 billion EUR in 2013 (European Commission: 2014).⁹¹

However, if we look at details it is easy to uncover that it is mainly financial sector that benefited from the deal and that trade surplus is generated mainly due to exports of services in banking, financial and accounting sectors (European Commission: 2014). If we look at FDI flows, the picture is exactly the same. The table below presents FDI income data for selected countries prior and post FTA with South Korea was signed. Countries were chosen for illustrative purposes.

FDI income with South Korea (million euro)

Country / Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Germany	132	520	793	822	825
Netherlands	352	222	473	619	485
Sweden	86	-31	217	312	303
France	233	311	343	323	278
Latvia	3	-1	-1	-4	-7
Slovakia	54	-159	-184	-230	-78
Poland	10	-112	-69	-79	-85
Hungary	6	-86	39	-157	-133
EU27	2495	2439	4344	4420	2962
EU15*	1590	1927	3581	4299	3040

⁹¹ European Commission. *Trade: South Korea*. Available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea>. Last accessed: June 6, 2014.

*EU-15 area countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.

Source: *Eurostat, dataset* [bop_fdi_inc_r2]

We can see that while for the established EU economies, most of which are in the EU15 group, the dynamic of FDI income with South Korea since 2008 is largely positive, this is not the case for most newly accepted member states. This could be explained by the fact that prior to the Lisbon Treaty each member state was able sign its own Bilateral Investment Treaties with foreign states and utilize differences in national investment laws/regulations to offer better conditions for foreign firms. However, since 2009 this is no longer the case. As we can see, improved market access to the European single market has diverted FDI flows away from new and less economically powerful member states, therefore weakening their competitiveness.⁹² As a result, considering the fact that business representatives of the most troubled EU economies are largely absent in the largest European lobby groups⁹³, it is not surprising that during the times of economic crisis in Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain the European Commission was heavily involved in FTA negotiations with South Korea from which neither of those states was able to extract significant benefits. Investigating the economic impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on individual member states could be an interesting topic for a separate study.

Conclusions

In this paper, a neo-Gramscian theory was applied to analyze institutional and procedural changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in relation to EU's external trade policy. It was demonstrated that the dominance of the European transnational capitalist class, comprised of TNC owners, globalized bureaucrats and professionals, politicians and the media, is already established at the European level, and that the implemented changes were necessary to expand their hegemony on a global scale. This paper has also provided a historical overview of how this hegemony has been established and showed that currently it is the financial fraction of the transnational capitalist class that is the most influential on European arena. This view was supported by analysis of EU's

⁹² Manfred Elsig, *op. cit.*, p. 787, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2010.486975.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 792.

response to the recent financial crisis, as a result of which costs of the financial sector rescue were socialized among the EU's taxpayers. It was demonstrated that the dominant class is very persistent in preserving the established historical bloc and is building a foundation to further the acceptance of its ideas within the EU by strategically placing favourable for them discourses at the European level.

As a result, ideas of 'competitiveness' and 'open markets' as a key to economic growth have become almost default in the EU and are actively used even after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. European transnational capitalist class is able to use its dominance at the European level in order to establish a foundation for the expansion of its hegemony on a global scale. A lot of the changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon increased bargaining power of European transnationals against their competitors from other regions of the world. At the same time, the selectivity in the choice of trading partners used by the European Commission in the recent years has further strengthened the position of European transnationals.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE "ENEMY IMAGE" IN AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS FROM 1979 TO 1991

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Rezumat: Evoluția «imaginii dușmanului» în relațiile americano-sovietice din anii 1979-1991.

Articolul prezintă principalele schimbări în atitudinile politice ale SUA și URSS, în anii 1979-1991, urmărind evoluția imaginii "celeilalte superputeri". Autorul explorează rolul retoricii oficiale în perioada Războiului Rece, determinând etapele transformării reprezentărilor superputerii-rivale în discursurile publice ale liderilor SUA și URSS. Articolul evidențiază caracteristicile comune și deosebiri retoricii oficiale ale superputerilor, ca și domeniile fundamentale în care a fost ilustrată imaginea "rivalului". Deoarece adevărata schimbare în reprezentarea "celeilalt" a început în anul 1988, autorul arată cum a evoluat imaginea superputerilor rivale, de la «principali dușmani externi» la «parteneri».

Résumé: L'évolution de "l'image de l'ennemi" dans les relations américano-soviétiques des années 1979-1991.

L'article ci-joint présente les principaux changements des attitudes politiques des Etats-Unis de l'Amérique et de l'URSS pendant les années 1979-1991, tout en suivant l'évolution de l'image de "l'autre superpuissance". L'auteur y explore le rôle de la rhétorique officielle durant la Guerre Froide, tout en déterminant les étapes de la transformation des représentations de la superpuissance – rivale dans les discours publics des leaders des Etats-Unis et de l'URSS. L'article met en évidence les traits communs, ainsi que les différences de la rhétorique officielle des superpuissances, ainsi que les domaines fondamentaux où on illustre l'image du "rival". Comme le véritable changement dans la représentation de "l'autre" commença en 1988, l'auteur y montra comment évolua l'image des superpuissances rivales, de "principaux ennemis externes" à "partenaires".

Abstract. The article presents the main changes in the political attitudes of the USA and the USSR, during 1979-1991, analyzing the evolution of the image of "the other superpower". The author explores the role of the official rhetoric in the age of the Cold War,

determining the stages of transformation of the rival-superpower's appearances in the American and Soviet leaders' public speeches. The article highlights similarities and differences in the official rhetoric of the superpowers, as well as the basic areas in which the image of "the rival" was depicted. Since the real change in the representation of the "Other" started in 1988, the author indicates how the rival superpowers' image has evolved from «main external enemies» to «partners».

Keywords: USA, USSR, "enemy image", official rhetoric, American-Soviet relations, Cold War, partner, cooperation.

Introduction

After the Cold War, scientists have an opportunity to rethink the events of the second half of the twentieth century, because of the opening of previously classified documents. The increased scientific interest to these events enabled the researchers to write a "new Cold War history".

The manifestation of such interest is the activity of large number of research centers and groups aimed at studying of the various aspects of this confrontation during the Cold War. Such centers were established in the USA, Europe (UK, Italy, Russia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Romania), Asia (China, Mongolia). Usually the main area of research in these centers are determined by the role of country in the Cold War and its place in international relations, as well as the interest of historians of each country in the creating of own national history.

Nowadays American researchers are mostly focused on the history of the Third World and the Eastern Europe, during the Cold War, the issues of ideology. The American-Soviet relations are the leading area of research in Russian centers. European scholars paid their attention mainly to Europe during the Cold War and the history of the Third world. In the countries of the post-Soviet space, the main attention is focused on inter-Soviet issues.

In recent years, scientists show a particular interest concerning the image of the "Other" in American-Soviet relations. This causes the increased popularity of the imagology studies, which focuses on the study of the image of the "Other", the "Alien". This direction of research was formed within the framework of Comparative Literature, and then – in the 1990s began to be used in other sciences, in history is well. The imagology of international relations is focused on the study of transnational images, stereotypes of perceptions and comparison of "Own" and "Alien".

Of particular note is the last phase of the Cold War. The first half of the 1980s was marked by the escalation of American-Soviet conflict, when the world was on the brink of nuclear catastrophe. In the second half of the 1980s, this global confrontation decreased and Cold War finished. These changes in American and Soviet foreign policy were reflected in the ideology of both superpowers. As a result, stereotypes in the public consciousness towards the opposite side began to break.

The various aspects of the Cold War were studied by J.L. Gaddis, M.P. Leffler, S.J. Walker, O.A. Vestad, F. Holliday, A. Filitov, A. Fateev, A. Utkin and others. M. Kramer pointed on the key role of ideology in this global confrontation. In the Russian historiography there are few publications dedicated to issues American-Soviet confrontation and the “Enemy image” in particular. For example, we can name such researches, who examined certain area: O. Fedorov, O. Kolesnikova, O. Ryabov (the study of cinematography), O. Sitnikova, A. Byelokonyeva (newspapers), O. Tretyachenko (literature). In Ukraine the issues of the Cold War and American and Soviet foreign policy are explored by A. Tumashov, A. Rudiuk, D. Krysenko, but there are no imagological studies in this field yet. Generally, the great majority of researches of the “Enemy image” in the USA and the USSR concern mostly the initial phase of the Cold War.

This article is an attempted to explore of the “Enemy image” in the United States and the Soviet Union in 1979-1991.

The development of American-Soviet relations during the last stage of the Cold War (1979-1991) makes it possible to divide it into two periods, when the image of the opposite country was different. In 1979 the intervention of Soviet troops in Afghanistan caused the new wave of aggravation of the American-Soviet confrontation. In 1985, when M. Gorbachev came into power, the great changes in American-Soviet relations occurred and finally the Cold War ended.

The image of the opposite superpower as “the main external enemy” during the Cold War was the most important part of the ideological policy both in the United States and in the Soviet Union.

The basic means of forming the “Enemy image”

Before we examine the evolution of the “Enemy image” in the United States and the Soviet Union in 1979-1991, let’s focus on the basic means of forming the “Enemy image” that was used by both superpowers during the entire Cold War, among which we can name such as the media, the education system, the cinema, cartoons and more.

The newspapers were one of the most popular means of formation of the

“Enemy image” during the Cold War, and occupied a special place in the ideological confrontation, because they were powerful resource of the official information. In addition, the press was widespread and easily accessible mean of obtaining information. On the pages of both American and Soviet press stereotypes were formed with the help of text and visual images (cartoons, photos).

In the press, strong negative characteristics were often used towards the opposite superpower in order to form a hostile attitude of it. In the American newspapers and magazines there were used such expressions against the USSR such as “the path to despotism”, “totalitarianism”, “aggressive policy”. Similarly in the Soviet press the USA were depicted as “lighteners of new war”. The image of the opponent country was formed on the background of constant reminders about the military threat and the expansion of opposing superpower’s influence on other countries.

Very important tool of visualization of the “Enemy image” through the press were cartoons. Visual propaganda had a very strong potential impact on the society through its focus on human emotions and feelings. Among the most frequently used elements for describing the opposite side both in the American and Soviet cartoons were official and unofficial national symbols (in the USSR – mark “US”, symbolic person “Uncle Sam”, stars and stripes, in the USA – the hammer and sickle, the Kremlin). There were also the identification of the enemy country with the certain animal (the USSR in American cartoons was depicted as a Bear, and the USA in the Soviet – as an Eagle).

The next extremely important mean of forming of the “Enemy image” was the education system, which was very influential in this sphere. A special role was played by the school and high school history textbooks. There were present many accents on the aggressive, expansionist nature of the opposite country’s foreign policy, the issues about the increase of military funding, undemocratic political and social structure in the other side, the criticism of the economic system.

The cinematography also had important influence on shaping mass stereotypes during the Cold War. Films were characterized by vivid emotional coloring, the impact on the subconscious of the person. Films directed their viewers to self-identification with the characters of the movies. They were encouraging to feel sympathy to positive heroes – usually representatives of their own country, and hostility to negative heroes – always the representatives of the opposite side. Among the main problems, which were highlighted in the movies during the Cold War, we have to mention the espionage, preparation of a secret nuclear attack, suppression of the people in the opposing superpower with undemocratic regime, inciting regional military conflicts and so on.

However, the most influential mean of the forming of the "Enemy image" during the Cold War was the official rhetoric. It reflects the official position of the government on various issues of the international situation and internal political life. During the global confrontation of the United States and the Soviet Union it was one of the main sources of distribution of the opposite superpower's image as the main external enemy. Official rhetoric most vividly reflected the "Enemy image" and allowed to trace its specificity during a particular stage of bipolar confrontation, covered facts about military sphere, human rights, and political, economic, cultural and other issues.

The "Enemy image" in the official rhetoric in 1979-1985

The main field of confrontation between the superpowers in the 1979-1985 was the military sphere. The aggravation of confrontation between the USA and USSR was manifested in rampant arms race and involvement of both superpowers in regional conflicts. Superpowers needed to position itself as a defender of the national interests and values in order to ensure public support for its foreign military policy.

The official rhetoric of both superpowers was characterized by the presence of accusations of the other side in aggression, expansionism and attempts to establish hegemony in the whole world. For example, in Soviet leaders' speeches, concerning the USA, there were often used such ideological clichés as "aggressive intrigues of imperialism"¹, "pushing of world for war"², "course on undermining détente"³, "ideology and politics of hegemony"⁴, "illusion of power advantages"⁵, "aggressive, reckless policies"⁶. In the American official rhetoric there were also used the ideological stamps for similar characteristics of the Soviet Union, among which it is worth noting: "the main

¹ Юрий Андропов, *Избранные речи и статьи* [Favorite speeches and articles], Москва, Политиздат, 1984, p. 215.

² *Ibid.*, p. 200.

³ *Материалы XXVI съезда Коммунистической партии Советского Союза* [The materials of the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], 23 февраля-3 марта 1981 года, Стенографический отчет, Москва, Политиздат, 1981, Т.1, p. 20.

⁴ *Материалы XXVII съезда Коммунистической партии Советского Союза* [The materials of the XXVII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Москва, Политиздат, 1986, с. 4

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

source of aggression in the world”⁷, “Soviet adventurism”⁸, “imperialist expansionism of totalitarianism”⁹, “imperial adventures”¹⁰ etc.

The active involvement of the opposing superpower in regional conflicts was also emphasized in official American and Soviet speeches. Soviet leaders accused the United States in conducting the colonial policy toward the countries of the Third World. In the American official rhetoric, the main emphasis was made on establishment of Soviet military bases, the supply of arms, financial aid, sending of military advisers to the Third World countries. The accusation of the unilateral arms race, led by the opposite side, was an important component of the “Enemy image” too. This was also used by both authorities to rise a question of the necessity to improve the level of own self-defense and to develop new weapons for the defense and protection of the state interest. We also have to mention that it was mutual for both superpowers to proclaim their own peace initiative.

The specific feature of the American rhetoric in this area was an appeal to such topic as espionage, aimed primarily on stealing of secret Western scientific and high technology by the Soviet Union. This can be explained by the fact that in 1949 by the initiative of the USA the Western countries created a Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, known as CoCom – an international organization. Primarily there were 17 member-states, but soon their member increased and CoCom existed till 1994¹¹. The purpose of this organization was to prevent selling strategic goods and technology to the Soviet Union.

The sphere of human rights and their violation was another important area in which the image of the opponent country was present. It should be mentioned that there was put a different content to the explanation of the human rights in the USA and the USSR.

⁷ Ronald Reagan, *Radio Address to the Nation on the Bonn Economic Summit*, May 4, 1985 in <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=38587> (Accessed in 09. 11. 2014).

⁸ Idem, *Radio Address to the Nation on National Security and Administration Goals*, March 14, 1987 in <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=33972> (Accessed in 09. 11. 2014).

⁹ Idem, *Radio Address to the Nation on Soviet-United States Relations*, August 29, 1987 in <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=34747> (Accessed in 09. 11. 2014).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls and the Wassenaar Arrangement* in “Encyclopedia of Business”, 2nd ed., in <http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/> (Accessed in 09. 11. 2014).

In Soviet rhetoric the emphasis on the human rights violations in the United States was primarily in the sphere of social rights. This was due to the fact that the main principle of the existence of Soviet society was collectivism. For example, American trade unions were characterized in the USSR as those, which were "exposed to persecution and economic blackmail, adoption of anti-labor laws". The Soviet leaders used such phrases as "army of unemployed", "millions of people had thrown out of the gate factories", "millions of people are unemployed" and so on to underscore the plight of American citizens. It was constantly reminded about the deepening of the social stratification in the United States.

In the speeches of American presidents, in turn, the attention was focused on violations of personal and political rights in the USSR. The reason was the perception of freedom as a priority value on the state level in general and for each individual in particular, because the main feature of American society was individualism. The American President R. Reagan constantly emphasized in his speeches that the human rights violations in the Soviet Union – was one of the four key issues that must be addressed for in conducting any negotiations with the Soviet Union. Soviet policy towards human rights was characterized as "communism's unrelenting assault on human freedom"¹². It was noted that in the Soviet Union were persecuted and sent to prison "those who speak in opposition to official policy, who seek to worship according to their religious beliefs, or who represent diverse ethnic minorities and nationalities"¹³. Besides, the USSR was accused in increasing of anti-Semitism, the ban of travel abroad of those who wished to obtain religious freedom and so on.

One of the main accusations of opposite country was the lack of the democracy development. However, it should be noted that the official rhetoric of the USSR paid less interest to this issue. The Soviet leaders interpreted democracy as equality among equals and emphasized that in the United States the idea of the "right of the strong to fight for survival" was cultivated and this led to the spread of the "the amorality, hatred to all of the democratic manifestations"¹⁴. In the American official rhetoric an interest to the coverage of

¹² Ronald Reagan, *Radio Address to the Nation on Armed Forces Day and Defense Spending*, May 18, 1985 in <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42346> (Accessed in 09. 11. 2014).

¹³ *Republican Party Platform of 1980*, July 15, in <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25844> (Accessed in 10. 11. 2014).

¹⁴ Материалы XXVII съезда Коммунистической партии Советского Союза [The materials of the XXVII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Москва, Политиздат, 1986, с. 14.

the Soviet deficiencies in the political sphere was especially great. An important component of public speaking of American leaders was a constant reminder of the democratic foundations of the political system of their own state, based on liberalism, freedom, and human life priority over the public interest, individualism. In contrast R. Reagan emphasized totalitarian, despotic nature of the Soviet state system, where the main features of the functioning of the state was censorship, repression, the advantage of state interests over the interests of an individual, devaluation of human life.

In addition to the above-mentioned spheres that were common to the official rhetoric of both superpowers, in the speeches of the Soviet leaders was often illuminated the information about the “main enemy” in socio-economic and cultural contexts. The representatives of Soviet authorities in their speeches systematically reminded about the inflation in the American economy, an increase in the number of unemployed. As for American culture, M. Gorbachev in his report at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU noted its “bourgeois expansion”, “vandalism”, impoverishment under the onslaught of “unbridled mercenarines and the cult of violence, preaching racism, propaganda lowland instincts, customs of underworld and the “bottom” of society”¹⁵.

It should be mentioned that in official rhetoric both leaders of the USA and the USSR often used the same terminology, but interpreted it differently. So, the main stylistic method, which was used – it was antithesis a comparison of opposing images and values. Antitheses illustrated the different meanings that fit to the concept of “democracy”, “freedom” in both superpowers.

In Soviet official political discourse there were used such antitheses as: “democracy” – “imperialism”, “colonialism”; “freedom” – “the exploitation of the workers”; “free state which helps its allies” – “the state of “imperial ambitions, which pursues a policy of the plunder of developing countries”¹⁶; “peace proposals to reduce the number of weapons” – “the United States are unwilling to enter into agreements and they increase the number of weapons”.

In American official rhetoric as the main antitheses we can find the following: “democracy” – “communism”, “totalitarianism”; “freedom” – “censorship”, “tyranny”, “dictatorship”, “repression”; “free state which helps its allies” –

¹⁵ *Материалы XXVII съезда Коммунистической партии Советского Союза* [The materials of the XXVII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Москва, Политиздат, 1986, p. 19

¹⁶ *Заявление Генерального секретаря ЦК КПСС М.С. Горбачева по советскому телевидению* [Statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Gorbachev on Soviet television], 18 августа 1986 года, Москва, Политиздат, 1986, с. 9.

"the empire that spreads its influence and power, enslaves other nations"; "compliance with contracts and reducing the number of weapons" – "the Soviet Union violates, never adheres agreements, increases the number of weapons".

So, in 1979-1985, until M. Gorbachev came into power, the main means of depicting of the opposite side as the main enemy didn't change.

The changes of the opposite superpower's image during 1985-1991

The second period began in 1985 and lasted until 1991, when with the collapse of the Soviet Union took place the end of the Cold War. This stage was marked by gradual debugging of the American-Soviet relations, which led to the phasing out of the traditional characteristics of the opposite country as the main external enemy.

The research of the official rhetoric shows that the real changes in the image of the opposing state's image occurred much later. In this regard, in the second period (1985-1991) it seems appropriate the allocation of two main stages in the official rhetoric superpowers, during which the opposing side's image differed considerably.

The first phase covered the 1985-1987. During these years, the first evidence of the changes in the official rhetoric of the USA and the USSR were the calls of both superpowers' leaders to establish a dialogue in order to preserve peace.

In the speeches of leaders, it was primarily emphasized the need for dialogue about the issues in the military sphere – namely, the reduction of nuclear weapons and prevention of the nuclear disaster. It should be noted that the understanding of the necessity to stop the arms race and the inability of any party to win a nuclear war didn't cause any serious changes in the overall negative image of the opposite superpower. M. Gorbachev in his public speeches continued to use the traditional expressions in relation to the USA as "imperial ambitions of the United States", "American militarism – the first lines of military threat", "American imperialism", "American ruling circles seek social revenge", "discriminatory policy of Washington" in the trade and economic relations, "reactionary, aggressive US circles". In R. Reagan's speeches of that time it can be also found traditionally negative characteristics of the Soviet Union: "Communist dictatorship", "Soviet adventurism", "communism – is a prison", "imperialist expansionism totalitarianism", "imperial adventure", "aggressive strategy".

The more noticeable changes in the image of another superpower started in 1988. So, we can consider this as the beginning of the second stage. The period 1988-1991 was characterized by the gradual abandonment of the traditional

lighting of the opposite side as the main enemy. From now on the other superpower was positioned as a potential partner not only in the military, but also in all other spheres of activity.

The turn emerged after the Washington summit (December 8, 1987), the result of which was the signing of INF treaty. As the evidence of this there were both leaders' statements which were announced within a few days after the talks. On December 10, 1987, during the communication with the business community in Washington the Soviet leader noted that there were new conditions in which the space for cooperation was opened not only in reducing nuclear weapons, but also in economic, scientific, environmental spheres etc.¹⁷. On December 12, 1987 the American President in his weekly radio address to the nation while talking the results of the negotiations and relations with the USSR described them as the beginning of a "long road for common journey"¹⁸.

The specific changes in the coverage of the opposite country in public speeches and statements by leaders of the USA and the USSR started from the middle of 1988. Henceforth the key words in the American and Soviet official rhetoric in respect of other superpower were "hope" and "trust". It was an important indicator of changes in relations between the superpowers, because the distrust of the other side was one of the key causes of the arms race and gain of confrontation.

During the 1988-1991 R. Reagan and his successor as American President – George H.W. Bush in their public speeches repeatedly noted "the birth of hope" for a brighter future and the establishing of trust with respect to the USSR: "Seeds of freedom and greater trust were sown"¹⁹, "there is the hope of an era in which the terrible nightmares of the postwar era, totalitarianism and nuclear terror, may diminish significantly and – please God – someday fade away"²⁰, "the

¹⁷ *Хроника внешнеполитических событий в СССР 1987 г.* [The chronicle of events in the foreign policy of the USSR in 1987] in http://www.gorby.ru/archival/expocenter/vneshpolitika/show_29324/ (Accessed in 14.03.2015).

¹⁸ Ronald Reagan, *Radio Address to the Nation Following the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting*, December 12, 1987 in <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=33816> (Accessed in 09. 11. 2014).

¹⁹ Idem, *Radio Address to the Nation on the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Moscow and the Toronto Economic Summit*, June 4, 1988 in <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=35911> (Accessed in 09. 11. 2014).

²⁰ Idem, *Radio Address to the Nation on Soviet-United States Relations*, December 3, 1988 in <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=35227> (Accessed in 09. 11. 2014).

winds of change are bringing hope to people all around the world" etc.²¹.

In his public speeches during the 1988-1991, while describing the international situation and relations between the USSR and the USA, M. Gorbachev said: "The winds of the Cold War changed by the winds of hope"²², "range of trust broaden far beyond the usual ideological spectrum"²³, "new thinking and based on its policy rekindled hope, opened the way for the qualitative changes in human consciousness"²⁴ etc. In the 1988-1991 the usage of the term "Cold War" became the characteristic feature of official statements and speeches of leaders of the USSR and the USA if to compare with previous years.

In addition, in 1988-1991 for the official rhetoric of both countries concerning the bilateral relationship it was inherent the usage of such characteristics as "cooperation" and "partnership". In June 1988, after the Summit with M. Gorbachev in Moscow, R. Reagan noted the importance of "cultural exchanges to expand the American-Soviet cooperation"²⁵. M. Gorbachev at the meeting with representatives of the American intelligentsia in May 1990, revealing changes in American-Soviet relations, said: "We go from confrontation to competition, from rivalry to partnership"²⁶.

In the context of changes in the official rhetoric of the Soviet Union and the United States in 1988-1991 also became visible the change in the depiction of people of other superpower. In May 1988, during a dinner in honor of the arrival of R. Reagan to Moscow, M. Gorbachev said that they have to lose the old antipathy and traditional stereotypes associated with the "Enemy image": "The traits of other people became more visible"²⁷. In June 1988, during the

²¹ George H.W. Bush, *The President's News Conference in Paris*, July 16, 1989 in <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=17301> (Accessed in 09. 11. 2014).

²² *Хроника внешнеполитических событий в СССР 1988 г.* [The chronicle of events in the foreign policy of the USSR in 1988] in http://www.gorby.ru/archival/expocenter/vneshpolitika/show_29325/ (Accessed in 23. 03. 2015).

²³ Ronald Reagan, *The President's News Conference Following the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Moscow*, June 1, 1988 in <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=35903> (Accessed in 09. 11. 2014).

²⁴ *Материалы XIX Всесоюзной конференции Коммунистической партии Советского Союза* [The materials of XIX Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], 28 июня – 1 июля 1988 г., Москва, Политиздат, 1988, с. 160.

²⁵ Ronald Reagan, *op. cit.*

²⁶ *Хроника внешнеполитических событий в СССР 1990 г.* [The chronicle of events in the foreign policy of the USSR in 1990] in http://www.gorby.ru/archival/expocenter/vneshpolitika/show_29327/ (Accessed in 23. 03. 2015).

²⁷ *Хроника внешнеполитических событий в СССР 1988 г.* [The chronicle of events in

President's News conference on the question "Is there something in Soviet-American relations that you would advise your successor to leave behind? And is there something that you would especially advise to take to the future?" R. Reagan answered: "I'll tell him that he will find the Russian people most warm and hospitable and friendly"²⁸.

However, despite the positive changes in the image of the other superpower, the official rhetoric of the USA and the USSR continued to include a reminder about keeping the fundamental differences between them. The American leaders in their public speeches emphasized the difference between the superpowers. However, in their view it wouldn't make obstacles to the establishment of the intergovernmental cooperation in all possible areas. For example, at the President's News conference in June 1989, George H.W. Bush said: "I think the relationship is going in the right general direction, albeit we have tremendous differences with the Soviet Union, still"²⁹. In turn, in the Soviet leader's statements on the difference between the United States and Soviet Union also had notable changes. In May 1990, M. Gorbachev positioned these differences not as a disadvantage, but as a positive moment, considering them as "the basis for discussions, to share, to reach a higher level of knowledge"³⁰.

Conclusions

Since 1985 a new accents appeared in the official rhetoric of the USA and the USSR in the interpretation of American-Soviet relations. They were reflected in the appearance of calls for the establishment of cooperation in the military sphere, in particular in the reduction of nuclear weapons. However, the actual changes in the "Enemy image" started in 1988 when the other side was already positioned as a potential collaborator in various spheres of life. So, gradually the image of the opposite superpower evolved in 1979-1991 from the "Enemy" to the "Partner".

the foreign policy of the USSR in 1988] in http://www.gorby.ru/archival/expocenter/vneshpolitika/show_29325/ (Accessed in 23. 03. 2015).

²⁸ Ronald Reagan, *The President's News Conference Following the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Moscow*, June 1, 1988 in <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=35903> (Accessed in 09. 11. 2014).

²⁹ George H.W. Bush, *The President's News Conferences*, June 27, 1989 in <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=17216> (Accessed in 09. 11. 2014).

³⁰ *Хроника внешнеполитических событий в СССР 1990 г.* [The chronicle of events in the foreign policy of the USSR in 1990] in http://www.gorby.ru/archival/expocenter/vneshpolitika/show_29327/ (Accessed in 23. 03. 2015).

**MOLDAU IN POLNISCHEN UND UNGARISCHEN POLITIK.
DAS TREFFEN IN LEVOCA 1494**

**MOLDAVIA IN POLISH AND HUNGARIAN POLICY.
THE MEETING IN LEVOCA IN 1494**

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Rezumat: Moldova în politica poloneză și maghiară. Întâlnirea de la Levoča din 1494.

Acest studiu se referă la politica poloneză și maghiară față de Moldova, la cumpăna secolelor XV și XVI. În timpul negocierilor de la Levoča, din 1494, s-ar fi prezentat și discutat diferite opinii legate de această politică. Numărul redus și ambiguitatea surselor încă mai ridică întrebări asupra realei semnificații a întâlnirii de la Levoča și a cruciadei lui Ioan Albert. Articolul încearcă să reconstruiască această eveniment, explicând deciziile luate acolo deopotrivă cu scopul cruciadei lui Ioan Albert din 1497.

Abstract: *This paper refers to the Polish and Hungarian policy toward Moldova at the turn of 15th and 16th centuries. Different opinions about this policy should have been exposed and discussed during the negotiations in Levoča in 1494. The scarcity and ambiguity of sources still raise questions about the real meaning of the meeting in Levoča and the John Albert's crusade. The article tries to reconstruct this event, explaining the decisions that were made there as well as the aim of the John Albert's crusade in 1497.*

Résumé: La Moldavie dans la politique polonaise et hongroise. La rencontre de Levoča de 1494

L'ouvrage ci-joint fait référence à la politique polonaise et hongroise sur la Moldavie à la limite des XV-ème et XVI-ème siècles. On présenta et discuta pendant les négociations de Levoča, de 1494, des opinions différentes concernant cette politique. Le nombre réduit et l'ambiguïté des sources suscitent encore des questions sur la signification réelle de la rencontre de Levoča et sur la croisade de Jean Albert. L'article ci-joint essaye de reconstruire l'événement qu'on vient de mentionner, tout en expliquant les décisions qu'on y prit, ainsi que le but de la croisade de Jean Albert de 1497.

Keywords: *Moldova, Poland, John I Albert, Levoča, Stephan the Great*

EINFÜHRUNG

Das Ziel dieses Artikels ist es, ein Paar Bemerkungen zu der polnischen und ungarischen Politik gegenüber Moldau an der Wende des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts zu geben und vor allem den Meinungsunterschied zwischen den Brüdern: Johannes Albrecht (polnischer König) und Wladislaus II. (ungarischer König) in der Frage der moldauischen Politik unter Betracht zu ziehen und zu analysieren. Meine Untersuchungen befinden sich noch in Anfangsphase, von daher wird hier bestimmt nicht die ganze Literatur zu diesem Thema dargestellt. Ich werde vor allem auf polnischer Literatur basieren, um den polnischen Standpunkt zum Ausdruck zu bringen¹. Was die Urkunden betrifft, werde ich außer polnische auch türkische, moldauische und deutsche berücksichtigen, auch wenn es natürlich noch nicht alle sind.

Die Politik gegenüber Moldau war ein der Schlüsselprobleme, sowohl für Polen als auch für Ungarn, das sehr oft die Unruhe zwischen den Brüdern: Johannes Albrecht und Wladislaus II. ausgelöste und Streit anzettelte. Es gab nämlich einen definitiven Meinungsunterschied zwischen den Beiden, was die Sache Moldau betraf. Das hatte aber einen gemeinsamen Grund. Sowohl für Polen als auch für Ungarn war die Politik gegenüber Moldau stark mit deren Politik gegenüber der Türkei verbunden und davon abhängig. Je nachdem, wie die Beziehungen zur Türkei waren, änderte sich auch der Umgang mit moldauischem Fürstentum. Demzufolge nahm jeder von den Brüdern die Rolle von Moldau anders wahr. Der polnische König war ein großer Befürworter des Krieges gegen die Türkei, und Moldau ihm eher dazu diente, um das Ziel: Kampf und Sieg gegen die Türkei zu erreichen². Anders Wladislaus II. Er befürchtete

¹ Über das Treffen in Levoca schrieben: L. Finkel, *Zjazd Jagiellonów w Lewoczy* [Das Treffen der Jagiellonen in Levoca], in: „Kwartalnik Historyczny“ (weiter: KH), Bd. 28 (1914); S. Lukas, *O rzekomej wyprawie na Turka w r. 1497* [Über die angebliche Expedition gegen die Türkei im Jahre 1497], in: *Album uczącej się młodzieży polskiej*, Lwów 1879, s. 1 – 19; A. Prochaska, *Sprawy wołoskie w XV wieku* [Die Probleme der Walachei in 15. Jahrhundert], in: „Przewodnik Naukowy i Literacki”, Lwów 1888, s. 1061 – 1066; F. Bostel, *Zakaz Miechowity* [Das Verbot des Miechowitas], in: „Przewodnik Naukowy i Literacki”, Lwów 1884, s. 21 – 22; A. Diveky, *Az 1494. Évi lőcsei fejedelmi kongresszus, Lőcse*, 1913, s. 19.

² J. Smołucha, *Kilka uwag na temat wyprawy czarnomorskiej Jana Olbrachta w 1497 r.* [Ein paar Bemerkungen zur Expedition von Johannes Albrecht in der Jahre 1497], s. 413; F. Papée, *Jan Olbracht* [Johannes Albrecht] Kraków 1936, s. 63; O. Górka, *Białogród i Kilia a wyprawa z 1497 r., W: Sprawozdania z posiedzeń Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego* [Akkerman und Kilia sowie die Expedition aus dem Jahr 1497, in: Bericht aus dem Treffen des Wissenschaftsverein in Warschau], Bd. 25 (1932), s. 68; Johannes Albrecht wollte die antiosmanische Koalition gründen und bemühte sich

dagegen die Relationen gegenüber türkischem Nachbar zu verschlechtern und aus diesem Grund wollte er ein Status quo behalten. Solche Stellung des ungarischen Königs war nicht so überraschend, wenn man die geographische Lage von Ungarn, aber auch die damalige Situation innerhalb des Staates analysiert. Im Falle des osmanischen Angriffs war Ungarn ja das erste Ziel. Wladislaus II. beteiligte sich dazu am Konflikt innerhalb seines Staates und sein Thron wackelte. Seine Regierung befand sich in der ständigen Gefahr entweder wegen des Maximilians Habsburg, der die Regierung übernehmen wollte, oder wegen des Adels, die Johannes Zapolya unterstützte³. Seine Position war dadurch nicht stark genug um sich den Konflikt gegen die Türkei erlauben zu können.

Es gab aber auch Meinungen, dass die angeblich anti-türkische Politik des Johannes Albrechts nur eine Propaganda war, die der Welt mitgeteilt wurde. Diese hatte aber mit wirklichen Vorhaben des Johannes Albrechts nichts zu tun. Vielleicht wollte der polnische König ganz anderes Ziel erreichen, nämlich Moldau erobern und die anti-türkische Propaganda diene ihm eher dazu anti-moldauische Expedition zu rechtfertigen?⁴

Die Antwort auf diese Fragen sollte das Treffen in Levoca geben. Das wurde ja organisiert um den Streit über die Rolle der Moldau zu lösen.

sehr den Keizer Maximilian zu dieser Idee zu gewinnen. Der war aber mit dem Kampf gegen die Schweizer beschäftigt und hatte für den Krieg gegen die Türkei keine Lust. An Landtagen in Freiburg, Worms und Köln, führten Mikolaj aus Rozenberg und Watzenrode die Gespräche im Namen des polnischen Königs, Siehe.: Teki Naruszewicza 23, s. 815 – 828 = AGAD, Libri Legationum (weiter: LL) 22, k. 332 – 335; *Materiały do dziejów dyplomacji polskiej z lat 1486 – 1516 (Kodeks Zagrzebski)* [Materiellen zur Geschichte der polnischen Diplomatie aus den Jahren 1486 – 1516 – so genannte Zagrzebski Gesetzbuch], Ed. J. Garbacik, Wrocław – Warszawa – Kraków 1966, nr 26; K. Baczkowski, *Działalność polsko – węgierskiej dyplomacji w Rzeszy niemieckiej w latach 1498 – 1500 oraz sojusz Jagiellonów z Francją* [Die Tätigkeit der polnisch-ungarischen Diplomatie im Deutschen Reich in den Jahren 1498 – 1500 und die Allianz zwischen Jagiellonen und Frankreich], in: „Studia Historyczne“ (weiter: SH), Bd. 20 (1977), teil. 4, s. 518 – 519, 521 – 522; H. Wiesflecker, *Kaiser Maximilian I. Das Reich, Österreich, Und Europa an der Wende zu Neuzeit*, Bd. 2, München 1975, s. 157 – 158, 297, 299 – 305; H. Ulmann, *Kaiser Maximilian I auf urkundlicher Grundlage dargestellt*, Bd. 2, Stuttgart 1891, s. 603, 623 – 624.

³ Johannes Albrecht beschloss gleich danach, als er an die Macht gekommen war, eine enge Allianz mit Wladislaus II. Beide Seiten sollten sich gegenseitig helfen, vor allem gegen die Türkei, aber auch gegen die Rebellen aus eigenen Ländern, Siehe: *Codex diplomaticus regni Poloniae et Magni Ducatus Lithuaniae*, Ed. M. Dogiel, Wilnae 1758 – 1764 (weiter: Dogiel), Bd. 1, s. 86; L. Finkel, *Zjazd Jagiellonów w Lewoczy...*, s. 331 – 333.

⁴ Solche Vermutungen hatte S. Lukas, *O rzekomej wyprawie na Turka w r. 1497* [Über die angebliche Expedition gegen die Türkei im Jahre 1497], in: *Album uczącej się młodzieży polskiej*, Lwów 1879, s. 1 – 19.

DAS TREFFEN IN LEVOCA

Das Treffen wurde für April 1494 angekündigt⁵. Dorthin sollten alle Brüder: Johannes Albrecht, Alexander, Frederic, Sigismund und Wladislaus ankommen, um über gemeinsame politische Probleme zu sprechen und sie zu lösen. Alexander kam jedoch nicht. Es war hingegen Friedrich, der Markgraf von Brandenburg-Ansbach anwesend. Jedoch brachte das Treffen zum Vorschein, wie groß die Unterschiede zwischen Johannes Albrecht und Wladislaus II. in der Frage der Politik gegenüber Moldau sind. Obwohl die Sitzung über drei Wochen lang dauerte, wurde kaum Dekret erlassen. Wir verfügen nur noch über ein Paar Dokumente, die uns aber in der Sache der Moldau nicht helfen können. Das erste königliche Dokument kommt aus dem 22. April und ist an Kronstadt und Hermenstadt gerichtet. Die Städte sollten 4000 Gulden zahlen⁶. Das zweite Dokument kommt aus dem 23. April. Es ist ein königlicher Befehl (des Wladislaus II.) zum siebenbürgischen Woiwoden Bartholomäus Drágffy von Béltek damit er die Abtei Kerz schützte⁷. Das dritte kommt aus 1. Mai und ist auch an Siebenbürgen angerichtet⁸. Es gibt noch ein Dokument, das aus dem 5. Mai stammt⁹. Der Mangel an Urkunden fuhr dazu, dass es heutzutage viele Vermutungen betreffs des Ziels des Treffens sowie seines Verlaufs und der während der Sitzung wohl getroffenen Entscheidung gibt. Wegen der Knappheit an Urkunden, gibt es auch Schwierigkeiten, um das Treffen rekonstruieren zu können. Man verfügt also über den Bericht von Miechowita, der jedoch nicht genug detailliert ist¹⁰, über den Text von Bonfini¹¹ und über die „Gerüchte“, die in verschiedenen Urkunden gestreut wurden. Auch die Ereignissedie nach der Sitzung in Levoca geschahen, können als Konsequenzen der Entscheidungen der Levocaer Sitzung betrachtet werden und deswegen für die Forschung sehr hilfreich sein. Der Bericht von Miechowita ist jedoch umstritten, weil der ursprüngliche Text des Autors später geändert wurde (erste Version kommt aus dem Jahr 1519, die zweite aus dem Jahr 1521)¹². Das kompliziert

⁵ L. Finkel, *Zjazd Jagiellonów w Lewoczy...*, s. 317.

⁶ Direcția Județeană Sibiu a Arhivelor Naționale ale României, Colecția de documente medievale [Rumäniens Nationalarchiv. Kreis Sibiu Abteilung, Kollektion des mittelalterlicher Dokumente], Serie U. II (Inventar 25), nr. 557.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Serie U. II (Inventar 25), nr. 558.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Serie U. II (Inventar 25), 561.

⁹ Magyar Országos Levéltár (Budapest), nr 24771; siehe auch Neumann Tibor, *A gróf és a herceg magánháborúja*, in: „Századok“ 148 (2), s. 399; L. Hopp, *Az „antemurale” es „conformitas” humanista eszméje a Magyar-lengyel hagyományban*, Budapest 1992, s. 46.

¹⁰ Marcin aus Miechow, *Chronica Polonorum. Suplementum*, In: *Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum*, Ed. J. Szujski, Bd. 2, Kraków 1874, (weiter: Miechowita), s. 259 – 260.

¹¹ A. Bonfini, *Rerum Hungaricarum Decades quatuor cum dimidia... per Joannem Sambucum*, Frankfurt 1581 (weiter: Bonfini), s. 714.

¹² Ursprüngliche Version: *Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum*, Bd. 2, s. 259, Veränderte

zusätzlich die Ermittlung des Verlaufs des Treffens. Laut Miechowita (in beiden Versionen des Textes) wurden in Levoca verschiedene Gesetze gegen die Türkei und die Moldau beschlossen. Jedoch, wie der Chronist erwähnte, wurden alle Gesetze annulliert oder abgelehnt¹³. Der grundsätzliche Unterschied zwischen den beiden Überlieferungen besteht im Ziel der polnischen Expedition gegen Moldau im Jahre 1497. Laut der ersten Version sollte der Krieg hauptsächlich gegen Moldau geführt werden (die in dieser Urkunde als Walachei genannt ist), in der zweiten Version ist von der Türkei als Hauptgegner während der Krieg 1497 die Rede, und dass der Hospodar von Moldau dazu verpflichtet sei, die polnische Armee zu unterstützen. Weitere Informationen gibt uns Bonfini. Der Chronist erwähnte, dass das Treffen in Levoca eine Machtdemonstration der jagiellonischen Dynastie sein sollte. Jagiellonen sollten damals die Konflikte zwischen Polen und Ungarn klären und auch eine Allianz gegen einen „Feind“ schließen¹⁴. Was für ein Feind es sein sollte, haben wir leider keine Informationen mehr. Die Schlussfolgerungen des Finkels, dass man unter dem gemeinten „Feind“ Maximilian Habsburg verstehen muss, sind nicht zu halten. Da damals Maximilian Habsburg eher mit dem Kampf gegen Frankreich beschäftigt war¹⁵, wäre die Allianz gegen ihn sinnlos. Es musste also von der Allianz gegen der Türkei die Rede sein, die aber nicht über die gemeinsame polnisch-ungarische Expedition gegen die Türkei entschied, sondern über die ungarische Zustimmung für

Version: J. Pistorius, *Polonicae Historiae Corpus hoc est, Polonicarum rerum Latini recentiores et veteres scriptores, quotquot extant, uno volumine comprehaensi omnes, et in aliquot distributi Tomos*, Basileae 1582, Bd. 2, s. 238 – 239; L. Finkel, *Zjazd Jagiellonów w Lewoczy ...*, 318.

¹³ Miechowita, s. 259 – 260; J. Pistorius, *Polonicae Historiae Corpus ...*, s. 238 – 239; L. Finkel, *Zjazd Jagiellonów w Lewoczy*, s. 318.

¹⁴ Bonfini, s. 714, der Autor erwähnte auch, dass der Fürst von Brandenburg die Brüder zum Frieden bewog und mit dem Krieg drohte, wenn einer diesen Frieden bricht. Finkel zog daraus die Schlussfolgerungen, dass der Pakt zwischen den Brüdern: Johannes Albrecht und Wladislaus II. müsste die Sache der Thronfolge in Ungarn betreffen. Der brandenburgische Fürst Frederik suchte dann die Verbündeten gegen Nürnberg und die bayerischen Fürsten, die mit dem Maximilian kollabierten. Im Tausch für die Hilfe bat er die Unterstützung gegen den Maximilian, der zum Thronkandidaten in Ungarn gehörte.: L. Finkel, *Zjazd Jagiellonów w Lewoczy ...*, s. 328; Siehe auch: F. Wagner, *Der Schwäbische Bund und die fränkischen Hohenzollern*, in: „Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte“, Bd. 22 (1882), s. 316 – 327, Bd. 25 (1885), s. 465 – 510; H. Ulmann, *Kaiser Maximilian I ..*, s. 149 – 161; W. Vogel, *Des Ritters Ludwig von Eybs Aufzeichnungen über das kaiserliche Landgericht des Burggraftums Nürnberg*, hrsg. W. Vogel, Erlangen 1867, s. 39 – 44; *Urkunden zur Geschichte des Schwäbischen Bundes (1488 – 1533)*, hrsg. K. Klüpfel, Bd. 1, Stuttgart 1846, s. 110 in.

¹⁵ F. Papée, Jan Olbracht [Johannes Albrecht], s. 68; L. Finkel, *Zjazd Jagiellonów w Lewoczy ...*, s. 328.

die Expedition von Johannes Albrecht¹⁶. Die dritte Urkunde: Liborius Naker erzählt „Gerüchte“, dass dem polnischen König die Expedition gegen die Türkei auch dazu dienen sollte, für seinen Bruder – Sigismund den Thron in Moldau zu gewinnen¹⁷. Wenn man das Benehmen des Stefans des Großen während des Krieges 1497 analysiert, so kann man vermuten, dass in diesen „Gerüchten“ nicht alles erfunden war. In so einem Plan müsste ja auch der derzeitige moldauische Hospodar eine Rolle spielen. Laut Zbigniew Spieralski hatte Johannes Albrecht vor, dem Stefan dem Großen eine gemeinsame Expedition gegen der Türkei anzubieten und wenn er diese Angebote abgelehnt hätte (was fast sicher war), hätte Albrecht einen guten Vorwand, seinen Staat anzugreifen¹⁸. Dafür, dass Albrecht solches Vorhaben in der Tat hatte, spricht auch das Verhalten des Wladislaus II. Ergab zwar seine Zustimmung für die Übernahme der Kilia und Akkermann von Polen und Litauen, unterstrich aber deutlich, dass es keine Rede vom Krieg gegen den moldauischen Hospodar sein darf¹⁹.

¹⁶ Miechowita, s. 259 – 260; O. Górka lehnte die Möglichkeit ab, dass das Treffen in Levoca dazu diene, einen gemeinsamen Angriffsplan auf die Türkei festzulegen. Er war der Meinung, dass die Stellung des ungarischen Königs in dieser Sache ganz klar und deutlich war. Aus der Sicht des Autors, brauchte Johannes Albrecht nur die Zustimmung des Wladislaus, um Kilia und Akkerman erobern zu können. Siehe.: O. Górka, *Białogród i Kilia a wyprawa z 1497*, s. 69.

¹⁷ Liborius Naker *Tagebuch über den Kriegszug des Hochmeisters Johann v. Tiefen gegen die Türken im J. 1497*, in: *Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum*, Bd. 5 (weiter: Liborius Naker), s. 312; über solches Vorhaben erwähnt auch Kromer M., *Kronika polska Marcina Kromera biskupa warmińskiego ksiąg XXX dotąd w trzech językach, a mianowicie w łacińskim, polskim i niemieckim* wydana, na język polski z łacińskiego przełożona przez Marcina z Błazowa Błazowskiego i wydana w Krakowie w drukarni M. Loba r. 1611, Sanok 1857 (weiter: Kromer), s. 1328.

¹⁸ J. Smołucha, *Papiestwo a Polska w latach 1484 – 1526. Kontakty dyplomatyczne na tle zagrożenia tureckiego* [Papstamt und Polen in der Jahren 1484 – 1526. Diplomatische Kontakten während der Zeit der osmanischen Gefahr], Kraków 1999, s. 63; Z. Spieralski, *Po klęsce bukowińskiej 1497 roku. Pierwsze najazdy Turków na Polskę* [Nach der Niederlage in Kozmin 1497. Erste türkische Angriffe auf Polen], in: „*Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości*“, Bd. 9, Teil. 1, Warszawa 1963, s. 46; J. Smołucha, *Kilka uwag na temat wyprawy czarnomorskiej Jana Olbrachta w 1497 r.*, s. 413 – 414; M. Plewczyński, *Wojny Jagiellonów z wschodnimi i południowymi sąsiadami Królestwa Polskiego w XV wieku* [Die Kriege der Jagiellonen gegen die Ost- und Südost Nachbarstaaten im 15. Jahrhundert], Siedlce 2002, s. 131; A. Lewicki, *Król Jan Olbracht. O klęsce bukowińskiej 1497 r* [König Johannes Albrecht: Über die Niederlage in Kozmin 1497], KH, Bd. 7 (1893), s. 1 – 15.

¹⁹ J. Pistorius, *Polonicae Historiae Corpus...*, s. 240; *Materiały do dziejów dyplomacji polskiej z lat 1486 – 1516*, s. 25, nr 13; Z. Spieralski, *Die Jagiellonische Verbundenheit bis zum Ende des 15. Jahrhundert*, in: „*Acta Poloniae – Historica*“, Bd. 41, 1980, s. 80; Z. Spieralski, *Po klęsce bukowińskiej 1497 roku. Pierwsze najazdy Turków na Polskę*, s. 46; J. Smołucha, *Kilka uwag na temat wyprawy czarnomorskiej Jana Olbrachta w 1497 r.*, s. 413 – 414; O. Górka, *Białogród i Kilia a wyprawa z 1497 r.*, s. 69; F. Papée, *Zagadnienia*

Er hätte das wahrscheinlich nicht gemacht, wenn sein Bruder nicht die oben gemeinten Pläne gehabt hätte. Doch der ungarische König verpflichtete sogar Johannes Albrecht dazu, jeden Schritt gegen Kilia und Akkerman mit dem Stefan dem Großen absprechen zu müssen²⁰. Albrechts Pläne konnten in dieser Lage nicht in Erfüllung gehen. Alle diese Ideen aus Levoca sollten aber strengt geheim bleiben. Jedoch der Freund von Stefan dem Großen: Bartolomeus Drágffy de Belthewkhat an das Treffen teilgenommen. Als er über die Pläne des polnischen König gehört hatte, entschied er sich wahrscheinlich²¹ dafür, seinem Freund darüber Bescheid zu geben. Seit dieser Zeit reagierte der moldauische Herrscher sehr misstrauisch auf jede polnische Bewegung²². Obwohl polnischer König alle oben gesagten Pläne zurücknahm und Wladislaus II. sogar kategorisch die Idee ausschloss: Sigismund auf dem moldauischer Thron zu setzen, löste dies bei Stefan dem Großen die Unruhe aus. Er vertraute Polen nicht mehr. Wahrscheinlich mit diesem Misstrauen gegenüber Polen kann man seinen undatierten Brief nach Konstantinopel verbinden, in dem er den Sultan um Hilfe bat²³. Als Antwort auf diese Ereignisse wurde auch moldauischer Bote, Logofet Tautul zum Sultan geschickt²⁴.

Olbrachtowej wyprawy z 1497 r. [Die Frage der Expedition aus dem Jahr 1497], in: KH 47 (1933), s. 19 – 20; F. Papée, *Jan Olbracht*, s. 68-70; K. Baczkowski, *Europa wobec problemu tureckiego w latach 1493 – 1495* [Europa gegenüber der osmanische Gefahr in der Jahren 1493 – 1495], in: SH, Bd. 40 (1997), s. 314, 320 – 322; Z. Wojciechowski, *Zygmunt Stary* [Sigismund I. (der Alte)] (1506 – 1548), Warszawa, 1979, s. 78 – 79.

²⁰ O. Górka, *Nieznany żywot Bajezida II źródłem dla wyprawy czarnomorskiej i najazdów Turków za Jana Olbrachta* [Unbekannte Lebensgeschichte des Bayezids II. als die Quelle zur Geschichte des Schwarzes See- Expedition und türkischen Angriffe während der Regierungszeit des Johannes Albrecht], in: KH, Bd. 52 (1938), s. 399; *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti* (weiter: CE), Bd. 3, nr 446 - Korrespondenz zwischen Johannes Albrecht und Wladislaus II. Siehe auch: F. Papée, *Jan Olbracht*, s. 66.

²¹ „Wahrscheinlich“, weil Stefan der Große auf jeden Fall über die Pläne von Johannes Albrecht wusste, also jemand, der am Treffen in Levoca teilgenommen hatte, musste ihm alles erzählen. Von daher gibt es Vermutungen, dass es der Drágffy sein musste. Kromer (s. 1328) erwähnt zum Beispiel, dass Stefan vom „Boten“ und „ungarischem Adel“ vor Albrechts Pläne gewarnt wurde.

²² CE, Bd. 3, nr 427; Z. Spieralski, *Po klęsce bukowińskiej 1497 roku. Pierwsze najazdy Turków na Polskę*, s. 47; J. Smołucha, *Kilka uwag na temat wyprawy czarnomorskiej Jana Olbrachta w 1497 r.*, s. 414; O. Górka, *Nieznany żywot Bajezida II...*, s. 400; F. Papée, *Jan Olbracht*, s. 67. L. Fac, *Południowo – wschodni teatr działań wojennych w latach 1497 – 1509* [Kriegerische Handlungen auf der Südöstliche Grenzen in der Jahren 1497 – 1509], in „Rocznik Przemyski“, Bd. 43 (2007), teil. 1, s. 62.

²³ *Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum* (weiter SRP), Bd. 2, s. 333-334; Darüber schrieb auch Z. Spieralski, *Po klęsce bukowińskiej 1497 roku.*, s. 47.

²⁴ O. Górka, *Białogród i Kilia*, s. 71.

DIE FOLGEN DES TREFFENS IN LEVOCA

Weitere Informationen, was während des Treffens passieren konnte, und welche Entscheidungen dort getroffen wurden, geben uns die Ereignisse, die nach dem Treffen geschahen.

Nach der Sitzung begann Johannes Albrecht die Vorbereitungen auf den Krieg gegen die Türkei einzusetzen. Das sollte das Ziel seines Lebens sein, deswegen alle Versuche, ihn von dieser Idee abzubringen, erstickten im Keim²⁵. Er wollte für den Krieg möglichst viele Anhänger gewinnen. Von daher an wurden alle Vasallen von Polen (also auch Moldau) dazu verpflichtet, Polen während des Krieges zu unterstützen²⁶. Darüber hinaus wurde nach Konstantinopel ein polnischer Bote: Mikolaj Strzyżowski geschickt und forderte vom Sultan, die Tataren aus dem Bereich von Akkerman zurückzuziehen²⁷. Diese Forderung war so unrealistisch, dass die eher

²⁵*Lietuvos Metrika* (1427 – 1506), Bd. 5, Vilnius 1993, nr. 57.4; Diese Expedition riet dem König vor allem der Kanzler: Krzesław von Kurozweki, ab. Es ist auch möglich, dass auch Nikolaus Kamieniecki ein fester Gegner dieses Krieges war, darüber im weiteren Teil des Artikels; J. Pistorius, *Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego część ostatnia, czasy podługoszwowe obejmująca (1480 – 1535)* [*Polonicae Historiae Corpus...*, s. 240; B. Wapowski, *Die Chroniken von Bernard Wapowski aus der Jahren 1480 – 1525*], Ed. J. Szujski, in: SRP, Kraków 1874, Bd. 2. (weiter: Wapowski), s. 22 – 25; I. Czamańska, *Mołdawia i Wołoszczyzna wobec Polski, Węgry i Turcji w XIV i XV wieku* [Moldau und Walachei gegenüber Polen, Ungarn und die Türkei in 14. und 15. Jahrhundert], Poznań, 1996, s. 168, 174 – 175; F. Papée, *Jan Olbracht*, s. 127 – 128; O. Górka, *Białogród i Kilia ...*, s. 70 – 71; W. Kujawski, *Krzysztof z Kurozwęk jako wielki kanclerz koronny i biskup wrocławski* [Krzysztof von Kurozweki als Kanzler und Breslauer Bischof], Warszawa, 1987, s. 73; S. Tarnowski, *Żywot i śmierć Jana Tarnowskiego kasztelana krakowskiego i hetmana wielkiego koronnego* [Das Leben und der Tod von Johannes Tarnowski: Krakauer Kastellan und Großhetman der polnischen Krone]. Sanok 1855, s. 41; R. Trawka, *Kmitowie. Studium kariery politycznej i społecznej w późnośredniowiecznej Polsce* [Kmitowie. Zur Karriere und Geschichte des Adels im Spätmittelalter in Polen], Kraków 2005, s. 235.

²⁶ Johannes Albrecht bemühte sich sehr, dass die Verpflichtungen auf jeden Fall ausgefüllt wurden. Deswegen wollte er polnische Verbündeten aber auch die Nachbarn zu diesem Krieg umstimmen, siehe: *Akta Stanów Prus Królewskich*, Bd. 3, teil. 1, nr. 229, 291 (er bot damals die Einwohner des Danzigs um das Geld für den Krieg gegen die Türkei), 295, 299; CE, Bd. 3, nr 418, 419; J. Erich, W. Hubatsch, *Regesta Historica – Diplomatica Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum 1198 – 1525, pars 1: index Tabularii Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum, Regesten zum Ordensbriefarchiv, vol. 2 (1455 – 1510)*, Göttingen 1950, nr 17926, 17983, 17985; *Liborius Naker*, s. 290; J. Smołucha, *Kilka uwag na temat wyprawy czarnomorskiej Jana Olbrachta w 1497 r.*, s. 414.

²⁷ CE, Bd. 3, s. 444; I. Czamańska, *Mołdawia i Wołoszczyzna...*, s. 167; J. Smołucha, *Kilka uwag na temat wyprawy czarnomorskiej Jana Olbrachta w 1497 r.*, s. 415.

als Vorwand diene, um die Türkei angreifen zu können²⁸. Es schien, dass der polnische König damals stark überzeugt war, dass Stefan der Große ihn in diesem Krieg unterstützen wird oder zumindest nicht stören wird. Von seiner möglichen Feindlichkeit wollte er nichts wissen. Er war dabei ziemlich blauäugig, weil als 1497 ein polnischer Bote Krzeslaw von Kurozweki nach Moldau geschickt wurde, um den Stefan davon zu überzeugen, um einen gemeinsamen Krieg gegen die Türkei zu führen, die Antwort, die er von Hospodar bekam, war sehr fragwürdig und mehrdeutig. Deswegen wollte Krzeslaw von Kurozweki den König von dieser Idee: einen Krieg zu führen, abzubringen, jedoch ohne jeglichen Erfolg²⁹.

Stefan der Große, der von Bartholomeus Drágffy von den Plänen von Johannes Albrecht wusste, blieb aufmerksam. Er befürchtete, dass der polnische König seinen Plan realisieren will um ihn aus dem Thron zu werfen. Deswegen wendete er sich an den Sultan und informierte ihn, dass sich Polen auf den Krieg vorbereitete. Er war zwar nicht sicher gegen wen der Krieg geführt werden sollte, verpflichtete sich aber dazu, den Sultan zu unterstützen³⁰. Er erwähnte auch, dass die ungarische Armee im Siebenbürgen gesammelt wurde. Eine sehr interessante Information ist, dass der Sultan dem Stefan einen Angriff auf Siebenbürgen verordnete. Der moldauische Herrscher antwortete dem Sultan in einem Brief, dass er diesen Befehl nicht erfüllen kann, weil er gleichzeitig einen Angriff der Krimtataren befürchtete³¹.

²⁸ Solche Vermutungen hatte schon I. Czamańska, *Mołdawia i Wołoszczyzna...*, s. 167; Johannes Albrecht lehnte auch den Vorschlag des Mehmeds ab– des Sohnes von Sultan, was seine Vermittlung zwischen Mengli Girej und Litauer betraf, siehe: I. Czamańska, *Mołdawia i Wołoszczyzna...*, s. 168.

²⁹ J. Pistorius, *Polonicae Historiae Corpus...*, s. 240; Wapowski, s. 22 – 25; I. Czamańska, *Mołdawia i Wołoszczyzna...*, s. 168, 174 – 175; F. Papée, *Jan Olbracht*, s. 127 – 128; O. Górka, *Białogród i Kilia...*, s. 70 – 71; W. Kujawski, *Krzesław z Kurozwek...*, s. 73; S. Tarnowski, *Żywot i śmierć Jana Tarnowskiego...*, s. 41.

³⁰ *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Lehistan (Polonya) arasındaki münasebetlerle ilgili tarihi belgeler = Historical documents concerning relations between the Ottoman Empire and Lehistan (Poland)*, ed. Nigâr Anafarta, Istanbul 1970, nr 1; H.J. Kissling, *Eine anonyme altosmanische Chronik über Sultan Bajezid II*, in: *Dissertationes orientales collectae*, II, Sultan Bajezid II und der Westen, München 1988, s. 136 – 155 der Autor zitierte den türkischen Version der Chronik, dagegen in der Artikel: *Die anonyme altosmanische Chronik über Sultan Bajezid II*, in: *Dissertationes orientales collectae*, II, Sultan Bajezid II und der Westen, München 1988, s. 163 – 195, übersetzte er den türkischen Version der Chronik in Deutsch und verbesserte damit die französische Übersetzung des E. Roboly's; Siehe auch: J. Smołucha, *Kilka uwag na temat wyprawy czarnomorskiej Jana Olbrachta w 1497 r.*, s. 415.

³¹ *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Lehistan (Polonya) arasındaki münasebetlerle ilgili tarihi belgeler = Historical documents concerning relations between the Ottoman Empire and Lehistan (Poland)...*, nr 2; J. Smołucha, *Kilka uwag na temat wyprawy czarnomorskiej Jana Olbrachta w 1497 r.*, s. 415.

Johannes Albrecht wollte inzwischen von den Plänen von Stefan dem Großen nichts wissen und bereitete sich weiter auf den Krieg vor. Dem Verlauf des Krieges entnehmen wir auch Informationen, wovon in Levoca entschieden wurde. Laut der älteren polnischen Literatur war die Haltung des Stefans gegenüber Polen sehr freundlich. Er solle sogar versuchen, die polnische Armee zu beschützen³². Erst die Untersuchungen von Smółucha und Rückgriffe auf die türkischen Urkunden veränderten die Stellung der polnischen Historiographie. Eine von dieser Chronik wurde von Kreuterins Deutsche übersetzt (*Der fromme Sultan Bayezid. Die Geschichte seiner Herrschaft (1481 – 1512) nach den altosmanischen Chroniken des Oruc und des Annonymus Hanivaldanus*)³³, die zweite dagegen von Kissling (*Die anonyme altosmanische Chronik über Sultan Bajezid II*)³⁴. Laut dieser ersten Chronik sollte Stefan der Große seine Zustimmung für den Pakt mit Polen geben und nicht nur sein Erlaubnis für den Durchmarsch der polnischen Armee durch seinen Staat erteilen, sondern auch seine Hilfe in dem Krieg anzubieten. Als Entschädigung sollte er zwei unbekannte Städte bekommen, die früher zur Türkei gehörten³⁵. Als polnische Armee moldauische Grenzen überschritt, änderte sich plötzlich die Stellung des Stefans. Er verbot der Armee durch seinen Staat zu marschieren und sprach sich für die Türkei aus. Dank der Chronik, die von Kreuter übersetzt wurde, bekommt man auch zusätzliche Informationen. Vom Anfang an arbeitete Stefan der Große mit der Türkei zusammen. Gleich als Stefan die Information über den Marsch der polnischen Armee mitbekam, schickte er seinen Boten zum Mesih Pasha – Herrscher von Sylistria, um

³² Das beste Beispiel dafür ist Olgierd Górka. In der Artikel: *Białogród i Kilia ...*, s. 74 – 76, versuchte der Autor den Stefan reinzuwaschen. Der Herrscher von Moldau wurde als polnischer Freund dargestellt, der auch die polnische Armee von der türkische Kräfte und mögliche Falle in Bukowina warnte; in seinen nächsten Artikel: *Nieznany żywot Bajezida II...*, s. 405 – 409, lehnte der Autor diese Idee, dass Stefan die polnische Armee warnte ab und gab zudem zu, dass er mit der Türkei in Verbindung stand. Górka war aber immer noch der Meinung dass die moldauische Armee an der Schlacht in Kozmin nicht beteiligt war; die Polemik mit Górka fuhr Papée. Der Autor verteidigte auch den polnischen König Johannes Albrecht: F. Papée, *Zagadnienia Olbrachtowej wyprawy z r. 1497* [Die Aspekte der Expedition aus dem Jahr 1497], in: KH, t. 47 (1933), s. 25 – 26.

³³ R.F. Kreutel, *Der fromme Sultan Bayezid. Die Geschichte seiner Herrschaft (1481 – 1512) nach dem altosmanischen Chroniken des Oruc und des Annonymus Hanivaldanus*, Osmanische Geschichtsschreiber, Bd. 9, Graz, 1978.

³⁴ H.J. Kissling, *Die anonyme altosmanische Chronik über Sultan Bajezid II*, in: *Dissertationes orientales collectae*, II, *Sultan Bajezid II und der Westen*, München 1988.

³⁵ R.F. Kreutel, *Der fromme Sultan Bayezid. Die Geschichte seiner Herrschaft (1481 – 1512) nach dem altosmanischen Chroniken des Oruc und des Annonymus Hanivaldanus*, in: *Osmanische Geschichtsschreiber*, Bd. 9, Graz 1978, s. 212-216; J. Smółucha, *Kilka uwag na temat wyprawy czarnomorskiej Jana Olbrachta w 1497 r.*, s. 417; wahrscheinlich ist hier die Rede von Białogród i Kilia.

ihn um Hilfe zu bitten. Er schickte jedoch nur 800 Ritters zu, was eine viel kleinere Quote im Vergleich dazu bildete, was Stefan zutraute. Stefan der Große bemerkte also, dass er mit diesen Kräften nicht in der Lage war, die polnische Armee zu bekämpfen. Er befürchtete die Rache des polnischen Königs. Deswegen entschied er sich, eine Falle vorzubereiten. Er teilte also dem Johannes Albrecht mit, dass die große türkische Armee schon die moldauische Grenze überschritten hatte, und aus diesem Grund empfahl er ihm einen Rückzug. Die weitere Informationen gibt uns die Chronik von Liborius Naker und sogenannte Bystrzycki Chronik. Laut Bystrzycki Chronik³⁶, die Stellung des Stefans: keine Erlaubnis, um die Grenzen seines Staates zu überschreiten – für Johannes Albrecht sehr unangenehm war. Sein Ziel sollte ja sein: Kilia und Akkerman zu erobern, jedoch der weitere Marsch ohne moldauische Hilfe oder zumindest deren Neutralität viel zu riskant war. Johannes Albrecht wollte aber auf keinen Fall mit leeren Händen nach Hause zurückkommen. Deswegen entschied er sich, den Hospodar zur Zusammenarbeit zu zwingen. Aus diesem Grund gab er einen Befehl aus, die Hauptstadt von Moldau, Suczawa, anzugreifen. Ohne Erfolg³⁷. Diese Entscheidung: Suczawa anzugreifen hatte aber weitere Folgen. Dieser Schritt von Johannes Albrecht hat seinen Bruder – Wladislaus II. sehr geärgert. Gleich danach, als er die Informationen über den Angriff auf die moldauische Hauptstadt mitbekommen hatte, forderte er von seinem Bruder, sofort aus Moldau zurückzuziehen³⁸. Johannes Albrecht hatte also keine Wahl. Am 18. Oktober beschloss er einen Frieden, der den polnischen Königen ermöglichte, die Ehre zu retten. Er sollte sofort Moldau verlassen und bekam auch Stefans Wort, dass während der Rückkehr nach Polen seine Armee nicht angegriffen wird. Er bekam auch angeblich freundliche Ratschläge von Stefan: nicht den kürzesten Weg durch die Bergschluchten zu wählen, weil dort sehr

³⁶ *Letopisetul de la Bistrița 1359 – 1506* [Laut Chronik von Bistritz], in: *Cronice inedite atinǎtoare de Istoria Românilor*, Ed. I. Bogdan, Bukarest, 1895 (sogenannte *Bystrzycki Chronik*) s. 59, aber auch laut Wapowski und Kromer kamen nach Lviv moldauische Bote: der Kanzler Tăutul und Schatzmeister Isac, und forderten, dass die Armee aus dem Moldau zurückgezogen wurde. Es kam aber zum Licht, dass Stefan der Große einige polnische Gefangene zum Sultan geschickt. Als Johannes Albrecht das mitbekommen hatte, hielt er moldauische Bote auch fest: Kromer, s. 1329; B. Wapowski, s. 26; siehe auch: Liborius Naker, s. 289 – 314.

³⁷ *Letopisetul de la Bistrița 1359 – 1506...*, s. 59.

³⁸ F. Papée, *Jan Olbracht*, s. 135 – 140; Schon im August ein ungarische Bote: Lasonczyk zum Johannes Albrecht geschickt. Wladislaus II. forderte von dem Bruder, dass er auf die Expedition verzichtete und warf ihm vor, dass er die Pakte aus dem Levoca gebrochen hat. Stefan der Große sei sein Verbündeter und deswegen Wladislaus könne dem Johannes Albrecht nicht helfen. Wladislaus betonte auch, dass die Konsequenzen aus dem Angriff auf Moldau können sehr gefährlich sein, siehe: *Materiały do dziejów dyplomacji polskiej...*, s. 25, nr. 13.

Gefährlich ist³⁹. Die wurden aber von den polnischen König ignoriert. Seine Armee fiel dadurch in eine Falle, und am 26. Oktober wurde sie in der Nähe von Kozmin geschlagen⁴⁰. Dieselben Ereignisse wurden aber ganz anders in den Altosmanischen Chroniken dargestellt. Es gibt dort kein Wort vom Angriff auf Suczawa. Es wurde hingegen der Trick des Stefans beschrieben. Der Herrscher von Moldau solle den polnischen König vor die große türkische Armee warnen und als Freund riete er ihm den Rückweg zu wählen, der durch die Bergschluchten führe. Johannes Albrecht hörte ihn zu und geriet dadurch in eine Falle. Als die polnische Armee sich zwischen den Bergen befand, griffen plötzlich die türkischen und moldauischen Armeen an. Das war in der Nähe von Kozmin. Polnische Armee wurde geschlagen⁴¹.

Der Hauptunterschied zwischen polnischen und osmanischen Urkunden liegt also an der Stellung des Stefans. Laut oben genannten polnischen Urkunden wollte der moldauische Herrscher den polnischen König warnen, während die osmanischen Chroniken über die Falle des Stefans berichten. Woran liegt das? Es ist ziemlich unwahrscheinlich, dass Stefan der Große in der Tat den polnischen König schützen wollte. Er wusste ja über angebliche Pläne des Johannes Albrechts und bemühte sich stark um die türkische Hilfe zu bekommen. Vielleicht liegt es also daran, dass polnische Urkunden: sowohl Wapowski, als auch Kromer auf die zweite Version des Miechowitas basierten, die ja über den Krieg des Johannes Albrechts gegen die Türkei berichtete und nicht gegen die Moldau. Deswegen die Falle des Stefans zur diese Geschichte überhaupt nicht passen würde.

³⁹ Die Sache der „Falle“ wurde sehr ähnlich durch Wapowski und Kromer dargestellt. Als die polnische Armee nach Polen zurückzog, merkte Stefan der Große, dass sie den anderen Weg wählten als die, die sie nutzten um nach Moldau zu kommen. Er riet also um die Armee doch denselben Weg nutzen, weil der zweite Weg sehr gefährlich ist, da der zwischen den Bergen führt. Johannes Albrecht hörte aber nicht, siehe: Kromer, s. 1332; Wapowski, s. 119; F. Papée, *Jan Olbracht*, s. 129; in ältere Literatur gibt es die Ansicht, dass dieser Vorschlag des Stefans entstand aus die Sorge für polnische Armee und bewies auch seine freundliche Stellung gegenüber Polen, siehe: O. Górka, *Białogród i Kilia ...*, s. 74.

⁴⁰ *Kronika czasów Stefana Wielkiego Mołdawskiego (1457 – 1499)* [Die Chronik aus der Zeit des Stefans der Große (1457 – 1499)], hrsg. O. Górka, Kraków 1931, s. 116, Autor gibt aber die falsche Datum der Schlacht: 17. Oktober, war erklärte O. Górka; Siehe auch: O. Górka, *Białogród i Kilia ...*, s. 74 – 76; S. Górka, *Nieznany żywot Bajezida II...*, s. 405 – 409; M. Plewczyński, *Wojny Jagiellonów ze wschodnimi i południowymi sąsiadami Królestwa w XV wieku* [Die Kriege der Jagiellonen gegen die Süd- und Ost Nachbarländern in 15. Jahrhundert], Oswiecim 2014, s. 140 – 148; Z. Spieralski, *Po klęsce bukowińskiej 1497 roku*, s. 52 – 53; E. Fischer, *Kozmin, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des polnisch-moldauischen Konflikts 1497*, Berlin 1903, s. 14 – 15; L. Fac, *Południowo – wschodni teatr działań wojennych w latach 1497 – 1509*, s. 62; J. Demel, *Historia Rumunii* [Die Geschichte des Rumäniens], Wrocław 1986, s. 137.

⁴¹ H.J. Kissling, *Die anonyme altosmanische Chronik über Sultan Bajezid II...*, s. 185 – 186.

Die Stellung des ungarischen Königs: Wladislaus II. ist nicht weniger kompliziert. Im Levoca war er absolut gegen den Angriff auf Moldau und verpflichtete sogar seinen Bruder dazu, keinen Krieg um Kilia und Akkerman zu führen, ohne die Zustimmung des Stefans der Große zu haben. 1496 beschloss er auch einen Frieden mit der Türkei⁴². Jedoch in den Briefen des Stefan zum Sultan ist die Rede von der ungarischen Armee, die in Siebenbürgen gesammelt wurde. Sultan forderte also vom Stefan einen Angriff auf Siebenbürgen. Warum denn, wenn Wladislaus II. ein großer Anhänger des Status Quo war? 1497 sendete er sogar seinen Boten: Lasonczy zum Johannes Albrecht und verpflichtete ihn, den Krieg sofort zu beenden sowie warf ihm vor, dass er die Entscheidungen aus Levoca brach. Er lehnte ab, jede Hilfe dem Bruder während des Krieges zu leisten, weil der Stefan Verbündeter vom Ungarn sein solle. Er wies darauf hin, dass ein Angriff auf Moldau sehr schädlich sowohl für Polen als auch für Ungarn sein kann. Er bat aber seine Hilfe in Mediation zwischen Polen und Moldau, sowie zwischen der Türkei⁴³. Wladislaus, im Gegensatz zu Johannes Albrecht, war kein Anhänger des Krieges, hatte dafür auch keine gute Karten. Er wollte Frieden behalten. Ungarische Armee, die in Siebenbürgen gesammelt wurde diente eher dazu, sich vom eventuellen Angriff (entweder moldauischen oder tatarischen – den auch Stefan der Große befürchtete⁴⁴) zu wehren. Es ist schon bekannt, dass Stefan der Große vom Sultan ermutigt wurde, Siebenbürgen anzugreifen⁴⁵. Es ist aber auch möglich, dass die Sammlung der Armee mit dem Widerstand der Bauersleute, die an der Wende des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts sehr häufig passierten, zu tun hatte⁴⁶.

ZUSSAMENFASSUNG

Die oben dargestellten Tatsachen zeigen, wie unterschiedlich die Rolle der Moldau in der polnischen und ungarischen Politik wahrgenommen wurde. Der Hauptgrund dafür war der Tat, dass die Politik gegenüber Moldau stark mit der Politik gegenüber der Türkei verbunden war. Johannes Albrecht befand sich unter einem starken Einfluss des Kalimachs und war ein sehr großer Anhänger des Krieges gegen die Türkei. Das war das Ziel seines Lebens. Nach der Niederlage in Kozmin ist er sogar

⁴² O. Górka, *Nieznany żywot Bajezida II...*, s. 400 – 401.

⁴³ *Materiały do dziejów dyplomacji polskiej...*, s. 25, nr 13; H.J. Kissling, *Die anonyme altosmanische Chronik über Sultan Bajezid II*, in: *Dissertationes orientales collectae*, II, *Sultan Bajezid II und der Westen*, München 1988, s. 157.

⁴⁴ *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Lehistan (Polonya) arasındaki münasebetlerle ilgili tarihi belgeler = Historical documents concerning relations between the Ottoman Empire and Lehistan (Poland)...*, nr 2; J. Smółucha, *Kilka uwag na temat wyprawy czarnomorskiej Jana Olbrachta w 1497 r. ...*, s. 415.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ J. Demel, *Historia Rumunii*, s. 145.

in Depression geraten. Er wollte eine antitürkische Koalition gründen und bemühte sich sehr darum. Anlässlich könnte er das Konflikt mit der Türkei dazu nutzen, seine Interesse in Moldau zu realisieren. Sicherlich diente das Treffen in Levoca auch dazu, die Politik gegenüber Moldau zu besprechen. Das Benehmen des Stefans der Große während des Krieges deutet, dass Johannes Albrecht in der Tat nicht unbedingt gute Vorhaben gegenüber Moldau hatte. Auch die ständige Briefe des Wladislaus zum polnischen König während des Krieges 1497 zeigen, dass er über möglichen Vorhaben des Johannes Albrechts wusste, stimmte mit diese aber überhaupt nicht überein. Ich bin aber nicht der Meinung, dass während des Krieges 1497ausschließlich um Moldau ginge und die anti-türkische Propaganda diente nur dazu, der Kampf gegen Moldau zu rechtfertigen. Der polnische Bote: Mikolaj Strzyżowski wurde ja nach Konstantinopel geschickt und forderte vom Sultan, die Tataren aus dem Bereich von Akkerman zurückzuziehen; Krzeslaw von Kurozweki wurde dagegen zum Stefan der Große geschickt um ihn zum gemeinsamen Krieg gegen der Türkei zu überzeugen; Johannes Albrecht bemühte sich auch darum den Maximilian Habsburg zur anti-türkische Koalition zu gewinnen. Das würde nicht gemacht werden, wenn es nur um der Kampf gegen Moldau ginge. Warum sollte man denn damit Riskieren, die Relationen mit der Türkei zu verschlechtern? Es scheint also, dass Johanes Albrecht in der Tat gegen die Türkei kämpfen wollte, aber anlässlich wollte er auch die Sache der Moldau lösen und vielleicht sogar den Thron für seinen Brüder Sigismund gewinnen. Wladislaus dagegen, auf Grund seiner politischen und geographischen Lage, befürchtete eher die Türkei. Er teilte also die Meinung seines Bruders nicht und wollte auf jeden Fall den Konflikt vermeiden. Er wusste genau, dass die Moldau auch in der Interessenzzone der Türkei liegt und deswegen lehnte er jeden Konflikt mit Moldau ab. Während das Treffen in Levoca betonte also, dass Johannes Albrecht keinen Schritt gegen die Türkei (um Killia und Akkerman zu erobern) ohne Zustimmung des Stefans der Große machen darf. Das Treffen in Levoca und die Ereignisse danach zeigten also wie groß das Problem war. Diese subjektive Rolle der Moldau änderte sich nach der Niederlage in Kozmin. Der Sieg gegen die polnische Armee gab auch dem moldauischen Hospodar viel Selbstvertrauen. Deswegen forderte er vom Johannes Albrecht gleich nach dem Krieg die Rückgabe von Pokutia. Der Streit um Pokutia wird ein Hauptproblem in polnisch-moldauischen Beziehungen an der Wende des 15. Und 16. Jahrhunderts sein, und wurde kontinuierlich zum größten Problem der polnischen Außenpolitik geworden, nicht nur für Johannes Albrecht, aber auch für seinen Nachfolger Alexander und auch für Sigismund I.

**DIE EROBERUNG DES AUTONOMEN FÜRSTENTUMS SIEBENBÜRGEN
DURCH DIE HABSBURGER.
DIE GRÜNDE UND DIE VERWENDETEN METHODEN**

**THE CONQUEST OF THE AUTONOMOUS PRINCIPALITY
OF TRANSYLVANIA BY THE HABSBURGS.
THE REASONS AND THE METHODS USED**

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Rezumat: Cucerirea Principatului autonom al Transilvaniei de către Habsburgi. Motivele și mijloacele folosite

Anexarea Transilvaniei de către Monarhia Habsburgică a reprezentat o parte componentă a politicii de expansiune a Curții din Viena înspre sud-estul Europei. Fostă componentă a regatului medieval al Ungariei, Transilvania devine, în deceniul al patrulea al secolului al XVI-lea, un stat semi-independent: Principatul Transilvaniei, aflat sub suzeranitatea Imperiului Otoman. Odată cu sfârșitul deceniului al treilea al secolului al XVI-lea, împărații din Casa de Habsburg, în calitate lor de moștenitori ai regilor Ungariei, ridică la rândul lor pretenții dinastice la stăpânirea Transilvaniei. Sub acest aspect, poziția strategică, precum și potențialul demografic și economic al Transilvaniei, au avut un rol important pentru Curtea Veneză. Larga paletă a metodelor folosite de Habsburgi în vederea instaurării stăpânirii lor asupra Transilvaniei a constat în încheierea de tratate diplomatice cu conducătorii Principatului transilvănean, în inițierea de alianțe dinastice prin perfectarea unor proiecte de căsătorie, sau chiar în contractarea de căsătorii între membrii dinastiei Habsburgilor și conducătorii Transilvaniei. De asemenea, trupele imperiale austriece au intervenit de câteva ori în Transilvania pentru a impune politica Curții de la Viena. Prin renunțarea, în anul 1688, la suzeranitatea otomană asupra Transilvaniei, prin declarația Principelui și a Stărilor Generale ale țării și prin acceptarea suzeranității Habsburgilor asupra Principatului au fost create premisele favorabile pentru alipirea (încorporarea) Transilvaniei la Monarhia Habsburgică.

Résumé: La conquête de la Principauté autonome de la Transylvanie par les Habsbourg. Les motifs et les moyens utilisés

L'annexion de la Transylvanie par la Monarchie Habsbourgeoise représente une partie composante de la politique d'expansion de la Cour de Vienne vers le sud-est de l'Europe. Ancienne composante du royaume médiéval de l'Hongrie, la Transylvanie devint,

la quatrième décennie du XVI-ème siècle, un Etat semi-indépendant: la Principauté de la Transylvanie, qui se trouvait sous la suzeraineté de l'Empire Ottoman. Dès la fin de la troisième décennie du XVI-ème siècle, les empereurs habsbourgeois, en leur qualité d'héritiers des rois de l'Hongrie, émettent, à leur tour, des prétentions dynastiques à la domination de la Transylvanie. A cet égard, la position stratégique; ainsi que le potentiel démographique et économique de la Transylvanie jouèrent un rôle important pour la Cour Vienneise. La palette extrêmement diversifiée de méthodes que les Habsbourg utilisèrent en vue de l'installation de leur domination sur la Transylvanie consista dans la conclusion de traités diplomatiques avec les dirigeants de la Principauté transylvaine, l'initiation d'alliances dynastiques par la préparation des projets de mariage, ou même par l'engagement de mariages entre les membres de la dynastie des Habsbourg et les dirigeants de la Transylvanie. De plus, les troupes impériales autrichiennes intervinrent plusieurs fois dans la Transylvanie afin d'imposer la politique de la Cour de Vienne. Par la renonciation, l'année 1688, à la suzeraineté ottomane sur la Transylvanie, par la déclaration du Prince régnant et des Etats Généraux du pays et par l'acceptation de la suzeraineté des Habsbourg sur la Principauté on créa des prémisses favorables pour l'annexion (incorporation) de la Transylvanie à la Monarchie Habsbourgeoise.

Abstract: The conquest of the autonomous Principality of Transylvania by the Habsburgs. The reasons and the methods used

The annexation of Transylvania by the Habsburg Monarchy was a part of the Court of Vienna's expansion policy towards South-East of Europe. As a former component of the medieval kingdom of Hungary, Transylvania becomes, in the fourth decade of the sixteenth century, a semi-independent state: the Principality of Transylvania, under Ottoman suzerainty. Since the end of the third decade of the sixteenth century, the Habsburg kings, as heirs of the Hungarian kings, assumed themselves dynastic pretensions to mastery Transylvania. In this regard, the strategic position and the economic and demographic potential of Transylvania had an important role for the Viennese court. The wide range of methods used by the Habsburgs in order to establish their dominion over Transylvania consisted of signing treaties with the rulers of the Principality of Transylvania, initiating dynastic alliances by perfecting marriage projects, or even contracting marriages between the members of the Habsburg dynasty and the rulers of Transylvania. Moreover, the Austrian imperial troops have intervened several times in Transylvania to enforce the policy of the Vienna Court. In 1688, by waiving the Ottoman suzerainty over Transylvania, by the Declaration of the Prince and the general assembly of Transylvania, and by accepting the Habsburg suzerainty over the Principality, the favorable premises for annexation (incorporation) of Transylvania to the Habsburg Monarchy were created.

Keywords: Habsburgs, policy of expansion, Transylvania

Das Entstehen des Fürstentums Siebenbürgen

Siebenbürgen war während des Mittelalters als ein Woiwodat organisiert, das zum Königreich Ungarn gehörte und über eine bestimmte Autonomie verfügte. Die Expansion des Osmanischen Reiches in Richtung Zentraleuropa, die im Jahr 1526 mit der Schlacht von Mohács für das ungarische Königreich endete, und die Ansprüche der Habsburger auf die ungarische Krone führten im Jahr 1541 zur endgültigen Teilung des Königreichs Ungarn zwischen den beiden Mächten.¹ In dieser politischen Machtkonstellation geriet Siebenbürgen als Vasallgebiet in die Einflussosphäre der Osmanen. Die Verleihung des Territoriums von Siebenbürgen durch Sultan Süleyman I. an den minderjährigen ungarischen König Johann Sigismund Szapolyai II. im Jahr 1541 war der Grundstein für das Entstehen des autonomen Fürstentums Siebenbürgen als eigenes Staatsgebilde. Im Vergleich zu der Zeit als Woiwodat wurde das Gebiet des Fürstentums durch den Anschluss des sogenannten Partiums („Partes regni Hungariae applicatae“; angeschlossene Teile des Königreichs Ungarn) mit der Genehmigung der Osmanen und durch die Verhandlungen mit den Habsburgern² territorial

¹ Zur Teilung des Königreichs Ungarn, vgl. GÜNDISCH Konrad, *Die „Geistliche Universität“ der siebenbürgisch-sächsischen Kirchengemeinden im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert*. In: Volker Leppin, Ulrich A. Wien (Hg.), *Konfessionsbildung und Konfessionskultur in Siebenbürgen in der Frühen Neuzeit*. (= Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, Bd. 66), Stuttgart 2005, S. 109; PETRITSCH Ernst D., *Das osmanische Reich und Siebenbürgen im Reformationszeitalter*. In: Volker Leppin, Ulrich A. Wien (Hg.), *Konfessionsbildung und Konfessionskultur in Siebenbürgen in der Frühen Neuzeit*. (= Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, Bd. 66), Stuttgart 2005, S. 15 ff.

² In dem Friedenvertrag zwischen den Osmanen und den Habsburgern aus dem Jahr 1562 wurde auch vereinbart, dass die Teilung der Gebiete des Königreichs Ungarn, die nicht durch die Hohe Pforte besetzt wurden, durch die Verhandlungen zwischen der habsburgische Kaiser Ferdinand I. und der ungarische König Vasall der Osmanen, Johann Sigismund Szapolyai II., stattfinden soll. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, *Österreichische Staatsverträge. Fürstentum Siebenbürgen (1526–1690)*. In: *Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Neuere Geschichte Österreichs*, Bd. 9, Wien 1911, S. 168; Der Vertrag von Speyer, der im dem Jahr 1570 zwischen dem habsburgischen Kaiser Maximilian II. und Johann Sigismund Szapolyai II. geschlossen wurde, stellte die Grundlage für die endgültige Teilung der Gebiete des Königreichs Ungarn, die nicht durch die Osmanen besetzt wurden, zwischen die beiden Herrschern dar. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 182–200; Es geht letztendlich um die Gebiete des Königreichs Ungarn, die nicht durch die Osmanen besetzt wurden, und die unten der Namen Partium an dem Kerngebiet der Herrschaft Johann Sigismund Szapolyais II., Siebenbürgen, angeschlossen wurden.

vergrößert.³ Das Fürstentum Siebenbürgen, ein Randgebiet des Osmanischen Reiches, war nun in Wirklichkeit zu einem Pufferstaat zwischen den Osmanen und den Habsburgern geworden, ein Staat mit „wandernden Grenzen“ im Westen und im Norden.⁴

Die Gründe, die zur Eroberung Siebenbürgens durch die Habsburger geführt haben

Der Anschluss von Siebenbürgen an die Habsburgische Monarchie war ein Teil der Expansionspolitik des Wiener Hofes in Richtung Südosteuropa, eine Expansion, die nach 1683 mit dem Zusammenbruch des politischen und militärischen Gleichgewichtes zwischen den Habsburgern und den Osmanen zu Gunsten des Wiener Hofes richtig losging. Die Eroberung der Gebiete des damaligen Königreiches Ungarn, die sich unter der direkten Herrschaft der Hohen Pforte befanden oder Vasallen von diesen waren, wie das Fürstentum Siebenbürgen, wurde vom Wiener Hof dynastisch – rechtlich begründet.

Bei der Eroberung Siebenbürgens durch die Habsburger standen neben dynastisch – rechtlichen (1), auch die militärstrategischen (2) und nicht zuletzt die machtpolitischen Gründe (3) im Vordergrund.

1. Die dynastisch-rechtliche Ansprüche der Habsburger auf das Fürstentum Siebenbürgen beruhten auf den gegenseitigen Erbverträgen, die der Kaiser Maximilian I. im Jahr 1505 und 1515 in Wien Neustadt bzw. Wien mit

³ Das Entstehen des Fürstentums Siebenbürgen, vgl. FENEŞAN Cristina, *Constituirea Principatului autonom al Transilvaniei* [Die Gründung des autonomen Fürstentums Siebenbürgen]. Bukarest 1997; ANDEA Susana, *Instituțiile centrale și locale în Transilvania* [Zentralen und lokalen Institutionen in Siebenbürgen]. In: Virgil Căndea (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. O epocă de înnoiri în spirit european (1601–1711/1716)*. Bukarest 2003, Vol. 5, S. 683–688; PAPP Sándor, *Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden der Osmanen für Ungarn und Siebenbürgen. Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung*. In: Johannes Koder (Hg.), (= Schriften der Balkan-Kommission, Bd. 42), Wien 2003; Das Fürstentum Siebenbürgen war der einzige Teil des ungarischen Königreiches, der nicht unter der direkten Verwaltung der Osmanen oder der Habsburger stand. In der ungarischen Geschichtsschreibung existierte die Hypothese des Fortbestandes von Staatsrecht und der Reichsidee Ungarns durch das Fürstentum Siebenbürgen. Vgl. ZACH Krista, *Fürst, Landtag und Stände. Die verfassungsrechtliche Frage in Siebenbürgen im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*. In: Gabriel Adriányi u.a. (Hg.), (= Ungarn-Jahrbuch. Zeitschrift für die Kunde Ungarns und verwandte Gebiete, Bd. 11, Jahrgang 1980–1981), München 1982, S. 64.

⁴ KLUETTING Harm, *Reformierte Konfessionalisierung in West – und Mitteleuropa*. In: Volker Leppin, Ulrich A. Wien (Hg.), *Konfessionsbildung und Konfessionskultur in Siebenbürgen in der Frühen Neuzeit*. (= Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, Bd. 66), Stuttgart 2005, S. 51.

dem König von Ungarn und Böhmen, Wladislaw Jagiello II., abgeschlossen hatte.⁵ Nach der Niederlage des ungarischen Königreiches im Kampf von Mohács (1526) konnten sich die Habsburger über das gesamte ungarische Erbe, inklusive Siebenbürgen, in der politischen und militärischen Machtkonstellation von damals gegen die Osmanen nicht behaupten.

2. Die strategische Lage Siebenbürgens war ein weiterer Grund für die Eroberung des Fürstentums durch die Habsburger. Die Erhaltung dieses Landes in der Einflussphäre der Osmanen gefährdete das habsburgische Ungarn und auch die österreichischen Länder.⁶ Gleichzeitig hatte Siebenbürgen nicht nur für die Osmanen, sondern auch für den Wiener Hof eine wichtige strategische Rolle inne. Das Fürstentum konnte als Bastion einer möglichen weiteren Expansion der Habsburger in Richtung Südosten verwendet werden, außerdem konnte Siebenbürgen auch dem Schutz und der Konsolidierung der Herrschaft in Ungarn, der Vormauer des Christentums⁷, nach seiner Befreiung von den Osmanen dienen. Siebenbürgen selbst wurde noch im Jahr 1722 als eine *Bastei gegenüber dem Wüten des eingeschworenen Feindes des christlichen Namens, das stärker als die übrigen gefährdet sei* bezeichnet.⁸ Die strategische Rolle Siebenbürgens für die Habsburger und für die Verteidigung des habsburgischen Ungarns gegen die Osmanen wird seit der Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts sowohl

⁵ Vgl. ZÖLLNER Erich, *Geschichte Österreichs. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*. Wien–München 1990, S. 154 f., 160 ff. und 165; GÜNDISCH Konrad, *Siebenbürgen und die Siebenbürger Sachsen*. In: Wilfried Schlau (Hg.), (= Studienbuchreihe der Stiftung Ostdeutscher Kulturrat, Bd. 8), München 1998, S. 75; VOCELKA Karl, *Geschichte Österreichs. Kultur – Gesellschaft – Politik*. München 2003, S. 98; ZACH KRISTA, *Politische Ursachen und Motive der Konfessionalisierung in Siebenbürgen*. In: Volker Leppin, Ulrich A. Wien (Hg.), *Konfessionsbildung und Konfessionskultur in Siebenbürgen in der Frühen Neuzeit*. (= Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, Bd. 66), Stuttgart 2005, S. 63.

⁶ Aus Siebenbürgen konnte die rechte Flanke der osmanischen Armee im Fall einer Offensive der Hohen Pforte in Richtung Zentraleuropa durch die ungarische Ebene gesichert werden; Die strategische Bedeutung Siebenbürgens für die Herrschaft der Osmanen in Ungarn, im Banat und in den Fürstentümern Walachei und Moldau wurde von den osmanischen Sultanen, Würdenträgern, Diplomaten und Chronisten sowie auch von den ausländischen Botschaftern in Konstantinopel (Istanbul) bis ins 17. Jahrhundert hinein betont. Vgl. FENEŞAN Cristina, (1997), S. 128–131.

⁷ Vgl. MAYER Theodor, *Verwaltungsreform in Ungarn nach der Türkenzeit*. In: Josef Fleckenstein, Heinz Stoob (Hg.), Sigmaringen 1980, S. 97 f.

⁸ KUTSCHERA Rolf, *Landtag und Gubernium in Siebenbürgen 1688–1869*. In: Paul Philippi (Hg.), (= Studia Transylvanica, Ergänzungsbände des Siebenbürgischen Archivs, Bd. 11), Köln–Wien 1985, S. 347; Siebenbürgen wurde auch als „am meisten ausgeliefertes Bollwerk“ (Vgl. TRÓCSÁNYI Zsolt, MISKOLCZY Ambrus, *Siebenbürgen im Habsburgerreich. Das lange 18. Jahrhundert (1711–1830)*. In: Béla Köpeczi (Hg.), *Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens*. Budapest 1990, S. 407) gegen die Osmanen bezeichnet.

durch verschiedene siebenbürgische Politiker, Beamte und Gelehrte, sowie durch die habsburgischen Staatsmännern und Militär betont.⁹

3. Die machtpragmatischen Gründe für die Eroberung Siebenbürgens durch die Habsburger bestanden in der allgemeinen Bedeutung für die europäischen Mächte der Frühneuzeit im Erwerb neuer Gebiete, deren materielle, finanzielle und menschliche Ressourcen der Steigerung ihrer politischen, militärischen und wirtschaftlich – finanziellen Kraft dienen sollten. Diese Ressourcen wurden im Kampf um die Hegemonie in Europa als Druckmittel eingesetzt. Was Siebenbürgen betrifft, verfügte das Land neben reichen Bodenschätzen (Gold, Silber, Salz) auch über ein nicht unbedeutendes demographisches Potenzial, das für die Habsburger als Steuerzahler, als Arbeitskräfte und nicht zuletzt als Rekrutenreservoir nützlich sein konnte.

Die Methoden, die die Habsburger verwendet haben, um Siebenbürgen zu erobern

Die Bestrebungen des Wiener Hofes nach einer Besetzung Siebenbürgens hörten auch nach dem Misserfolg in den 1530er und 40er Jahren nicht auf, sondern sie gingen weiter. Das Spektrum der verwendeten Methoden war breit, es reichte von diplomatischen Verhandlungen (1), über die Betreibung einer dynastischen Heiratspolitik (2) und bis hin zu militärischen Interventionen (3).

1. Zum diplomatischen Weg gehörten die Verträge, die die Habsburger im Laufe der Zeit zuerst mit den ungarischen Königen Vasallen der Osmanen und später mit den siebenbürgischen Fürsten geschlossen hatten (a), die Vereinbarungen der Habsburger mit manchen siebenbürgischen Hochwürdenträgern (b) und nicht zuletzt die Friedensverträge, die die Habsburger mit dem Suzeränmacht des Fürstentums Siebenbürgen, dem Osmanischen Reich, geschlossen haben (c).

a) Diese Kategorie der Verträge zielte in erster Linie auf die direkte Sicherung der dynastischen Rechte der Habsburger in Siebenbürgen. Dazu gehörten die Verträge, in denen die ungarischen Könige, Vasallen der Osmanen, und die siebenbürgischen Fürsten Siebenbürgen nach ihrem Ableben ohne männliche Nachkommen den Habsburgern zusprachen¹⁰, und jene Verträge, in

⁹ Vgl. FENEŞAN Cristina, (1997), S. 122–131; KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 1 und 8; Der habsburgische General Caraffa schrieb am Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts: „... *den eine unläugbare Wahrheit ist 's auch, daß ohne Siebenbürgen Ungarn nicht zu zwingen ist*“. Vgl. KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 8.

¹⁰ Es geht um den Vertrag von Oradea (Großwardein / Nagyvárad), 1538, zwischen der ungarische König Vasall der Osmanen, Johann Szapolyai I., und der Habsburger Ferdinand I. (Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 68; BARTA Gábor, *Die Anfänge des*

denen die ungarischen Könige, Vasallen der Osmanen, und die siebenbürgischen Fürsten zu Gunsten der Habsburger gleich auf ihren Thron verzichteten.¹¹ In beiden Fällen der Verträge wurden den ungarischen Königen, Vasallen der Osmanen und den siebenbürgischen Fürsten als Ersatz Territorien in der Habsburgischen Monarchie und auch Geldentschädigungen zugesprochen.¹² Zu der Kategorie von Verträgen sind auch jene zuzuordnen, die zwischen dem siebenbürgischen Fürsten Michael Apafi I. und Kaiser Leopold I. nach 1683 geschlossen wurden.¹³ Die siegreichen Feldzüge der habsburgischen Truppen

Fürstentums und erste Krisen (1526–1606). In: Béla Köpeczi (Hg.), *Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens*. Budapest 1990, S. 248), weiter um den Vertrag von Speyer (1570) zwischen der ungarische König Vasall der Osmanen, Johann Sigismund Szapolyai II., und der Kaiser Maximilian II. (Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 188 f.; BARTA Gábor, (1990), S. 257; PAPP Sándor, (2003), S. 73) und um den Vertrag von Prag (1595) zwischen der siebenbürgische Fürst Sigismund Báthory und der Kaiser Rudolf II. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 218–235.

¹¹ Es geht um die Verträge von Gilău (Gela / Gyalu), 1541 (Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 90–95; PAPP Sándor, (2003), S. 60) und von Alba Iulia (Weißenburg, Karlsburg / Gyulafehérvár), 1551 (Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 114–119; BARTA Gábor, (1990), S. 254; FENEȘAN Cristina, (1997), S. 146 f.; PAPP Sándor, (2003), S. 61 f.), beide geschlossen zwischen die Königin Isabella, die Witwe des ungarischen Königs Vasall der Osmanen, Johann Szapolyai I., und der Habsburger Ferdinand I., und um die Verträge, die von 1597 und bis 1602 zwischen der siebenbürgischen Fürst Sigismund Bathory und der Kaiser Rudolf II. geschlossen wurden. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 235–241; 257–261 und 264–275; BARTA Gábor, (1990), S. 296 ff.; ARENS Meinolf, *Habsburg und Siebenbürgen 1600–1605. Gewaltsame Eingliederungsversuche eines Ostmitteleuropäischen Fürstentums in einen Frühabsolutistischen Reichsverband*. In: Paul Philippi u.a. (Hg.), (= *Studia Transylvanica*, Ergänzungsbände zum Siebenbürgischen Archiv, Bd. 27), Köln–Weimar–Wien 2001.

¹² Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 118 f., 188 f., 239 und 261; BARTA Gábor, (1990), S. 248 und 253; ARENS Meinolf, (2001), S. 77 f.; PAPP Sándor, (2003), S. 60 f.

¹³ Es handelt sich dabei um das Übereinkommen von Dumbrăveni (Elisabethstadt / Ebesfalva), 1685, und um die Verträge von Wien („Tractatus Hallerianus“), 1686, und von Blaj (Blasendorf / Balázsfalva), 1687. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 858–914; PRODAN David, *Instaurarea regimului austriac în Transilvania* [Der Beginn der habsburgischen Herrschaft in Siebenbürgen]. In: Oțetea A. u.a. (Hg.), *Istoria României. Feudalismul dezvoltat în secolul al XVII-lea și la începutul secolului al XVIII-lea. Destrămarea feudalismului și formarea relațiilor capitaliste*. Bukarest 1964, Vol. 3, S. 226–229; KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 2 ff.; ROTH W. Paul, *Das Diploma Leopoldinum, Vorgeschichte, Bestimmungen*. In: Roth W. Paul (Hg.), *Beiträge zur Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte Siebenbürgens, Schwedens und der Steiermark*. Graz, 2001, S. 136 f.; ANDEA Susana, ANDEA Avram, *Transilvania în timpul lui Mihai I Apafi* [Siebenbürgen in der Zeit der Herrschaft Michael Apafis I.]. In: Virgil Căndea (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. O epocă de înnoiri în spirit european (1601–1711/1716)*, Bukarest 2003, Vol. 5, S. 356–362; MAGYARI Andrei, *Începutul regimului habsburgic în Transilvania și mișcarea adversă a lui Francisc Rákóczi al II-lea* [Der Beginn der habsburgischen Herrschaft in Siebenbürgen und der antihabsburgische Aufstand unter der Führung von Francisc Rákóczi II.]. In: Virgil Căndea (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. O epocă de înnoiri în spirit european (1601–1711/1716)*. Bukarest 2003, Vol. 5, S. 370 ff.

gegen die Osmanen und die militärische Bedrohung Siebenbürgens durch die habsburgische Armee ermöglichte dem Wiener Hof die Verschärfung von dessen Bedingungen. Konkret geht es um die Bedingungen, die die unmittelbare Unterordnung und die Anschließung Siebenbürgens an die Habsburgische Monarchie Schritt für Schritt vorbereiteten.

b) Die Abkommen, die die Habsburger mit manchen siebenbürgischen Hochwürdenträgern im Geheimen geschlossen hatten, sahen die Unterstützung und Beteiligung der Letzteren für persönliche Vorteile am erleichterten Erwerb Siebenbürgens durch den Wiener Hof vor.¹⁴

c) Die Versuche der Habsburger die Herrschaft über Siebenbürgen auch auf diplomatischem Wege durch Verhandlungen mit der Suzeränmacht des Fürstentums, dem Osmanischen Reich, zu erreichen, hatten mehr als eineinhalb Jahrhunderte lang keinen Erfolg gehabt. In dem Friedensvertrag mit der Hohen Pforte von Satu Mare (Sathmar / Szatmárnémeti), (1565) mussten die Habsburger sogar auf ihren Ansprüchen betreffend die Herrschaft Siebenbürgens verzichten.¹⁵ Die Diplomatie der Habsburger erreichte erst im dem Friedensvertrag von Karlowitz (1699) den Erfolg. Die Hohe Pforte musste auch „de jure“ eine Situation anerkennen, die schon „de facto“ existierte: Die Besetzung von Siebenbürgen durch die habsburgischen Truppen. Die Osmanen verzichteten im Friedensvertrag von Karlowitz auf ihre Herrschaft über Siebenbürgen und gaben ihre Zustimmung für die Eingliederung des Fürstentums in das Länderkonglomerat der Habsburger.¹⁶

¹⁴ Es geht um das Abkommen von Nyírbátor, 1549, zwischen der Statthalter Siebenbürgens, Georg Martinuzzi, und der Vertreter des Habsburger Ferdinand I. (Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 110–115; BARTA Gábor, (1990), S. 253 f.; FENEŞAN Cristina, (1997), S. 141; PAPP Sándor, (2003), S. 61), und um das Sonderabkommen von Cârţişoara (Oberkerz / Kercisora, Kercisóra), 1685, zwischen der kaiserliche Delegierten, Pater Antidus Dunod, und Teleki, der „allmächtigen Minister“ des Fürsten Michael Apafi I. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 864; Vgl. auch PRODAN David, (1964), S. 227.

¹⁵ Vgl. GÜNDISCH Konrad, (1998), S. 81.

¹⁶ Vgl. MORIZ Angeli v., *Feldzüge gegen die Türken 1697–1698 und der Karlowitzer Friede 1699*. In: Abtheilung für Kriegsgeschichte des k. k. Kriegs- Archives (Hg.), *Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen. Nach den Feld-Acten und anderen authentischen Quellen*. Wien 1876, Serie I., Band II, S. 297 und 301 f.; MÜLLER GEORG, *Die Türkenherrschaft in Siebenbürgen. Verfassungsrechtliches Verhältnis Siebenbürgens zur Pforte 1541–1688*. In: Südosteuropäisches Forschungsinstitut, Hermannstadt–Sibiu 1923, S. 7; Die Hohe Pforte verzichtete aber nicht einfach so auf ihre Herrschaft über Siebenbürgen. Während der Verhandlungen von Karlowitz machten die Osmanen zwei Vorschläge in der folgenden Reihenfolge: Erstens: Siebenbürgen blieb weiter ein autonomes Fürstentum unter der Suzeränität der Hohen Pforte. Zweitens: Siebenbürgen wird an die Habsburgische Monarchie abgetreten. Dafür müssen die Habsburger den Osmanen aber einen jährlichen

2. Die Habsburger versuchten Siebenbürgen unter ihren Einfluss zu bringen auch durch die Betreibung einer dynastischen Heiratspolitik mit den ungarischen Königen, welche Vasallen der Osmanen waren, und mit den siebenbürgischen Fürsten – ein Schritt in Richtung Erwerb des Fürstentums.¹⁷

3. In ihren Bestrebungen, Siebenbürgen zu erobern, führten die Habsburger, als die politische und militärische Konjunktur günstig für sie war, neben diplomatischen Verhandlungen auch militärische Interventionen durch. Bis zur endgültigen Eroberung Siebenbürgens am Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts marschierten die habsburgischen Truppen im Fürstentum mehrmals ein und besetzten es ganz oder Teile davon.¹⁸ Bei der endgültigen Eingliederung Siebenbürgens in die Monarchie spielten die habsburgischen Truppen eine wichtige Rolle. Um ihre Macht zu demonstrieren, rückten sie zwischen 1685 und 1688 mehrmals im Fürstentum ein¹⁹, und unter ihrem Druck wurden das

Tribut bezahlen. Beiden Vorschläge wurden aber von den christlichen Mächten nicht akzeptiert. Vgl. MORIZ Angeli v., (1876), S. 297 f.

¹⁷ Es geht um die in dem Vertrag von Speyer (1570) vereinbarte Möglichkeit einer Eheschließung zwischen der ungarischen König Vasall der Osmanen, Johann Sigismund Szapolyais II., und eine habsburgische Prinzessin (Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 68 f. und 188 f.), und um die im Jahr 1595 durchgeführte Eheschließung zwischen der siebenbürgische Fürst Sigismund Bathory und die Habsburgerin Maria Christina. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 226 und 235–241; ZLEPKO Dmytro, *Die letzten Báthorys (1575–1613) und die Reformation in Siebenbürgen*. In: Gabriel Adriányi u.a. (Hg.), (= Ungarn - Jahrbuch. Zeitschrift für die Kunde Ungarns und verwandte Gebiete, Bd. 11), München 1982, S. 131; BARTA Gábor, (1990), S. 296; WINKELBAUER Thomas, *Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht. Länder und Untertanen des Hauses Habsburg im Konfessionellen Zeitalter*. In: Herwig Wolfram (Hg.), *Österreichische Geschichte 1522–1699*. Wien 2003, Teil I, S. 144.

¹⁸ Die Habsburger beherrschten zwischen 1529 und 1536 mit der Hilfe ihrer siebenbürgischen Anhänger Teile des Fürstentums. Vgl. BARTA Gábor, (1990), S. 245 ff.; Als Folge der Abdankung der ungarischen Königin Isabella und ihres minderjährigen Sohnes, Johan Sigismund Szapolyai II., zum Gunsten der Habsburger befand sich Siebenbürgen zwischen 1551 und 1556 im Besitz des Wiener Hofes. Vgl. PAPP Sándor, (2003), S. 61 f.; Der Wiener Hof beherrschte zwischen 1598 und 1605 nach wiederholten Verzicht des Fürsten Sigismund Bathory auf dem siebenbürgischen Thron zum Gunsten der Habsburger mit Unterbrechungen wieder das ganze Fürstentum. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 235–241 und 257–280; ARENS Meinolf, (2001); Die habsburgischen Truppen befanden sich zwischen 1661 und 1664 in manchen Städten und Festungen Siebenbürgens. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 824–832; ROTH Harald, *Die Rolle Siebenbürgens im habsburgisch-osmanischen Konflikt 1663/64*. In: „Siebenbürgische Semesterblätter“, Drittes Jahr, Heft 1, München 1989, S. 86; ANDEA Susana, ANDEA Avram, *Principatul Transilvaniei în vremea Rákóczeștilor* [Das Fürstentum Siebenbürgen in der Zeit unter der Herrschaft der Fürsten aus der Dynastie Rákóczi]. In: Virgil Căndeia (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. O epocă de înnoiri în spirit european (1601–1711/1716)*. Bukarest 2003, Vol. 5, S. 200 f.; ANDEA Susana, ANDEA Avram, (2003), *Transilvania în timpul ...*, S. 347 f.

¹⁹ Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 865 f.; KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 2 f.; ANDEA Susana,

Übereinkommen von Dumbrăveni (1685) und die Verträge von Wien (1686) und von Blaj (1687) unterzeichnet. Durch die Verträge von Wien und Blaj und durch die Deklaration der Vertreter des Fürsten Michael Apafi I. und der siebenbürgischen Ständen sowie der wichtigen Würdenträger des Landes vom 9. Mai 1688 – die kurz danach am 13. Mai auch vom siebenbürgischen Landtag bestätigt wurde – verpflichtete sich Siebenbürgen, die habsburgischen Truppen in wichtigen strategischen Städten und Festungen des Landes aufzunehmen und auch zu versorgen.²⁰ Auf diese Weise wurde die militärische Besetzung des Fürstentums Siebenbürgen von den Habsburgern durchgeführt und vollendet: Die Habsburger fassten im Land festen Fuß. Die weiteren Schritte des Wiener Hofes zielten auf die Integration Siebenbürgens in der Monarchie.

Schlussfolgerungen

Die Eingliederung Siebenbürgens in die Habsburgische Monarchie war ein Teil der Expansionspolitik des Wiener Hofes in Richtung Südosteuropa. Siebenbürgen, Teil des mittelalterlichen Königreichs Ungarn, entwickelte sich in den 1540er Jahren zu einem eigenen Staatsgebilde, das Fürstentum Siebenbürgen, das unter osmanischer Herrschaft stand. Die Habsburger als Erben der ungarischen Könige erhoben schon am Ende der 1520er-Jahre dynastische Ansprüche auf die Herrschaft über Siebenbürgen. Auch militärstrategische und machtpragmatische Gründe spielen dabei eine wichtige Rolle. Die Palette der Methoden, durch die Habsburger Siebenbürgen unter ihre Herrschaft zu bringen versuchten, war breit und sie reichte von der Schließung von Verträgen mit den siebenbürgischen Herrschern, über die Betreibung einer dynastischen Heiratspolitik zwischen den Habsburgern und den siebenbürgischen Herrschern und bis zu militärischen Interventionen der habsburgischen Truppen ins Fürstentum. Durch den Verzicht des siebenbürgischen Fürsten und der Stände des Landes auf die osmanische Herrschaft im Jahr 1688 und durch die Annahme der habsburgischen Oberhoheit wurde der Weg für die endgültigen Eingliederung Siebenbürgens in der Habsburgischen Monarchie freigemacht.

ANDEA Avram, (2003), *Transilvania în timpul ...*, S. 359; MAGYARI Andrei, (2003), S. 370 f.

²⁰ Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 858–909; PRODAN David, (1964), S. 226–229; KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 3 f. und 319–324; ANDEA Susana, ANDEA Avram, (2003), *Transilvania în timpul ...*, S. 359; MAGYARI Andrei, (2003), S. 371.

АРМЕЙСКОЕ ОФИЦЕРСТВО И РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ 1905 – 1907 ГГ. В РОССИИ

ARMY OFFICERS AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905 – 1907

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Rezumat: Corpul de ofițeri ai Armatei și Revoluția rusă din 1905 – 1907

În acest articol se examinează poziția sociopolitică a ofițerilor Armatei Ruse în contextul evenimentelor din anii primei Revoluții ruse. În vederea analizei atitudinilor manifestate de către reprezentanții corpului ofițeresc autorul a apelat la mărturiile contemporanilor, la informațiile identificate în presa de la începutul secolului XX în diverse fonduri arhivistice. Se ajunge la concluzia potrivit căreia, în pofida unor cazuri de implicare în activitatea revoluționară a unor ofițeri, în ansamblul său corpul ofițeresc a rămas fidel jurământului prestat și a acționat, de regulă, în limitele cadrului normativ schițat de regulamentele militare și legile Imperiului Rus.

Abstract: Army Officers and the Russian Revolution of 1905 – 1907

This article examines the socio-political position of the Russian Army officers into the context of the events of the First Russian Revolution. In order to analyze the attitudes of the officer corps representatives, the author appealed to the testimonies of contemporaries, to the information identified in the prints of the early 20th Century, or in various archives. It concludes that, despite some cases of officers' involvement in the revolutionary activity, the officer corps as a whole remained faithful to their oath and acted, normally, within the regulatory framework outlined by the military regulations and by the laws of the Russian Empire.

Résumé: Officiers de l'armée et la Révolution russe de 1905 – 1907

On consacre l'article ci-joint à la situation sociale et politique des officiers de l'Armée russe dans le contexte des événements des années de la première Révolution russe. En vue de l'analyse des attitudes manifestées par les représentants du corps d'officiers, l'auteur y fit appel aux témoignages des contemporains, aux informations qu'on identifia dans la presse du début du XX-ème siècle, en divers fonds d'archives. On arriva à la conclusion conformément à laquelle, malgré quelques cas d'implication des officiers dans l'activité révolutionnaire, en général, le corps

d'officiers resta fidèle au serment prêté et agit, d'habitude, dans les limites du cadre normatif ébauché par les règlements militaires et les lois de l'Empire Russe.

Keywords: *Officers, revolution, political parties, mass riots, the use of weapons*

Вступление

В течение длительного времени в Советском Союзе и на постсоветском пространстве исследование проблем истории офицерского корпуса Русской армии практически не осуществлялось. При этом описание отдельных сторон его жизни и деятельности носило, как правило, необъективный характер. К числу вопросов, освещавшихся поверхностно и предвзято, относилась и проблема роли офицерства в революционных событиях в стране. Командный состав армии изображался в виде социального субъекта, слепо выполнявшего распоряжения господствовавших классов, готового в любой момент бездумно использовать силу оружия против собственного народа.

В западной историографии также затрагивались лишь отдельные аспекты истории русского офицерства¹, в число которых его роль в социально-политических событиях в стране не входила.

В настоящей статье предпринимается попытка с позиций историзма рассмотреть отношение офицерства к событиям 1905 – 1907 годов, показать неоднозначность его социального поведения, отстраненность от политической жизни страны и в то же время – участие в борьбе не только с погромами и уличными бесчинствами маргинальных элементов, но и народными выступлениями.

¹ Например: J. Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914*. Ithaca, London, 1984, p. 165-198; D. A. Rich, *The Tsar's Colonels: Professionalism, Strategy, and Subversion in Late Imperial Russia*, Cambridge (MA), London, 1998; B. W. Menning, *Pieces of the Puzzle: The Role of Iu. N. Danilov and M.V. Alekseev in Russian War Planning before 1914*, in "International Historical Review", vol. 25, № 4 (December 2003), p. 775-798; B. W. Menning, *The Offensive Revisited: Russian Preparation for Future War, 1906—1914*, in D. Schimmelpennick van der Oye, B.W. Menning (eds.), *Reforming the Tsar's Army: Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution*, Cambridge, 2004, p. 215-231; B. W. Menning, *War Planning and Initial Operations in the Russian Context*, in R. F. Hamilton and H. H. Herwig (eds.), *War Planning 1914*, Cambridge, 2010, p. 80-142 и др.

Насилие как метод политической борьбы в России в начале XX века

Внутриполитическая и социально-экономическая обстановка в Российской империи в начале XX века была нестабильной. Значительная часть крестьянства и рабочего класса выражала недовольство уровнем жизни, интеллигенция и буржуазия выступали за реформирование политической системы. Как писал Л. Н. Толстой, „...престиж царской власти... не переставая, падал и упал в последнее время так, что во всех сословиях никто уже не стесняется, смело осуждать не только распоряжения правительства, но самого царя и даже бранить его и смеяться над ним”².

Еще более осложняла ситуацию девальвация традиционных морально-этических ценностей, негативно влиявшая на общественные настроения. Беззастенчивость в достижении личных целей и стремление к максимальному обогащению стали своего рода модой. Современник с горечью отмечал: „Положение в широких общественных кругах дают почти исключительно деньги, причем никто не интересуется способом их приобретения. Добыты ли они воровством..., грязными адвокатскими делами или темными коммерческими спекуляциями – это безразлично, лишь бы деньги были”³.

Подобное положение вызывало эскалацию социально-политической напряженности, переросшую в революцию 1905-1907 гг. Безусловно, она была вызвана глубинными причинами политического и экономического характера. Однако немалую роль в ее генезисе сыграла деятельность либеральных и революционных сил, а также определенных слоев беспартийных граждан, принадлежавших к образованной части общества и демонстрировавших свою оппозиционность власти. В этой связи В. В. Шульгин вспоминал: „...настолько была... распространена известного рода партийность в мире адвокатском, писательском, артистическом, ученом, что не разделявшие оппозиционно-революционных доктрин сейчас же попадали на черную доску: перед ними закрывались все двери”⁴.

² Письмо Л. Н. Толстого Николаю II [The Letter of L. N. Tolstoi addressed to Nikolai II], in Библиотека думающего о России, http://www.patriotica.ru/history/tolstoy_letter.html (дата обращения: 08.11.2014).

³ Е. И. Мартынов, *Назревшие реформы* [Overdue Reforms], in А. И. Каменев, И. В. Домнин, Ю. Т. Белов, А. Е. Савинкин (составители), *Офицерский корпус Русской Армии. Опыт самопознания* [The Officer Corps of the Russian Army: the experience of self-discovery], Москва, Русский путь, 2000, с. 316.

⁴ В. В. Шульгин, *Что нам в них не нравится* [What We Do Not Like Them For], С.-

Говоря об использовавшихся в ходе революции средствах политической борьбы, следует подчеркнуть, что они носили многообразный и неоднозначный характер – от мирных протестов до вооруженных выступлений и террористических актов. В повседневной деятельности тактику террора использовали эсеры, эсеры-максималисты, анархисты, а также национальные политические партии в Царстве Польском и на Кавказе. Социал-демократы, как большевики, так и меньшевики, устами своих лидеров отрицавшие терроризм как метод политической борьбы в ряде случаев также были причастны к проведению террористических актов.

Относительно умеренная часть оппозиции, непосредственно не участвовавшая в терактах, своими действиями и заявлениями поддерживала, по сути, террористическую деятельность, осуществлявшуюся радикальными элементами. Так, кадеты добивались полной политической амнистии для сторонников терроризма, преследуя цель привлечь голоса новых избирателей. Тактику террора оправдывали и левые думские фракции, в том числе, трудовики и энесы (народные социалисты). Более того, в Государственной думе фракция кадетов заблокировала предложение П. А. Столыпина принять резолюцию, осуждавшую террор, несмотря на то, что тот в своем докладе сообщил о страшных цифрах: только с октября 1905 г. по апрель 1906 года по политическим мотивам в стране было убито 288 и ранено 383 государственных служащих⁵.

Всего же в 1905-1908 гг. террористами было убито 2563 должностных лица и 3616 частных лиц, ранено, соответственно, 2954 и 3998 человек⁶.

Для сравнения приведем число лиц, казненных по приговору суда в те же годы. Источники того времени приводят различные цифры казненных в 1905 – 1908 годах. Минимальное число составляет 1435 человек, максимальное – 2628 человек. Из них по приговору военно-полевых судов, рассматривавших дела, связанные с участием в революции, было казнено только 683 человека. Правомерно сделать вывод, что остальные приговоры были вынесены обычными судами, в связи с

Петербург, Хорс, 1992, с. 41- 42.

⁵ А. И. Суворов, *Политический терроризм в России XIX - начала XX веков. Истоки, структура, особенности* [Political Terrorism in Russia in the 19th-the Beginning of the 20th Centuries. Origins, structure, features], in "Социологические исследования" [Sociological research] 2002, № 7, с. 57.

⁶ Н. С. Таганцев, *Смертная казнь: сборник статей* [The Death Penalty: a collection of articles], С.-Петербург, Государственная типография, 1913, с. 92.

совершением общеуголовных преступлений, носивших тяжкий характер. Подтверждением тому, что число смертных приговоров, выносившихся за участие в вооруженных выступлениях, было относительно небольшим, служат следующие данные. В 1906 – 1909 гг. за „государственные преступления, восстание и сопротивление” к смертной казни было приговорено 387 человек, за убийства – 1190 человек, за разбой и грабежи – 1197 человек⁷.

Между тем, по данным американского историка А. Гейфмана всего в период с 1901 по 1911 год жертвами политического терроризма стали 17 тысяч человек⁸.

Потеря идейных и нравственных ориентиров в обществе привела к тому, что осуществление террористических акций одобряла немалая часть населения страны. Занимавший в период революции 1905-1907 гг. пост начальника Петербургского охранного отделения жандармский полковник А. В. Герасимов отмечал, что „особенными симпатиями среди интеллигенции и широких обывательских, даже умеренных слоев общества пользовались социалисты-революционеры. Эти симпатии к ним привлекала их террористическая деятельность. Деньги в кассу их центрального комитета притекали со всех сторон и в самых огромных размерах”⁹. Иными словами, применение насилия в самых жестоких формах нередко поддерживали граждане, сами в политической борьбе не участвовавшие.

В свою очередь, власть вместо поиска путей общественного согласия использовала такую модель политического поведения, в основе которой лежало использование силы в отношении оппонентов. Какие-либо легальные политические институты, позволявшие вести борьбу в рамках закона, отсутствовали (первые шаги в этой сфере были сделаны только после опубликования Манифеста 17 октября 1905 г.), против оппонентов власти использовался репрессивный аппарат, народные выступления и волнения подавлялись войсками.

Подобное положение было обусловлено особенностями конкретно-исторического этапа в развитии страны: российское общество только приближалось к пониманию необходимости построения правового государства и гражданского общества, и в массовом сознании не были сформированы нормы и принципы демократии в их современном понимании.

⁷ *Ibid.*, с. 91.

⁸ А. И. Суворов, *указ. соч.*, с. 57.

⁹ *Apud* А. И. Суворов, *указ. соч.*, с. 57.

Общественно-политическая позиция армейского офицерства в период первой революции в России

В обстановке масштабных социально-политических потрясений офицерство оставалось едва ли ни единственным социальным слоем, стоявшим на позициях традиционной государственности. В громадном большинстве своем оно „... относилось с предубеждением не только к левой, но и к либеральной общественности”; при этом „государственный строй был для офицерства фактом предопределенным, не вызывающим ни сомнений, ни разнотолков. «За веру, царя и отечество»”¹⁰.

Скорее всего, именно это обстоятельство явилось главной причиной проявившейся в начале XX в. отчужденности офицеров от чиновничества, интеллигенции, буржуа и других образованных слоев общества. Современник отмечал, что „разношерстность... общества, состоявшего из людей самого различного воспитания, образования, из людей весьма пестрых этических понятий и политических воззрений, стояла в резком противоречии с душевным, духовным... единообразием и своеобразием офицерства”¹¹.

Несмотря на то, что в рассматриваемый период в стране появилось множество союзов и обществ политической направленности, организованных по профессиональному признаку (врачей, железнодорожников, учителей, банковских служащих и т.д.), современник отмечал, что к началу революции 1905 года „...специально военно-революционных организаций не было”¹².

В то же время, небольшая часть офицеров придерживалась оппозиционных взглядов, и в той или иной форме выступала против существовавшего государственного строя. Весной 1905 г. по инициативе нескольких слушателей военных академий состоялось учредительное собрание организации, получившей громкое название „Всероссийский офицерский союз”. Член ЦК этой организации С. Мстиславский впоследствии отмечал, что в программе союза говорилось о необходимости демократизации армии, а также выдвигались трафаретные требования членов гражданских

¹⁰ А. И. Деникин, *Путь русского офицера* [The Way of a Russian Officer], Москва, Современник, 1991, с. 58.

¹¹ Е. Месснер [и другие], *Российские офицеры* [The Russian Officers], in А. И. Каменев, И. В. Домнин, Ю. Т. Белов, А. Е. Савинкин (составители), *Офицерский корпус Русской Армии. Опыт самопознания* [The Officer Corps of the Russian Army: the experience of self-discovery], с. 134.

¹² К. М. Оберучев, *Офицеры в русской революции* [Officers in the Russian Revolution], Издание «Первого русского издательства в Америке», [без года издания], с. 35.

союзов. По его воспоминаниям „...конкретных... задач союз пред собой не ставил“, кроме того, „... революционную работу вела очень маленькая группа офицеров...“¹³.

В практической деятельности организация проявляла пассивность и практически ничем себя не зарекомендовала. Так, С. Мстиславский в своих воспоминаниях упоминает только два факта революционной деятельности: вхождение осенью 1905 года трех членов союза в межпартийный комитет по подготовке восстания в Петербурге и подготовку им лично *Руководства к уличному бою*, изданного в 1906 году¹⁴.

Точное количество членов этого союза установить вряд ли возможно, но, судя по косвенным данным, оно было невелико. Б. В. Савинков писал, что в начале декабря 1905 года в Петербурге состоялось совещание эсеров и социал-демократов, на котором от офицерского союза присутствовал „некий поручик“. По словам последнего, в союзе числилось около 60 офицеров, преимущественно флота и гвардии. Однако Б. Савинков отметил, что поручик „явно преувеличивал, ибо не ответил на вопрос, какие части в Петербурге не будут стрелять в случае восстания“¹⁵.

В конце 1906 г. некоторые члены Всероссийского офицерского союза параллельно создали еще одну структуру, которая называлась „Военный союз партии социалистов-революционеров“. Организация, вошедшая в контакт с эсерами, имел свой печатный орган – журнал „Народная армия“¹⁶, и ставила задачу подготовки вооруженного восстания в Петербурге. Однако, хотя К. М. Оберучев, длительное время занимавшийся революционной работой в армии утверждал, будто благодаря „работе членов этого союза принадлежит целый ряд вооруженных выступлений войск в разных частях России...“¹⁷, в качестве доказательства он привел лишь один пример. Им оказалось происшедшее в ноябре 1905 года выступление инженерных подразделений в Киеве, возглавлявшееся подпоручиком Б. П. Жадановским, связанным с РСДРП(б). Кроме него, в выступлении участвовали еще 5 офицеров¹⁸.

¹³ С. Мстиславский, *Отрывки о пятом годе* [Excerpts of the Fifth Year], in “Каторга и ссылка” [Penal Servitude and Exile], 1928, № 2 (39), с. 16, 20.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, с. 21, 32.

¹⁵ “Былое”, 1918, № 1 (29), с. 65.

¹⁶ К. М. Оберучев, *указ. соч.*, с. 37.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, с. 38.

¹⁸ М. И. Ахун, В. А. Петров, *Восстание инженерных войск в Киеве* [The Rise of the Engineering Troops in Kiev], in “Красная летопись” [The Red Chronicle], 1925, № 3 (14), с. 132.

В 1908 году „Всероссийский офицерский союз” прекратил свое существование¹⁹; в 1909 году за принадлежность к нему были осуждены 5 человек²⁰.

Отдельные офицеры участвовали в революционных выступлениях. Так, штабс-капитан Н. А. Неплюев и прапорщик Н. А. Золотарев установили „в ноябре месяце 1905 года сношения с тайными солдатскими организациями... взяли на себя руководство солдатским движением...”. Подполковник Г. П. Коновкин и поручик Д. И. Домусчи выразили „...свою солидарность восставшим нижним чинам”, а поручик Осберг лично руководил „толпой восставших нижних чинов”²¹. Вооруженное выступление части гарнизона в крепости Свеаборг (июль 1906 года) возглавили члены большевистской партии подпоручик А. П. Емельянов и подпоручик Е. Л. Коханский²².

Подобных случаев, однако, было немного. В этой связи „Вестник русской конницы” писал: „... явно изменившие долгу и ставшие во главе бунтовщиков офицеры насчитываются единицами среди десятков тысяч лиц офицерского состава армии...”²³. Возможно, еще какая-то доля офицеров в душе была настроена оппозиционно, но в жизни и повседневной деятельности это не проявлялось. В любом случае, громадное большинство офицерского корпуса сохраняло верность присяге и отвергало революцию в принципе.

В то же время, офицерство не участвовало в политической жизни страны, и не оказывало помощи партиям и организациям, поддерживавшим государственные устои. Причина состояла в том, что офицерам строго запрещалось заниматься любой политической деятельностью. В соответствующем решении Совета Министров, утвержденном императором Николаем II, говорилось: „Всем офицерам и всем нижним чинам воспрещается:

а) входить в состав и принимать участие, в каких бы то ни было союзах, группах, организациях, товариществах, партиях и т. п., образованных с политической целью, а равно присутствовать на... собраниях, обсуждающих политические вопросы;

¹⁹ С. Мстиславский, указ. соч., с. 19.

²⁰ М. И. Ахун, В. А. Петров, *Большевики и армия в 1905-1917 гг.* [The Bolsheviks and the Army in 1905-1917], Ленинград, «Красная газета» [Krasnaya Gazeta], 1929, с. 124.

²¹ *Приказ войскам Иркутского военного округа № 97* [Order for the Troops of Irkutsk Military District, No 97], in „Разведчик” [The Scout], 1908, № 911, с. 249.

²² „Народная армия” [The People's Army], 1907, № 1-2, с. 71.

²³ *Агитация в войсках* [Agitation in the Army], in „Вестник русской конницы” [Bulletin of Russian Cavalry], 1906, № 23, с. 1003.

б) принимать непосредственное участие или присутствовать в скопищах, сходках и манифестациях, какого бы они рода ни были”²⁴.

В случае нарушения требований приказа предусматривалась уголовная ответственность; если же нарушение было невелико, то офицера привлекали к дисциплинарной ответственности, вплоть до увольнения со службы. Следует подчеркнуть: приказ запрещал военнослужащим заниматься любой политической деятельностью, в том числе, направленной на поддержку существовавшего строя. Более того, возбранялось даже публичное выражение симпатий к политическим силам, боровшимся против революции. Например, в конце 1906 года в газетах появились сообщения о посылке командирами некоторых полков приветственных телеграмм в адрес съезда Союза русского народа, придерживавшегося монархической ориентации. В этой связи военный министр заявил, что „в виду приказов по военному ведомству 1905 года № 804 и 1906 года № 626, проводящих безусловный принцип внепартийности армии... таковые выражения сочувствия, хотя бы и правым политическим партиям, не должны быть допускаемы”²⁵.

Вынужденные находиться в стороне от социально-политической жизни офицеры в политических вопросах были некомпетентны, вследствие чего не могли бороться с агитацией, ведшейся среди солдат. Как писал А. И. Деникин „недостаточная осведомленность в области политических течений и особенно социальных вопросов русского офицерства сказала уже в дни первой революции...”²⁶.

В то же время, офицеры отнюдь не были людьми, оторванными от жизни. Говоря о революционных выступлениях, совпавших по времени с русско-японской войной, один из офицеров отмечал, что их „...цель состояла в том, чтобы сломить существующий режим. Так как достигнуть этого при победоносной войне ... труднее, чем во время войны неудачной, то наши радикалы не только желали поражений, но и старались их вызвать. Поражениям армии открыто радовались...”²⁷.

²⁴ Приказ от 19 декабря 1905 года № 804 [Order of December 19, 1905 № 804], in *Приказы по военному ведомству и циркуляры Главного штаба за 1905 год* [Orders for the Defense Ministry and the General Staff circulars for 1905], С.-Петербург, Военное издательство, 1905, с. 1352-1353.

²⁵ “Разведчик” [The Scout], 1907, № 854, с. 133.

²⁶ А. И. Деникин, *Путь русского офицера* [The Way of a Russian officer], с. 50.

²⁷ Н. Вишняков, *Пять лет военной публицистики* [Five Years of Military Journalism], in В. Ф. Новицкий (редактор), *Помни войну! Сборник статей на современные военные темы* [Remember the war! Collection of articles on contemporary military themes], Москва, Типография товарищества И. Д. Сытина, 1911, с. 66.

Другой офицер-фронтовик вспоминал: „Многие периодические издания, ... часто даром раздаваемые в госпиталях и тыловых учреждениях, были весьма усердными союзниками врага”²⁸.

Еще один участник войны с душевной болью писал, что шельмование своей армии в либеральной и революционной прессе, нескрываемое желание ее разгрома „... ошеломило... десятки тысяч раненых, возвратившихся из Манчжурии, и с моей стороны вызвало горький упрек обществу в статье *Тяжело ранен на Родине*, напечатанной в «Новом времени»”²⁹.

Несмотря на то, что правительство запрещало участие воинских чинов в любом виде политической деятельности, власти активно использовали войска для подавления вооруженных выступлений, массовых беспорядков, борьбы с боевиками и т.п. В этом контексте оппозиционная пресса упрекала армию в „бессилии против внешних врагов”, войне „со своим народом”, поддержке „антинародного правительственного режима”³⁰ и т. п.

С точки зрения кадровых офицеров, однако, ситуация представлялась иначе. Во-первых, происходившие события воспринимались ими как попытка уничтожения исторических и духовных основ бытия России, как „...движение позорное, антипатриотическое, антигосударственное и антирусское. Ибо лозунгом этого движения было поражение...”³¹.

Оставаться в стороне в подобной ситуации многие офицеры считали невозможным. „На совесть наших военных ляжет слишком тяжелый груз, если они не постараются сохранить за армией значение опоры государства...”,³² – писал в своем письме один из них. Большинство офицерского состава придерживалось мнения, что армия, независимо от того – извне или изнутри возникают угрозы государству – должна стоять на страже интересов и безопасности страны. Поэтому антиправительственные выступления (особенно во время войны с внешним противником) трактовались офицерством как измена Родине. Не случайно один из строевых офицеров писал, что борьба с революцией, „...терзающей нашу родину, является в настоящее время делом армии, делом в высшей степени

²⁸ В. А. К., *Мысли о Мукденских боях* [Thoughts of Mukden battles], in “Вестник русской конницы” [Bulletin of Russian Cavalry], 1906. № 14, с. 597.

²⁹ С. Толузаков, *Настроение в корпусе офицеров армии* [The mood in the body of the officers of the army], in “Разведчик” [The Scout], 1906, № 803, с. 203.

³⁰ А. А. Н., *Солдат и «свободы»* [The Soldier and the "Freedom"], in “Вестник русской конницы” [Bulletin of Russian Cavalry], 1906, № 8, с. 335.

³¹ В. В. Шульгин, *указ. соч.*, с. 43.

³² А. А. Н., *указ. соч.*, с. 337.

тяжелым и ответственным..."³³.

Во-вторых, именно на армию легла обязанность защищать мирное население от погромов, убийств, грабежей, происходивших в ходе революционных выступлений. Полиция, в силу своей малочисленности и слабого вооружения не могла в условиях массовых беспорядков предпринять должных мер по обеспечению общественной безопасности. Выше уже отмечалось, что число погибших от рук революционеров мирных граждан исчислялось тысячами.

Массовое распространение получили уголовные преступления, совершавшиеся участниками антиправительственных выступлений. Например, с января 1905 по июль 1906 г. только крупных ограблений по политическим мотивам было зарегистрировано почти 2 тысячи. При этом присвоение участниками ограблений „экспроприированных“ денег было настолько распространенным явлением, что лидеры экстремистских организаций вынуждены были признать эту проблему публично³⁴.

Уже упоминавшийся высокопоставленный жандармский офицер А. В. Герасимов, говоря о событиях 1905 – 1907 годов, в показаниях следственной комиссии Временного правительства отмечал, что „многие организации, действовавшие под анархистским флагом, по своей идеологии не были революционными, а просто пользовались анархической риторикой для оправдания обычного бандитизма“³⁵.

Подобное явление отмечает один из современных исследователей истории Нижегородского края: „Не счесть числа экспроприаций, грабежей, вымогательств, подделок документов с их последующим использованием для различных махинаций, организованных эсерами...“, а также представителями других организаций „...вне зависимости от партийной принадлежности“³⁶. Более того, происходили и гораздо более серьезные

³³ С. Глинский, *Честь или позор* [Honor or Disgrace], in „Разведчик“ [The Scout], 1906, № 834, с. 753.

³⁴ М. В. Савченко, *Провинциальная хроника революций начала XX века в России: алкогольный аспект (по материалам Пензенской губернии)* [Provincial Chronicle of Revolutions from the beginning of 20th century in Russia: issue of drunkenness (on the base of materials of the Penza province)] МГУ им. М. В. Ломоносова. Исторический факультет: <http://www.hist.msu.ru/Science/Conf/lomweb01/savchen.htm> (дата обращения: 09. 11. 2014).

³⁵ Apud А. И. Суворов, указ. соч., с. 59.

³⁶ Г. В. Набатов, *Нижегородская организация социалистов-революционеров* [Nizhny Novgorod Organization of Socialist Revolutionaries], in *История Нижегородского края*: <http://www.hist.nnov.ru/history/partis/11.html> (дата обращения: 09. 11. 2014).

преступления, по сути – террористические акты. Например, в северных уездах Витебской губернии совершались диверсии на железной дороге³⁷.

Происходили столкновения на национальной почве, и именно войска после соответствующего обращения гражданских властей пресекали или предотвращали их. Яркий пример тому – события в апреле 1903 г. в Кишиневе, когда после запоздалого обращения бессарабского губернатора Р. С. Фон Раабена армия сумела прекратить еврейский погром и задержать его участников (следует отметить, что несколько сот погромщиков, принявших участие в убийствах и грабежах еврейского населения, были осуждены). Р. С. Фон Раабен, проявивший растерянность и не обеспечивший своевременное привлечение воинских подразделений для восстановления порядка, был отправлен в отставку.

В ноябре 1905 г. минский губернатор П. Г. Курлов в специальном циркуляре предупредил полицейские власти об ответственности в случае „допущения погромов ... еврейских...” и непринятия „...предупредительных мер...”³⁸. Когда осенью 1905 г. в городе Белосток Гродненской губернии стали циркулировать слухи о предстоящем еврейском погроме, местные военные власти издали специальное постановление. В нем указывалось, что „всякая попытка произвести какой-либо беспорядок, будет подавлена самым беспощадным образом и что войска и полиция ..., всегда будут стоять на стороне порядка, не различая партий и национальностей”.³⁹

В июне 1906 г. еврейские погромы в Белостоке все же начались, вызвав столкновения погромщиков с вооруженными боевыми дружинами Бунда. В этой ситуации войска 6-го армейского корпуса пресекли и погромы, и столкновения⁴⁰.

Офицерство осознавало всю важность возложенной на армию миссии по защите населения. Как писал в своей статье участник тех событий, „защита населения от всякого насилия, от всякого посягательства на

³⁷ *Дело о наряде войск в помощь полиции, в связи с волнениями среди крестьян Витебской губернии* [The issue of distribution of army troops in order to support the police, in connection with unrests amongst peasants from Vitebsk province], Национальный исторический архив Беларуси (*infra* НИАБ), фонд 1430, оп. 2, д. 3786, л. 241, 242.

³⁸ *Циркуляры Департамента полиции о принятии мер по борьбе с революционным движением* [The Police Department Circulars on measures taken against the revolutionary movement], НИАБ, фонд 295, оп. 1, д. 7507, л. 35 об.

³⁹ *О введении в городе Белостоке военного положения* [On the Introduction of Martial Law in the city of Bialystok], Литовский государственный исторический архив (*infra* ЛГИА), фонд 378, 1905 г., д. 46, л. 75.

⁴⁰ „Разведчик” [The Scout], 1906, № 821, с. 551-552.

чужую жизнь, здоровье и достояние составляет священную обязанность армии". При этом он подчеркивал: „Не может быть различия, чьи жизни или имущество мы защищаем от насилия или разгрома. Для армии в России не может быть ни эллина, ни иудея, каждый гражданин нашего государства имеет полное право требовать от нас защиты и помощи..."⁴¹.

В-третьих, использование армии в целях восстановления порядка определялось законодательством. Командующие войсками военных округов, в случае обращения к ним за содействием гражданских властей были обязаны выделять необходимые силы. Иными словами, поступал приказ, не выполнить который офицеры не имели права.

Со времен революции и до наших дней в адрес армии высказываются обвинения в необоснованном применении оружия против участников событий 1905 – 1907 гг. Подобные заявления, однако, не соответствуют исторической действительности: использование оружия при подавлении беспорядков строго регламентировалось *Правилами о призыве войск для содействия гражданским властям*. Воинские части привлекались для наведения порядка лишь в случаях „недостаточности местных полицейских сил". До принятия этой меры гражданские власти были обязаны употребить для прекращения беспорядков все имевшиеся в их распоряжении средства „...и даже по прибытии вызванных войск сделать толпе последнее увещание". Только в случае безуспешности этого увещания гражданские власти уполномочивали „начальника военной команды принять меры к прекращению беспорядков". Тот, однако, не был обязан „немедленно приступить к действию оружием", а поступал „...по своему усмотрению всеми теми способами, которые признает соответствующими положению дела, прибегая и к увещаниям...". Если это не помогало, то в случае принятия решения использовать силу оружия, участники беспорядков трижды предупреждались об этом специальными сигналами. „По соблюдению всех этих условий..." неповинующиеся считались „достаточно предупрежденными", и, если и после этого беспорядки не прекращались, мог открываться огонь. То есть, оружие применялось только тогда, „когда никакими другими способами не представится возможным прекратить беспорядки"⁴².

Приведем несколько примеров. В октябре 1905 г. во Владивостоке произошел бунт запасных нижних чинов, недовольных тем, что их не выпустили по домам. Пьяная толпа начала грабить магазины и торговые

⁴¹ С. Глинский, *Честь или позор* [Honor or Disgrace], in „Разведчик" [The Scout], 1906, № 834, с. 753.

⁴² „Разведчик" [The Scout], 1906, № 801, с. 150.

заведения, разгромила базар. Бесчинства сопровождалась поджогами зданий, в результате чего „сгорела лучшая часть города”. Как отмечала пресса, беспорядки „приняли большие размеры потому, что власти, руководясь гуманными побуждениями, пытались прекратить их, не пуская в ход оружие”⁴³.

Как уже отмечалось выше, в ноябре 1905 г. произошло вооруженное выступление нескольких инженерных подразделений в Киеве. Вооруженная толпа численностью до тысячи человек двигалась по улицам, пытаясь присоединить к себе другие части и подразделения. Военное командование сосредоточило необходимые силы для противодействия восставшим, однако, оружие было решено, не применять: в результате столкновения могли пострадать жители города. Казакам, преградившим путь толпе на одной из улиц, во избежание кровопролития, было приказано пропустить ее. Представители военного командования, в том числе, командир 21-го армейского корпуса генерал-лейтенант Л. Л. Драке неоднократно пытались убедить солдат прекратить беспорядки и вернуться в казармы, но их усилия были напрасны. Когда восставшие подошли к казармам 45-го пехотного Азовского полка, сохранившего верность присяге и отказавшегося присоединиться к восстанию, из рядов мятежников прозвучали выстрелы в сторону пехотинцев. Только после этого были произведены три ответных залпа, завязалась перестрелка⁴⁴.

В ноябре 1905 г. начались волнения в одном из резервных батальонов в Ташкенте. После прибытия вызванных для восстановления порядка войск восставшим было предложено сложить оружие, однако они открыли огонь по правительственным силам. Ответный огонь побудил мятежников скрыться в казармах и вскоре сдаться⁴⁵.

В случаях, когда в бесчинствах участвовало гражданское население, офицеры оказывались в особенно сложной этической ситуации. Представляется, что именно этим обстоятельством вызывалась их нерешительность и ожидание указаний свыше в случаях, когда приходилось действовать против разношерстной толпы. Видимо, подметив эту тенденцию, командующий войсками Виленского военного округа генерал-лейтенант К. Ф. Кршивицкий в своем приказе указал, что подобное поведение демонстрирует „...боязнь взять на себя решение или даже растерянность испрашивающего приказаний”. В этой связи командующий потребовал „... в действиях войск, и особенно в случаях применения оружия... быстроты и

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 1905, № 788, с. 896.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, с. 896-897.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 1906, № 797, с. 71.

решительности, без которых присутствие войск на местах беспорядков ведет лишь...к развитию самих беспорядков..."⁴⁶.

Бывали трагические случаи, когда офицеры погибали от рук участников беспорядков, пытаясь предотвратить столкновение между ними и войсками.

Между тем, сдержанная реакция военнослужащих порождала у нападавших чувство безнаказанности: отмечен ряд случаев, когда в воинские колонны и караульные помещения бросали ручные гранаты или когда из толпы по солдатам и офицерам открывался огонь. Чаще всего в войска бросали камни, грязь, кололи лошадей булавками, плевали солдатам в лицо и т. п., причем как действовать в подобных ситуациях, закон не определял. Так произошло, например, в „кровавое воскресенье” 9 января 1905 года, когда под влиянием революционной агитации примерно 140 тыс. жителей города пытались пройти к Зимнему дворцу, чтобы вручить императору свою петицию. Следует отметить, что законодательство того времени не предусматривало права подачи монарху петиций кем бы то ни было, кроме представителей дворянства. Более того, в соответствии с законом авторы петиций должны были привлекаться к ответственности.

Уже в наши дни Синодальная комиссия по канонизации святых (образована постановлением Священного Синода в 1989 г. согласно решению Поместного Собора Русской Православной Церкви 1988 г.), провела расследование событий 9 января. На основе ее материалов были сделаны следующие выводы: полицейские власти, „загнав себя в тупик принятым на совещании 8 января решением о разрешении массовых шествий рабочих на окраинах города и о недопущении их в центр, ... уже утром 9 января утратили контроль над ситуацией в столице...”. При этом даже не был назначен официальный представитель для приема петиции, хотя это могло в определенной мере разрядить обстановку (самого императора в столице не было, он находился в Царском Селе). „В результате лишь совершенно не подготовленные к борьбе с массовыми выступлениями гражданского населения воинские части оказались вынужденными противостоять шествию рабочих”. При этом военное командование считало, что переговоры с рабочими будут вестись представителями гражданских и полицейских властей. Переговоров, однако, не было, и многочисленные толпы, пренебрегая требованиями армейских командиров, проявляя открытую агрессию в отношении

⁴⁶ Приказ войскам Виленского военного округа № 18 [Order of the Vilna Military District, No 18], in *ibid.*, 1906, № 797, с. 71.

войсковых подразделений, стремились к центру города. В результате „...воинские части, лишь выполняя имевшийся у них приказ не пропускать рабочих в центр города, вынуждены были повсеместно после троекратных предупреждений открывать огонь по игнорировавшим их требования рабочим. ... В сложившихся условиях ожидать от связанных присягой и приказом воинских частей каких-либо иных действий было бы совершенно немыслимо”⁴⁷.

Безусловно, вина в трагических событиях того дня лежит и на офицерах, отдававших распоряжения, однако в гораздо меньшей степени, чем на председателе кабинета министров С. Ю. Витте, правительстве и министерстве внутренних дел, не предпринявших должных мер для поддержания порядка и предотвращения столкновений. Весьма значительную роль в трагедии сыграли политические силы, своей агитацией подготовившие шествие, и своими действиями провоцировавшие столкновения между войсками и демонстрантами.

Количество погибших в столкновениях с войсками гражданских лиц в 1905 – 1907 гг. достоверно установить вряд ли возможно. Например, вопрос о числе жертв в ходе небывалых по масштабам событий 9 января 1905 г. и поныне является предметом разногласий. В источниках приводятся различные цифры: от 130 убитых и умерших от ран в официальных документах до 2-3 тысяч погибших в зарубежной прессе. Представляется, что наиболее достоверными являются следующие данные: погибших – от 150 до 200 человек, раненых – от 450 до 800⁴⁸.

Данные о том, сколько было жертв в ходе других столкновений между войсками и протестующими, отсутствуют. Известно лишь, что войска для восстановления порядка вызывались многократно. Так, в течение 1905 г. армейские подразделения вызывались гражданскими властями 3893 раза. Сколько раз при этом применялось оружие, неизвестно, как неизвестно количество погибших. Известно, однако, что в 1903 г. в Кавказском военном округе оружие применялось 18 раз, при этом было убито 17 человек и ранено 62. Потери среди военнослужащих – 1 убитый и 51 раненый⁴⁹.

⁴⁷ Император Николай II и события 9 января 1905 года в Санкт – Петербурге [Emperor Nicholas II and the Events of January 9, 1905 in St.-Petersburg], in “Православная газета”, 2003, № 32: <http://orthodox.etel.ru/2003/32/nikolaj.shtml> (дата обращения: 16. 11. 2014).

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ В. А. Петров, *Царская армия в борьбе с массовым революционным движением в начале XX в.* [Imperial Army in the Fight against the Mass-Revolutionary Movement,

Столкновения протестующих граждан с пехотными частями часто влекли за собой человеческие жертвы: оружием пехотинцев были винтовки со штыком, которые и применялись в случае неповиновения. Поэтому местные власти в лице губернаторов, а также представители министерства внутренних дел в случае массовых волнений и беспорядков предпочитали вызывать кавалерию, чаще сего, казаков. На разгон митингов, демонстраций, пикетов и т. п. они обычно направлялись без огнестрельного оружия. Против протестующих использовались, как правило, только нагайки, являвшиеся частью экипировки и предназначавшиеся для того, чтобы подстегивать коня. Такой нагайкой можно было нанести оглушающий удар, но не более того. Но даже нагайки использовались далеко не всегда, так как обычно толпа обращалась в бегство от одного вида несущейся со свистом, улюлюканьем и гиком казачьей конницы.

Объективность требует констатировать: в периоды открытого вооруженного противоборства, как это происходило, например, во время декабрьского восстания 1905 г. в Москве, были случаи расстрела лиц, у которых в момент задержания находили оружие. Вполне возможно и то, что иной раз страдали невинные люди.

Отметим, однако, что, подобный самосуд в офицерской среде осуждался. Во второй половине 1906 г., в разгар революции, когда по всей стране происходили вооруженные выступления популярный в офицерской среде журнал „Разведчик” опубликовал статью, посвященную проблеме участия офицеров в борьбе с революцией. В числе прочего, в ней порицалось насилие по отношению к невинным, или даже виновным, но обезоруженным. „Такие поступки, совершенные офицерами, должны иметь своим неизбежным последствием придание виновного суду общества офицеров, как за поступок явно несовместимый с понятием о воинской чести – доблести офицерского звания. Здесь лучше быть слишком строгим...”. Статья призывала офицеров не предаваться чувству мести и озлоблению, несмотря ни на какие преступления, совершаемые против военнослужащих, включая „жестокие и бессмысленные смертоубийства из-за угла”. Подчеркивалось, что армия должна действовать беспристрастно, „...лишь для государственной пользы, а отнюдь не из личных целей и побуждений”⁵⁰.

in the Early Twentieth Century], in “Исторические записки” [Historical notes], 1950, т. 34, с. 325.

⁵⁰ С. Глинский, *Честь или позор* [Honor or Disgrace], с. 753.

Судя по откликам на эту статью, она отразила мнение большинства офицерского состава Русской армии.

Заключение

В ходе событий 1905-1907 гг. армейское офицерство, за исключением отдельных лиц, не поддержало революцию. Соответствовала ли такая позиция интересам народа и государства – предмет отдельного и чрезвычайно непростого исследования, в большей степени относящегося к философии. В то же время, очевидным является тот факт, что, сохраняя верность присяге, офицеры находились в первых рядах тех, кто противостоял политическому насилию и экстремизму, широко распространенному в России в начале XX столетия. Тем самым офицерство способствовало восстановлению общественного порядка в стране, участвовало в защите жизни, имущества и достоинства граждан, вносило элементы стабильности в российское общество в целом.

UNVEILING THE PRIVATE LIFE OF THE 18th CENTURY. A DIVORCE ACT OF 1795

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Rezumat: Dezvelind viața privată a secolului XVIII. Un act de divorț din 1795

Această notă exploatează conținutul unui document extrem de important, aflat în Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova. Informațiile sale valoroase completează perspectiva asupra vieții private de la sfârșitul secolului al XVIII-lea. Studiul de caz – care face obiectul articolului – se bazează pe un act de divorț din anul 1795. El prezintă nu doar legislația din epocă, ci și particularitățile poziției sociale și juridice deținute de femei. Cu alte cuvinte, în acest articol sunt identificate noi aspecte de viață privată, care pot fi analizate atât din punctul de vedere al mentalităților, cât și din cel al raporturilor de gen.

Abstract: *The paper exploits the content of a very important document, found in the National Archives of the Republic of Moldova. Its valuable information enhances the insight into the private life of the late eighteenth century. The case study – which is the subject of the article – is based on a divorce act of 1795. It shows not only the law of the time, but also the particularities of the social and legal position held by women. In other words, this article identifies new aspects of private life, which can be analyzed both in terms of mentalities and that of gender relations.*

Résumé: Dévoilant la vie privée du XVIII-ème siècle. Un acte de divorce de 1795

La note ci-jointe exploite le contenu d'un document extrêmement important, qui se trouve aux Archives Nationales de la République Moldavie. Ses informations valeureuses complètent la perspective sur la vie privée de la fin du XVIII-ème siècle. L'étude de cas – qui fait l'objet de la note ci-jointe – est basée sur un acte de divorce de l'année 1795. Celle-ci ne présente pas seulement la législation de cette époque-là, mais aussi les particularités de la position sociale et juridique que les femmes détenaient. En d'autres termes, on y identifie de nouveaux aspects de vie privée, qu'on peut analyser du point de vue des mentalités, mais aussi de celui de rapports de genre.

Keywords: *women's position in the society, laws and customs, legislation, divorce, physical separation, dowry, royal decision, private life.*

The recent research in the National Archives of Republic of Moldova has led to the disclosure of an extremely important document¹, since its prominence

¹National Archives of Republic of Moldova, F. 220.R.1. D.642. Original. Mihai Suțu ruled from 30 December 1792 to 25 April 1795. The mentioned document is authentic, with its original seals. See L. Zabolotnaia, *Un document necunoscut despre viața*

stands out both historically, and in terms of its content, due to the valuable information it provides on the aspects of private life. It is an act of divorce dating from 1795. As a social fact, the divorce in Moldova of the XVIIIth pondered a very discreet perception, which would not be really publicly displayed. The dissolution of marriage was a complicated and complex process that had attached to it various rules, habits and religious customs. Because at that time the marital union (marriage) was being considered as one of the seven mysteries of the Church, it could be solved only by the Church authorities. The marital institution has kept its religious feature all along the years. This highly sensitive issue compelled the members of the family to keep the divorce secret. Nevertheless, in cases where the dissolution of the marriage could not be peacefully completed, the spouses had to appeal to the Princely Court.

This paper presents two documents: the letter addressed to the ruler of the Moldova Principality, Mihai Suțu, dated 26 April 1795, and “the demand”² (*porunca*) addressed to the Lord Justice of the *Second Department*, which contained the stipulation concerning the solution of the conflict between (*sulgerul*) Alexandru Hrisoverghi and his wife, who followed the papers for the divorce process: “With the grace of Lord, one’s majesty, (voevoda), Mihail Constantin Sutsu, the ruler of the Moldavian Principality. Rendering the report in question (*anafora*)³, to my Peers, scouring for enquiry of the governors from the Second Department (Court of appeal), one resolves that after finding the right way according to thy and the sacred council of the Lord’s Metropolitan priest, as one is a true disciple of the holy rules (*pravile*), for the defendant (*sulger*) to be separated from his wife for a year”⁴. This divorce proceeding has reached the Princely Court after thorough investigation by the Church Tribunal, “through the sacred council” and “through the secular council of the noblemen”⁵.

Firstly, the noteworthy fact in this procedure is the princely decision, which implied, not the immediate divorce but a temporary separation. It is nevertheless prominent to mention that the “physical separation from the bed and table”, cannot be assimilated to the marriage itself, as the spouses lived together anyway. Thus, despite officially declared separated (mostly physically), the husband and wife would still stay that way. In case the real reasons of the disunion were foregone, the two could retake any time their wedlock⁶. This sort of convention of disunion was regarded more or less as a “last chance to keep the family together”. However, after the genuine detachment of the marital union,

privată. Un act de divorț [An unknown document about privacy. A divorce act], in „Revista de istorie a Moldovei”, 3 (71), Chișinău, 2007, p. 86-92.

²*Porunca* – decision, disposal, order.

³*Anafora* – official proclamation addressed to a royal/princely figure (filed by a senior governor/lord).

⁴National Archives of Republic of Moldova, F. 220. R.1. D.642.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ Vasile Chirvaiu, *Dreptul matrimonial* [Matrimonial Law], vol. III, Oradea, 1933, p. 399-400.

the side effects were far worse. The unbinding of the family reflected at that point was irreversible.

Secondly, the ruler decides, along the “physical separation” period, on the keeping, of the wife's dowry after the list of the dowry goods (*izvod*)⁷ and of all the gifts the husband might have given to her during the marriage. As for the social insurance of the lady, a particular person was to be appointed for this charge. One is to make a conveyance (*teslim*)⁸ to the governor in question, “one which is to be chosen by us, as to be careful and reliable”. “Distinguished lords, as you surely comply with sacred rules, one has already found a way and chosen the right Lord (stolnic) Ion Carpu, as he is honest and honorable, and is related with the defendant's (sulger) wife, so he will take care of her, of her lands, dowry, goods, both variable and fixed, and so he will be able to look after her and ensure her well-being (pofitaxi)”⁹. Hence the decision in question, one may safely deduce the idea that women were to be socially protected.

According to the historical sources, it is well-confirmed that the defendant has to register all his wife's goods and revenues, including the gifts given during the marital union. On the engagement day, the parents of the daughter decided upon the dowry. However, all the necessary paperwork concerning the dowry was to be realized on the wedding eve, “with all the relatives of the groom”. The dowry had a specific meaning for the wife, as it belonged to her solely and she was its exclusive master. The gains and the goods she would have received from the sale of parts of the dowry, were also concerned (as in they would all belong to her)¹⁰. The dowry and the wedding gifts would be lost only if the wife had been acknowledged guilty of adultery, indecent manners (drunken), malice, lack of prudence, waste of wealth and incompetence of the household sustenance, or if the wife was not a virgin on the wedding night¹¹.

In Moldova, according to the customs and “the land patronage” from the Middle Ages period, the dowry belonged only to the wife and the husband did not have any rights at all over her property: he could not sell it, alienate it or pledge it¹². The

⁷ *Izvod* – dowry paperwork filed in the presence of witnesses.

⁸ *Teslim* – conveyance, transmission.

⁹ *Pofitaxi* – to ensure.

¹⁰ Șarolta Solcan, *Femeile din Moldova, Transilvania și Țara Românească în Evul Mediu* [Women in Moldavia, Transylvania and Wallachia in the Middle Ages], București, 2005, p. 35-36.

¹¹ Lilia Zabolotnaia, *Dreptul femeilor la divorț în Moldova Medievală (secolele XVI- XVII)* [Women's Right to Divorce in Medieval Moldova (XVI-XVII Centuries)], in „*TYRAGETIA*”, XIV, Chișinău, 2005, p.148-154.

¹² Idem, *Situația femeilor din Moldova în evul mediu. Imaginea, statutul social, drepturile și obligații (sec. al XVI-lea - mijlocul sec. al XVII-lea)* [The Situation of Women in Moldova in the Middle Ages. Image, Social Status, Rights and Obligations (XVI – mid XVII Centuries)], în *ROMANIA: A Crossroads of Europe*. The Center for Romanian Studies. Iași -Oxford -Palm Beach -Portland, 2002, p. 43-57.

document that serves as a confirmation-basis of the wife's rights on her dowry is the *Calimachi Code*. Despite the fact that it has been printed in 1817, it is a document of high significance, since it has been constituted according to the Moldovan laws and customs. A worth-mentioning record is *Chapter 31, on marital contracts*, which reflects the legal situation on the matter, as in with regards to the position of the wife and her dowry:

§ 1610.:

1. *The husband is not to be entitled to the wife's dowry, or its revenues.*

2. *The husband is to guarantee the dowry's safety-net.*

§ 1639. The husband is indebted:

a) *To conserve the dowry as a wise provident.*

b) *Not to alienate it or to constitute a mortgage of it.*

§ 1649. *One is to return the dowry after the disunion of the wedding, due to decease or other reasons. Also, the content of the dowry and its revenues, both variable and multiplied, received before the wedding and after its dissolution, with their real value; in case of outgoings, one is to reimburse their equivalent both in quantity and quality*¹³.

From the entire above mentioned, one could not reasonably establish: the real motives of the divorce (*pricinii dihonii*)¹⁴. It is nevertheless worth mentioning that the wife was never guilty. The Justice/Court gave always to consider on the possible solutions of the conflict, for instance the reconciliation of the spouses during the year, which might have led to the possibility for the „husband to go back to the wedlock with his wife”. This, in effect, induces the fact that it has always been the husband's initiative.

A remarkable fact in the matter is the respectful manner in which the woman was treated: she would behold to her property during the „physical separation” and in case of divorce, she would be safeguarded by a specific person in charge of her representation in court, appointed by the magistrates.

In a male-dominated society, the women were usually presented in the background of the male activity. They were respected and appreciated as long as they were protected by a man (father, brother, husband). But as the matter of a divorce was disclosed, her social status would radically change, the society would normally turn its back on her, converting her in defenseless person with no rights. The document in question is enormously valuable as it allows a profound study of the private life from multiple points of view: legal, social, but especially moral.

¹³ *Codul Calimach (1817)*, Andrei Rădulescu critical edition, București, 1958, p. 555, 557, 561, 565, 567.

¹⁴ *Dihonie* – disagreement, conflict.

**REFLECTING UPON THE HISTORY OF BUKOVINA
IN TERMS OF DIPLOMATIC SOURCES**

In addition to their multiple tasks, the consulates and embassies have the mission to inform national authorities on the processes that mark the evolution of internal and foreign policy of the state of residence. To a researcher, the reports, notes, evaluations and other documents drawn up by the staff of the diplomatic institutions are valuable sources, on one hand, regarding the respective state. On the other hand, those documents reflect the way diplomatic services or the signatories saw matters, bring to light the intuition, insight, and objectivity of the authors' memoirs, or clichés and the preconceived approaches that sometimes defiled reality.

During the inter-war years Chernivtsi used to be a city of many diplomatic institutions of some states that considered the region politically, economically, culturally or geopolitically important: Poland, Great Britain, Austria, Germany, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and France. A series of reports, notes, and correspondence that belong to a few consular institutions of Bukovina were included in the volume of documents, entitled *Bukovina: National Movements and Sociopolitical Processes in the Years 1918-1944. The Diplomats Perspective (Documents)*¹, published with the financial support of the Government of the Federal Province of Carinthia (Austria). The two coordinators - Volodymyr Zapolovskyi and Serhii Osachuk - were, at the time of publication, researchers at the Bukovinian Research Centre of the National University, known in Ukrainian and German historiography for their lead volumes about the past of Bukovina during the Austrian period and the military events recorded in the province territory during the First World War.

¹ В. М. Заполовський, С. Д. Осачук (упор.), *Буковина: національні рухи та соціально-політичні процеси 1918-1944 рр. Погляд дипломатів (Документи)* [Bukovina: National Movements and Sociopolitical Processes in the Years 1918-1944. The Diplomats Perspective (Documents)], Чернівці, Зелена Буковина, 2007, 228 с.

The sources gathered in those more than 200 pages of the collection had been obtained from different people (researchers, ambassadors, academics, archivists), a rather vulnerable method, in terms of extensiveness, of data collection from documents dated between the wars by the representatives of the Bukovina Consular offices. A systematic review of the diplomatic archives in Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, France etc. will definitely reveal an impressive number of new sources which will obviously contribute to a better understanding of the province history and consular officials' perceptions on the issues analyzed.

The above-mentioned volume of documents has been structured into five chapters which are unequal lengthwise due to the number of documents that the editors managed to acquire, *Introduction* and *Geographic Index*. The book contains a few past and contemporary photographs of persons and buildings, reproductions of documents from the Polish, Czech and Swiss Consulates in Chernivtsi. Each chapter, containing data that belongs to a diplomatic institution, organizes documents chronologically. They have been translated into Ukrainian (there are no documents reproduced in the original language) and the volume coordinators entered footnotes containing brief comments or notes.

The first chapter of the volume contains two reports prepared by the representatives of the Austrian Embassy in Bucharest, the first one in 1923, and the other one in 1930. The first one informs Vienna that the foreign ministers of Romania and of the USSR reached an "understanding" which provides that, in exchange for Bucharest giving up the National Bank treasure, which was used by the Bolsheviks in the Soviet interest and, therefore, could not be recovered, the USSR renounces its claims over Bessarabia. The author expresses his doubts to the fact that such renunciation of Romania would be, in the long term, sufficient to defend its eastern border. The second report addressed to the Federal Chancellor, addresses as well the Bessarabian matter. The Austrian diplomat presents the positions of the government and of the opposition in the matters of the province between Prut and Dniester, emphasizing the deficiencies of the Romanian administration and identifying solutions to remedy the situation, but which he classifies as unfeasible with reference to the political class and the Romanian economic reality. He also discusses the Soviet factor and assesses the chances of a war between the USSR and Romania, presenting the views of the governing power and of the

opposition on this issue, and analyses the strengthening measures of the Romanian military capacity, as well as the Bucharest government demarches delivered to the cabinets in Paris and London, as well as the Warsaw negotiations on increasing the resistance potential against Moscow's expanding influence and military capabilities in the Black Sea.

The second chapter, the largest, brings together documents issued by the Polish General Consulate in Chernivtsi. The first document, representing the Declaration of the Polish National Council in Bukovina (P.N.C.B.), made public at the General Council of Bukovina on November 28, 1918, was taken from the Romanian National Archives² and reproduced in full. The original was issued in Polish (the volume published its translation into Ukrainian), containing the signatures of 12 members of the (P.N.C.B.) and on the back of the page the notary authentication of the signatures and qualities of each signatory. It also mentions: "Number of participants: 12 252", a number representing, probably, the total members of the P.N.C.B. in November 1918 or at the date of the last court of law registration. In the first part of the declaration, emphasizing that "the owner from time immemorial" of "the lands south of Dniester" was the Romanian people, the signatories stated: "We, the nowadays Poles living in Bukovina, based on secular grounds, deserve to be in this region by the right of the shed blood and bones of the Polish knights, scattered throughout this territory, alongside the recent graves of the heroic legions from the bloody days of this war". Welcoming "the holy day of resurrection of the united Romanian state" the Bukovinian Poles acknowledged "the ancient right of the Romanian people over the entire land south of Dniester, in general, and of Bukovina, in particular". However, the signatories accentuated the conditions expected to be put into practice by the Romanian administration: "The Bukovinian Poles, presenting the proof of their national vitality, grounded in the particular proposals of the present Bukovinian Government, unwaveringly trust that our friend the Romanian people will allow, within the Romanian state, the liberty of preservation of the Catholic faith, [use of] Polish language in churches and schools, free settlement, [exercise] professions and participations, sanctioned according to the law, to the ruling of the new province. "

² Central Historical Archives Department, *Presidency of the Council of Ministers* Fund, d. 17/1918, f. 27-28.

Many of the documents selected for publication in the volume, which were produced or intended for the Chernivtsi Polish Consulate, represent annual institutional reports (1922, 1928), instructions on coordinating the activity of the Polish representatives in Romania, syntheses about the situation in Bukovina, the communist movement, the matter of national minorities (with emphasis on the Ukrainian and German minorities), reflect the issue of conferences/ meetings of the Polish consuls in Romania, commercial trades, evaluate the establishment, mission and work of the Polish Inspectorate/ Committee for Physical Education in Romania. An important issue for the consular institution was the relationship with the Polish ethnic group in Bukovina, the subject being addressed by the reports on Polish Gymnastic Society "Sokół", Polish Scouts "Harcerstwo", Polish Academic Society "Lechia" as well as the Poland's Friends Society run, for that matter, by the Romanian academic Grigore Nandriș, known Slavicist and Polish speaker.

The third chapter presents 17 documents related to the Czechoslovakia Consulate in Chernivtsi. A first report briefly summarizes the activity of the Consulate from June to September 1921, and it reveals that on November 6, 1921 the capital of Bukovina used to have functioning Consulates of Great Britain, Austria, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The memorandum addressed to the Foreign Ministry in Prague, signed on 15 March 1924 by the Chernivtsian Jan Koutny revealed that the Czechoslovak minority had got organized since 1920 in an apolitical association entitled the "Masaryk Circle", which initially enjoyed the support of the Czechoslovak consuls, an attitude that changed with the appointment of the vice-consul Borovec. Some documents refer to the way Czechoslovakia was represented in the local press, the position of various Bukovina periodicals towards this state, the Consulate involvement in promoting a positive image and in reducing the number of articles criticizing the country it represented.

One of the major issues was related to the transformation of the institution into an Honorary Consulate and the appointment of a suitable person among the Bukovinians to fill this position. Along with the closure of the Consulate in Chernivtsi (1932) the problems of Bukovina became a matter of the Czechoslovakia Consulate in Galati. The Honorary Consul Robert German was concerned about granting the name of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Czechoslovakia's president (1918-1935), to a street in Chernivtsi, and the situation of the Polish and Czechoslovakian community. The authors of the

collection also published the Slovaks statement of Poiana Micului, Campulung County, addressed to the Minister of Religion and Arts in Bucharest, which presented the way Polish officials, were being treated in the county and in Chernivtsi. There are also two letters of the honorary consul Robert German to Professor Rudolf Kovalik, which include information as to the relation that must be followed by the Slovaks in dealings with the Polish community and the Romanian authorities.

Three documents presented in the fourth chapter of this volume are written by Nicolas Künzle, Swiss consular agent, and dated 1941, 1943, and, respectively, 1944. The first one is the memoir written by Nicolas Künzle on January 20, 1941, and contains his reports on the experience in the Soviet Chernivtsi, from 28 June to 18 December 1940. The author describes in detail the atmosphere set up by the Soviet regime, the local's fear of the communist authorities, the repressions against intellectuals and the bourgeoisie, the economic, social and cultural situation in the first months of Bolshevik "heaven". The other two letters, dated 1943 and 1944, reflect the consular agent's fear of living again under the communist regime. He reports on the Bukovinians refuge and the evacuation preparations from the capital of Bukovina, asking his superiors to send him the recall notification in time.

The last chapter brings together six documents made under the French Consular Agency in Chernivtsi. Two letters express the need to establish a consular agency in Chernivtsi, to find a suitable person for the position of consular representative, as well as a building for the future institution which, the (unknown) author of the letter says, should not be second to those of the Austrian, Polish and British consulates. The next document, from 1922, refers to difficulties in the development of some trade relations between France and Bukovina, and two others contain the French ambassador's request, dated at the beginning of 1939, asking to receive detailed monthly reports on the situation in Bukovina, including data on the activity of national minorities, as well as the thank you letter of the French ambassador addressed to the consular agent for his brilliantly well-organized transit of the French citizens, refugees from the Nazi- and Soviet-occupied Poland in September 1939. The last document is a letter sent from Bucharest to Paris, dated October 5, 1940, which contains the Romanian authorities' proposal to (re)establish the French Consular Agency in Suceava – the "new capital of Bukovina", to replace the closed one in Chernivtsi.

Summarizing the information contained in this volume, we must note that the scientific value of the documents is undeniable, as they bring to light many aspects and unpublished data. Although this selection of primary sources was not based on strictly scientific criteria, the original documents before translation were not published, and the number of documents related to consular institutions in Chernivtsi is quite small and cannot, therefore, accurately reflect the multivalent work of the consular staff and cannot reproduce the complex picture of the evolution of the Bukovinian society in the interwar time period, the editing of the volume coordinated by Volodymyr Zapolovskyi and Serhii Osachuk represents an important contribution to a better understanding of the history of the province and offers researchers new sources to support the decrypting process of the Bukovinian phenomenon.

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